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Abstract 
The thesis explores the feminist arguments against pornography and 
attempts to explain the nature of the problems involved in 
pornography in present day Western liberal society. It explicates the 
senses in which pornography is said to conflict with women's equality 
and liberty, partly drawing on philosophy of language, but also taking 
an approach inspired by a Wittgensteinian (or also referred to as the 
"Background") view of social practices. 
It is my contention that the earlier feminist critiques of pornography 
have not fully resolved the question of the social status, or social 
significance, of pornographic speech - an issue frequently raised by 
the feminists' critics. Thus, the thesis seeks to explain this social 
meaning of pornography, by examining its background social context, 
which ultimately gives sense and significance to individual speech. 
The Wittgensteinian perspective on social life would seem to provide 
a useful conceptual tool for this purpose. 
Contrary to the prevailing assumptions, the thesis claims that the 
pornographer in contemporary liberal society has an "authoritative" 
character; he is "authoritative" in the sense that his role embodies 
certain distinctive values and norms of society. Presently, women's_ 
social and political subordination is partly, but importantly, due to 
these shared ideas, norms, and practices. The thesis hence calls for our 
critical engagement with pornography, as well as with the norms 
which it reflects, in order to effect changes in the present day way of 
life. 
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Introduction 
In the opening paragraph of her book, Pornography: Men Possessing 
Women, Andrea Dworkin declared that the book is "about the 
meaning of pornography and the system of power in which 
pornography exists" (Dworkin, 1981: 9). My primary aim in this 
thesis is similarly to explain the meaning and problems of 
pornographic speech in contemporary Western liberal society. For 
decades, feminists who campaigned against pornography argued that 
pornography is a harmful speech that subordinates, and silences, 
women. The thesis explores and expands these feminist claims; it 
contends that pornography may indeed be said to be subordinating and 
silencing speech. It, however, also provides an alternative explanation 
of these issues, which would address the questions that have not been 
adequately answered by previous feminist analyses. 
Hitherto the influential feminist criticisms of pornography explicated 
its significance by crucially locating its role within the overall system 
of male dominance, or by demonstrating the nature or function of 
individual speech. The arguments offered here seek to surmount the 
limitations posed by these analyses. Although the thesis does examine 
the nature of language and applies this knowledge to the issue of 
pornography, it also critically attends to the relevance of the social 
context that surrounds individual speech and action, and to the 
intricate way in which pornography, other everyday norms and 
practices, and women's subordination come to be connected. 
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Dworkin and her collaborator, Catharine MacKinnon, so-called 
"radical feminists", waged a high profile campaign against 
pornography in the 1980s. Their relentless work, and a proposal to 
introduce an anti-pornography civil rights ordinance in the cities of 
Minneapolis and Indianapolis, spurred a further controversy over the 
issue of pornography. In practice, the debate over the problems of 
pornography often focuses on empirical and causal harms of 
pornography. The reason is that, within a certain dominant liberal 
tradition, it is thought that an evidence of such empirical harms would 
possibly count as the strongest reason against permitting the 
production and consumption of pornography. An opposition coming 
from feminists thus contended that pornography harms women in 
general; not to mention the exploitation of women working in the 
industry, the evil of pornography is said to be that it influences men to 
adopt misogynistic attitudes and causes many kinds of sexual violence, 
intimidation, and harassment. The difficulty with this harm argument, 
however, is that there has been no conclusive empirical evidence 
which demonstrates the causal connection between pornography and 
these various harms. Evidence to prove such causality appears to be, 
to date, still subject to disagreements. 
In recent years, however, there have been some attempts to illuminate 
the problems of pornography from the viewpoint of the philosophy of 
language. From a linguistic perspective, Jennifer Hornsby and Rae 
Langton provided, what may be called, a "constitutive argument" 
against pornography. In many respects, the "constitutive argument`9 
aims to overcome the limitations of the causal harm. argument in 
accounting for the nature of the problems involved in pornography. 
Drawing on J. L. Austin's speech act theory in particular, Hornsby and 
Langton explain the sense in which women are subordinated and 
silenced by pornography. Langton expounds MacKinnon's earlier 
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argument and argues that pornography's speech acts "constitute" 
subordination of women. Hornsby and Langton similarly maintain that 
women's speech acts are "silenced", or prevented from "counting as" 
the acts they intend, because of the social conditions created by 
pornography. 
My objective in this thesis is also to approach the issue of 
pornography from the perspective of speech act theory. I will assess 
and develop Langton's and Hornsby's arguments, and defend their 
position against some opponents. Although speech act theory appears 
to illuminate some problems associated with pornography, there are 
also limitations to this approach. The problem is that, although it helps 
to explain certain constitutive aspects of speech, it falls short of 
explaining the social meaning, or social significance, of individual 
speech. This means that, even if pornography does consist of 
subordinating speech acts, we would still seem to be faced with a 
question about the social implications of these speech acts. Can 
pornographic views be considered legitimate in society? Does it have 
any efficacy to impose its views? Does the pornographer, in other 
words, have any authority as regards matters concerning sex and 
women? Langton's speech act analysis of pornography in fact 
acknowledges the importance of the issue of authority. She thinks that 
the claim that pornography subordinates women is contingent upon 
the status of pornographers in society. Yet, this is a question she 
leaves unaddressed in her analysis. 
The question of the authoritative nature of pornography is in fact a 
very contentious point in the debate over pornography, and potentially 
a very critical point that would underlie the overall feminist argument 
against pornography. Critics of feminists tend to dismiss any social 
significance of pornography (and hence the problems attributed to it), 
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and, in my view, feminists have not yet responded to these critics 
satisfactorily. 
The thesis pursues this issue of authority; it aims to demonstrate the 
authoritative character of pornography in contemporary liberal society. 
In order to explain this social nature of pornography, I will 
supplement speech act analysis, by drawing resources from, what is 
called, the philosophy of the "Background". The concept of the 
"Background" is said to permeate much of twentieth century 
philosophy (Hekman, 1999: 122), but I am particularly indebted here 
to the thought of the later Wittgenstein and some feminist and 
communitarian thinkers. The idea of the "Background" is apparent, 
especially in Wittgenstein's notion of a "form of life". To put it very 
simply, the "Background" or "a form of life" refers to the social 
context, or social setting, of a particular speech and activity. But the 
idea emphasizes that every speech and activity is always integrated 
into, and part of, this wider social setting; its existence cannot be 
conceived in isolation from it. What the "Background" or "a form of 
life" signifies is the sets of understandings, norms, customs, and 
institutions of a particular society, which are already assumed and 
commonly shared by the members of society. It is said that- the 
meaning of individual speech and action within a society ultimately 
derives from, and depends on, such a shared framework; it is our 
practices, "the form of life", or the "Background", which give sense 
and significance to our speech and behaviour (e. g., Wittgenstein, 1967, 
1974,2001). 
I apply this idea of the "Background" to pornography to explain its 
social meaning. Indeed, the meaning of the'speech seems to become 
clearer once its social context is fully taken into account. I will argue 
that the role of the pornographer reflects, and embodies, certain 
distinctive values and norms of liberal society; it is because of its 
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capacity to exemplify some shared cultural norms of society that, I 
will argue, pornography is said to be "authoritative". Certain moral 
and cultural ideas of society are emblematically carried and expressed 
by the role of pornographer. I will also highlight and examine parts of 
the "Background" which give meaning and significance to the 
pornographic language-game. Attention to our everyday assumptions 
and practices in the "Background", I believe, will also enable us to 
understand better why women's speech acts may fail in certain 
contexts. 
My approach to the issue of the authority of pornography will 
significantly differ from other feminists, who attempted to explain the 
importance of pornography in terms of its role as a key practice in the 
system of male power and dominance. Although the presence of male 
power is an undeniable social fact, and pornography also reflects it, an 
explanation of this power is not necessarily an explanation of the 
authority of pornography; feminists who have focused on the aspect of 
power have not, in my view, fully accounted for the importance of this 
particular type of speech, nor the legitimacy or efficacy of the norm 
which it stipulates. In order to answer the sceptics, who question the 
signiflcance of pornographic norms in a society, which is formally 
committed to equality between the sexes, one would need to provide a 
more thorough explanation of the process in which the viewpoint of 
the powerful is said to become authoritative. I aim to offer a 
perspective on this issue from the theory of the 'ýBackground". 
I will also suggest that it is perhaps necessary to reconceptualise the 
relationship between male power and pornography; the right way to 
approach the issue might be here to explore, rather than to focus on 
the dimension of power, the aspect of the connectedness between 
pornography and other social values and norms, people's taken-for- 
granted, everyday assumptions and behaviours. Such a social practice 
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as pornography is maintained, and the power relation itself is 
reproduced through these only implicitly assumed but commonly 
shared values and norms. The collective consequences of people's 
following of certain shared norms and values can help to maintain the 
power and privilege of one social group and become a significant 
source of social inequality and hierarchy. 
Sometimes a concern is raised with regard to a "Background", or 
particularly Wittgensteinian, approach to the social sciences. It has 
been suggested that the view is associated with conservatism or 
relativism, and that it does not offer a means of criticizing existing 
cultures. Wittgenstein is in fact known for saying that our form of life 
is something that we need to "accept" as it is. For feminists who are 
concerned with the present state of the form of life, this implication is 
indeed worrying; although the understanding of our "Background" 
would seem to offer us an insight into the possibility and intelligibility 
of our speech and activities, it would not, so it appears, give us a 
means of evaluating or criticizing these existing practices. Here, we 
seem to have basically two alternatives; to accept this Wittgensteinian 
premise or reject it, and seek a basis of social critique elsewhere. in 
the final chapter, I will engage with the implication of this 
"Background" approach to the issue of pornography. Even accepting 
this Wittgensteinian premise, it appears that some forms of reasoned 
criticism are possible. From a broadly Wittgensteinian perspective, I 
will discuss different ways in which the feminists may assess and call 
into question the existing form of life. 
Thus, I will begin the thesis with speech act analysis of pornography 
(Chapter One). Langton argues that pornography. performs 
subordinating speech acts, if the pornographer, the speaker, has 
relevant authority in the sphere of sex. In contrast to Langton, I will 
argue that the speaker's authority is not necessary for the performance 
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of subordinating speech acts. After examining a version of speech act 
theory, I will make a case, albeit with some caution, that pornography 
can constitute subordinating speech, even without the condition of 
authority. Although pornography may perform subordinating speech 
acts this way, the issue of authority of pornography appears to remain 
relevant. I will attempt to explain the social meaning of pornography, 
i. e., its authoritative status, from the perspective of the philosophy of 
the "Background" (Chapter Two). I will continue this argument in 
Chapters Three and Four, examining the "Background" norms and 
values which are embodied by pornography. I will then turn, in 
Chapter Five, to Hornsby and Langton's argument on silencing of 
women's speech. I will defend the premise of the feminist argument 
against some critics. The mechanism of this silencing, and 
pornography's possible role in it, are the themes of the subsequent 
chapter (Chapter Six). The failure of women's speech would be better 
understood if we were to expand the analysis and consider other 
linguistic practices in their social context, and the implication of such 
practices for the subjectivity of the speaker. In the final chapter 
(Chapter Seven), I will discuss Wittgenstein's claim that our form of 
life "has to be accepted". I will offer different ways of engaging with, 
and critiquing, the form of life, which still appear to be compatible 
with Wittgensteinian philosophy. 
Finally, I should offer a few words about the definition of the word 
"pornography". A precise definition of what exactly counts as 
pornography is often quite contentious. My use of the term is clarified_ 
in Chapter One; it perhaps suffices to say at this point that my usage 
involves a minimum definition of the term; pornography is explained 
in terms of its content and function or intended function. This 
minimum definition, I believe, is sufficient for the purpose of my 
enquiry. 
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Chapter One 
Pornography and Subordination of Women: 
An Approach from Speech Act Theory 
This chapter explores, through the application of speech act theory, 
the claim that pornographic speech subordinates women. Some 
feminists have argued that pornography not only depicts and causes 
the subordinate status of women but in itself constitutes subordination 
of women. The chapter pays particular attention to Langton's 
argument that pornography's speech acts constitute subordination if 
pornographers are "authoritative" in the domain of sex. In response to 
Langton, I present an alternative analysis of pornography's speech 
acts. I will argue that pornography seems to perform subordinating 
speech acts and hence may be said to be subordinating speech. 
Pornography may be subordinating even if it is not "authoritative" in 
the way that Langton suggests. However, speech act analysis does 
raise the importance of the pornographer's authority, and this seems to 
require further attention in order to establish the social significance of 
pornography's speech acts. 
1. Introduction 
In order to explain the relevance of speech act theory to the debate on 
pornography and subordination of women, I will first introduce the 
context of the debate. 
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The context. From a "causal" to a "constitutive" account of the harm 
ofponwgraphy 
The standard debate on the problems of pornography often focuses on 
the question of the harm it causes. In fact, it focuses on different 
understandings of this harm. The harm of the material might be, first 
and foremost, as reflected in the British Obscene Publications Act of 
1959, considered as the harmful influences on the moral character of 
producers and consumers of pornography. It is contended, for example, 
that obscene publications have "a tendency to deprave and corrupt" 
those who are likely to "read, see or hear" them (United Kingdom. 
Laws, Statutes, etc., 1959). The harm in this sense is the harm to those 
who voluntarily consume or produce pornographic material. However, 
if pornography affects only those who willingly engage with it, then, 
as John Stuart Mill would have said, the question of whether they are 
harmed by such material should ultimately be left to the judgement of 
those individuals. As long as these individuals are persons of mature 
faculty, then they will finally determine what is morally good for them, 
and any societal enforcement of what is good would be regarded as an 
unjustifiable "paternalistic" interference with individuals' lives. 
Pornography, on the other hand, may be thought to constitute a harm 
to society as a whole; it causes harm to the existing morality of society 
and ultimately causes its dissolution. Critics of this argument, 
however, have pointed out that such an argument is likely to 
exaggerate the extent of society's moral cohesion (Williams, 1981: 
52), and it may be that some groups' moral preferences are simply 
presented as the positive values to be protected in opposition to those 
of others. 
In considering what could be the harms of pornography, or to be 
precise, in considering what kinds of harm can be good reasons for 
restricting or censoring pornography, liberal theorists usually reject 
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the accounts of harm made on paternalistic or moralistic grounds. The 
Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship in Britain 
(hereafter simply referred to as the Williams Report) also similarly 
eschewed the arguments for suppression of publications based on 
these two grounds (ibid.: 50-53,57-58). Liberals' rejection of 
paternalism and moralism reflects the value of individual liberty and 
moral autonomy, and in a free society, any argument against the 
distribution and consumption of pornography must contend against the 
fact that there is always a strong "presumption in favour of individual 
freedom" (ibid.: 51) and freedom of speech. ' In fact, according to a 
powerful tradition of liberalism, the only account of harm which is 
generally acceptable as possibly a good reason for restricting and 
suppressing pornography is that which is based on Mill's "harm 
principle": "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, 
is to prevent hann to others" (Mill, 1975: 10). 
The notion of harm reflected in Mill's principle is a "causal" notion of 
harm, which takes into account the harmful effects or consequences of 
some action upon the interests of persons other than the actors 
themselves. To follow this harm principle, the only ground for which 
pornography can be legitimately restricted is the existence of highly 
reliable evidence that it causes tangible harm to the interests of some 
individuals other than those who willingly engage with the material 
(cf. Hawkins and Zimring, 1991: 74-108; Williams, 1981: 50-61). 
Mill also emphasized that coercive measures are justified only when 
66a person is led to violate distinct and assignable obligation to any 
other person or persons" (Mill, 1975: 75, emphasis added) and thus 
the harm conceived is the harm to particular individuals in society 
who can claim the protection of such distinctive rights or interests. 
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Since the feminist critique of pornography, the harm in question came 
to surround particularly harms to women inflicted by the male 
consumers of pornography. Leslie Green, in calling the causal notion 
of harms "contingent harms", summarized the essence of this now 
common argument as follows: "[t1he standard argument appeals to the 
indirect and contingent harms of pornography: by influencing the 
beliefs, attitudes, and values of its consumers, and ultimately the 
whole culture of a society, pornography leads to a variety of violent, 
abusive, and discriminatory acts against women" (Green, 1998: 289). 
However, as Green and many others have pointed out, the main 
difficulty with this argument is that the causal connection between 
pornography and sexual violence or offences has not b6en clearly 
established. The available evidence is frequently not conclusive 
enough (there is, for example, a disparity among different countries) 
or its validity is contested (Williams, 1981: 61-95; Dworkin, R., 1991: 
13-14,1993: 38; Hawkins and Zimring, 1991: 74-108), and it is also 
argued that there may be other social factors beside pornography, such 
as the existence of a "macho culture' (Feinberg, 1985: 147-157), or a 
certain predisposition of individuals, which may possibly explain the 
perceived harms to women. 2 
Thus, even though the causal harms of pornography can be a good 
reason against its publication and consumption, this causation has to 
be empirically demonstrated. If law is to be invoked, it has to be 
" 'beyond reasonable doubt' " (Williams, 1981: 59). In the light of the 
difficulty of demonstrating the causal harms of pornography to 
women, some feminists, such as MacKinnon, have shifted the focus of 
their arguments from these harms to (though not neglecting them), to 
use Green's phrase, the "constitutive harms" of the material (Green, 
1998: 289). They have come to emphasize, not some consequential 
harms of pornography, but certain harms that pornography constitutes 
in itself. The claim is now no longer based on any empirical evidence 
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of causal harms; the claim is rather that pornography "is such a harm" 
(ibid.: 289). Although some might want to use the term "constitutive 
wrongs", rather than "constitutive harms", of pornography, in order to 
place it closer to Mill's principle, what is at issue is substantively the 
same. What differentiates these arguments from the standard ones is 
that what is asked is not primarily, "what harms does pornography 
actually cause", in the manner of the standard argument, but rather, 
"what wrongs or harms are constituted by pornographic speech in 
itself 
This feminist argument is hence a non-causal, and also non-empirical, 
argument about the harms of pornography. The main thrust of this 
argument is captured in MacKinnon's claim that, in the American 
legal context, the standard notion of harm is only understood in a 
narrow, " 'John hit Mary' " sense (MacKinnon, 1987: 156). That is; 
there is an assumption that speech is not harmful unless it is proven to 
cause -harm to someone. The proof of causation demanded is like 
giving a proof that one billiard ball is sure to hit another; that if 
pornography is harmful it must be shown that it triggers a reaction in 
its audience, who, under that influence, conducts harmful acts. 
MacKinnon complains that 
the idea is that words or pictures can be harmful only if they 
produce harm in a form that is considered an action. Words 
work in the province of attitudes, actions in the realm of 
behavior. Words cannot constitute harm in themselves.... ( ... ) The trouble with this individuated, atomistic, linear, isolated, 
tortlike - in a word, positivistic - conception of injury is that 
the way pornography targets and defines women for abuse and 
discrimination does not work like this (ibid.: 156). 3 
We might recall that liberals in fact held that free speech is not an 
absolute principle, and Mill too said, for example, that there is a good 
reason for not allowing speech if it is likely to incite danger or 
violence. For instance, he said: "[a]n opinion that com-dealers are 
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starvers of the poor ... may justly incur punishment when it is delivered 
orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn- 
dealer.... " (Mill, 1975: 53). However, Mill's argument here also rests 
on an empirical and causal account of the harm of speech. 
Furthermore, whereas Mill envisions only that some words may 
induce or lead to some conduct (e. g., incite violence), MacKinnon 
questions this assumption of a simple dichotomy between words and 
actions. She draws our attention not simply to a consequence of 
speech which may or may not result but also to a certain action or 
practice that speech essentially constitutes, and argues that 
pornography too should be considered in this light. She contends that 
the nature of pornography is "more actlike than thoughtlike" 
(MacKinnon, 1991: 204). Pornography is a speech which conveys 
certain viewpoints, but it also constitutes harmftd action against 
women. MacKinnon uses many verbs to describe harmful acts of 
pornography, such as "hurting, degrading, violating, and humiliating", 
but in a nutshell, it is said to be the act of "subordination" of women 
(MacKinnon, 1996: 23). In fact, MacKinnon and her collaborator, 
Andrea Dworkin, once drafted a civil rights ordinance and defined 
pornography as "graphic sexually explicit material that subordinate 
women through pictures or words"(ibid.: 22, emphasis added). 
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Thus, the argument is that pornography constitutes harmful action, 
which is subordination of women. This is independent of the question 
of whether or not pornography actually causes subjection of individual 
women. The harm constituted in pornography is said to be that it 
degrades and demeans women and defines them as men's 
subordinates. The harm conceptualised here is not to individual 
women in particular but first and foremost to women as a group (cf. 
Mendus, 1985: 110-111). The recent feminist concept of the harm of 
pornography therefore differs from the one used in the standard 
paradigm. It focuses not on the harmful behaviour that pornography 
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may incite to but on the action which it itself is said to constitute. A 
constitutive, or non-causal, argument against pornography actually 
predates these feminist arguments. To quote one example, Ian 
Robinson, in the context of the debate surrounding pornography and 
obscenity, lamented that much of the contemporary discussion 
mistakenly assumed that the right or wrong of pornography is to be 
judged in terms of its consequences upon some individual's behaviour 
(Robinson, 1973: 160-161). In Robinson's view, the debate was 
simply "confused by [this] cause-and-effect talk". He observed: 
'Tomography doesn't cause depravity and corruption, it is depravity 
and corruption" (ibid.: 165). Thus, Robinson also made an argument, 
not about some causal effects of pornography, but about the nature of 
pornographic speech itself (also cf. Woozley, 1982). The difference 
between this and the feminist argument is, of course, mainly that the 
feminists are not concerned about "depravity and corruption" or 
obscenity as such but pornography's detrimental effect on women's 
equality in society. 
The constitutive account of harm of pornography, however, is not 
easily accepted either. After all, a common defence of pornography - 
that it is only a "fantasy"; at best amounts to a "viewpoint"; 
pornography is "only words" which merely describe or refer to certain 
ideas. And if the words are said to have any power, that power should 
be measured in terms of their effect. Thus MacKinnon and Dworkin's 
contention that "pornography is an act against women is seen as 
metaphorical or magical, rhetorical or unreal, a literary hyperbole or 
propaganda device' (MacKinnon, 1996: 11). Another objection which 
is likely to arise is that, even if pornography is proven to constitute 
such a harm, this will not warrant legislation against it by that very 
fact. This would require further arguments, such as that the prohibition 
of pornography is the only effective means to cope with this problem, 
and that this should be given priority over the protection of liberty of 
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pornographers and consumers. However, some feminists at least want 
to demonstrate that causal reasoning is perhaps inadequate to grasp the 
nature of the problems of pornography; they want to offer instead a 
constitutive, or non-causal, account of the harm of pornography. But 
how might this non-causal and non-empirical account of harm of 
pornography be further defended? In a culture which tends to have a 
certain empiricist bias, the feminist argument that pornography is in 
itself a form of subordination seems to need more support. This, in 
fact, is the context where an approach from linguistic theory is 
deemed helpful. 
Pornography and speech act theory 
Rae Langton attempted to show that the feminist claim that 
pornography constitutes subordination of women is at least 
conceptually sound and coherent (Langton, 1993,1998). She was 
careful enough to mention that the demonstration of such a harm of 
pornography is not ispofacto an argument for its censorship; however, 
she argued that the feminist claim could at least be shown to be 
philosophically defensible. Applying J. L. Austin's theory of speech 
acts, Langton argued that pornography may indeed constitute speech 
acts of subordination. Austin's notion of speech acts, especi ally the 
concept of "illocution", which refers to the acts performed in speech, 
does seem to be attractive in offering a constitutive account of 
pornography. He not only clearly distinguished the notion of effect or 
consequence of an utterance from that of the act constituted by it, but 
his whole doctrine gives prominence to the latter aspect of speech, " 
which is sometimes neglected, or forgotten, in common discussion 
aboutspeech. 
Thus, in what follows, I will first attend to Austin's own theory and 
examine Langton's analysis , of pornography's -, illocutions. , The 
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orientation of this chapter is, however, somewhat exploratory, as were 
in some respects both Austin's and Langton's theories. My primary 
aim in this chapter is to examine, mainly through the application of 
speech act theory, whether or not pornography constitutes 
subordination of women. In response to Langton's analysis, I will 
present an alternative examination of pornography's illocution. It will 
be shown that my approach to, and interpretation of, pornography's 
illocutionary acts significantly differ from Langton's in some respects. 
However, just as Langton, I also set aside the question of whether or 
not the constitutive harms of pornography would merit any legislation 
against it. I will consider only, through the approach from speech act 
theory, whether or not pornographic speech can be said to be 
subordinating speech. 
2. Austin's speech act theory 
In this section I will explain the main tenets of Austin's speech act 
theory and how it might illuminate the debate on pornography. What 
follows in this section is, therefore, mainly an exposition of Austin's 
theory, and I will largely leave out the concepts developed by other 
theorists. 
Concept of speech acts 
Speech act theory is, according to one definition, "partly taxonomic 
and partly explanatory" (Bach, 1998: 81); it is a theory that aims to 
explain what the speaker is essentially doing in making an utterance 
and classifies the utterance according to its usage or function. The 
concept of speech acts, or the concept of "performative" utterances 
rather, to use Austin's earlier expression, seemed to have emerged out 
of the philosopher's dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to the 
philosophy of language. According to Austin, philosophers 
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traditionally had a tendency to treat statements that we make as 
essentially descriptive in nature, or as mere reporting of facts and 
events, and assumed that finding out the truth or falsity of such 
statements is the main concern of the philosophy of language: "We 
have not got to go very far back in the history of philosophy to find 
philosophers assuming more or less as a matter of course that the sole 
business, the sole interesting business, of any utterance - that is, of 
anything we say - is to be true or at least false" (Austin, 1961: 220). 
Philosophers, in other words, assumed that "the- business of a 
dstatement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or 'to state 
some fact' ... either truly or falsely" (Austin, 1976: 1). 
Austin found, although he may not have been the only one who did so, 
this prevailing approach in the philosophy of language unsatisfactory. 
The traditional approach treated statements as though their only 
purpose was to be either a true or false statement. He thought that, at 
least, at times, the purpose of making statements had nothing to do 
with "reporting" or "description" of an event, and thus had little to do 
with a matter of "truth or falsity". For example, when someone says, 
" 'I apologize' ", the speaker is not really reporting his or her action 
of apologizing; we would say, rather, that the speaker is actually 
apologizing in saying it (Austin, 1961: 222). Similarly, when people 
say " 'I do' " at a marriage ceremony, they are actually marrying; 
when someone says, " 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' he or 
she is actually christening the ship. Also, when someone says, 'I bet 
you sixpence it will rain tomorrow' ", he or she is in fact betting in 
saying it (ibid.: 222). In each of these instances, in making the 
utterances, the speaker is not reporting or describing the act of 
apologizing, marrying, christening, or betting, but in practice carrying 
out these very acts. Thus, in some circumstances, in saying something, 
we are actually doing certain distinct actions, and this has nothing to 
do with being true or false, or reporting facts and events as such. 
27 
Austin first named this special group of utterances, which are also 
actions of some sort, "performative utterances", 4 and contrasted it 
with what he called "constatives" (ibid.: 222; Austin, 1976: 3-6). The 
constatives bore the meaning close to the traditional sense of (true or 
false) "statement". His idea was therefore initially that, only in certain 
circumstances, did saying something count as doing something, i. e., 
"performative" (Warnock, 1973: 69-70). However, Austin came to 
realize that this distinction between performatives and constatives is 
not as tight as it seemed, and that there are a number of ambiguous 
cases in between (Austin, 1976: 133-147). After all, if we closely 
analyse a "statement" - understood as a description that reports some 
matter of fact truly or falsely - we would find that "to state" is also the 
doing of some act (ibid.: 133-134). In the end Austin came to think 
that all utterances are performances of some acts. The correct 
approach was hence thought to be not to divide utterances into 
"performatives" and "constatives" (i. e., non-performatives) but to 
study the different dimensions of each utterance. 
Austin therefore thought that to say something is generally also to do 
some acts. He refined his notion of performative utterances and 
subsequently developed the concept of different levels of acts that we 
do in making an utterance, namely, the concept of "speech acts". 
According to him, there are three different acts that we commonly do 
in making speech: these are "locutionary", "illocutionary", and 
"perlocutionary" acts of speech. A "locutionary act" is simply "[t]he 
act of 'saying something' ", which is roughly equivalent to uttering a 
certain sentence with a certain sense and reference (ibid.: 94,109). A 
locutionary act typically involves an "illocutionary act, " which is an 
act performed "in saying something" (ibid.: 99), such as apologizing, 
marrying, christening, and betting discussed earlier, but common 
examples given by Austin also include "informing, ordering, warning, 
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undertaking &c. ", which are supposed to have "a certain 
(conventional) force" (ibid.: 109). Finally, a "perlocutionary act" 
refers to "what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such 
as convincing, persuading, deterring ... surprising or misleading"; 
in 
other words, perlocutionary acts are the acts that "produce certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the 
audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons" (ibid.: 109,101). The 
related terminology of "locution", "illocution", and "perlocution", 
therefore also refers to these acts. But locution and perlocution may 
also connote the "content" of speech, and the "further effect or 
consequence' resulting from speech, respectively. 
It is probably best to illustrate these concepts with concrete examples. 
The following example is from Austin (ibid.: 102), but I will add a 
little more explanation. When a man says to another, "You can't do 
that"' the act of locution is exactly to say this sentence, "You can't do 
that! ', meaning you by "you" and that by "thaC'. In saying, '. 'You can't 
do that", the man "[protests] against", or objects to, the hearer's 
performing a certain act. This is an illocutionary act performed in the 
speech. Finally, the man manages to persuade, or convince, the hearer 
not to do the action. This is a perlocutionary act achieved by the 
speech. Austin in fact attempted to distinguish these three levels of 
speech acts in a more simple way, often saying that locutionary acts 
are the acts of saying something (ibid.: 100); illocutionary acts are the 
acts performed in saying something (ibid.: 99); and perlocutionary 
acts are "the achieving of certain effects" by saying something (ibid.: 
121), although he did not seem to be so content with this distinction, " 
especially that between "in saying" and "by saying" (ibid.: 121-132). 
A certain aspect of the relation between locution and illocution must 
be emphasized. Austin argued that "[t]o perform a locutionary act 
is... eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act" (ibid.: 98). As John Searle 
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explains it, what is meant by this is that the locutionary act and the 
illocutionary act of an utterance are not essentially separate acts that 
happen to coincide; it is not that one is performing these speech acts 
"simultaneously, as one might smoke, read and scratch one's head 
simultaneously" (Searle, 1969: 24). It is rather that the locutionary act 
entails the illocutionary act; or maybe, as Searle suggests, in 
performing an illocutionary act (say, apologizing), one normally also 
performs a locutionary act (ibid.: 24). 5 The point is that these acts are 
inseparable. The locution and illocution are rather distinct dimensions 
of one and the same utterance, and linguistically speaking, they are 
closely related to each other, more closely than they are to 
perlocutionary acts. Perlocution refers to certain effects of an utterance 
upon the thoughts or feelings of the audience, and the production of 
such effects is usually subject to a variety of factors, including non- 
linguistic factors. Thus, locution and illocution are essentially 
connected to each other, and they are deemed to be more properly, 
unlike perlocution, within the realm of linguistic study (cf. Hornsby, 
1994: 195). 
"Felicity" conditionsfor illocutionary acts 
We have now seen the three different levels of speech acts. Of those, 
the concept of illocution plays a central part in Austin's doctrine of 
speech acts. There is, however, another issue about how illocutionary 
acts are generally achieved. It is by no means taken for granted that 
illocutionary acts are always carried out successfully by the speaker, 
and just as a statement can be true or false, for Austin, illocutionary 
acts can be "happy", or "unhappy", successful or unsuccessful, with 
regard to their intended purposes. He called the unhappy performance 
of performative speech in general "infelicities" (Austin, 1976: 14) and 
explained the different conditions which performatives must satisfy in 
order to make their performances fully successful. For Austin, the 
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most important condition for illocutionary acts is that these must 
conform to appropriate conventions which give meanings to these acts 
in the first place. Austin thought that illocutionary acts are performed 
"as conforming to a convention" and thus essentially are 
"conventional" acts (ibid.: 105). That is to say, generally, "[t]here 
must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain 
words by certain persons in certain circumstances" (ibid.: 26); and 
"[t]he particular persons in a given case must be appropriate...., ' (ibid.: 
34). In addition to this condition of convention, "happy" illocutionary 
acts usually require the speaker's corresponding intention, thoughts, or 
feelings to perform these acts and also the hearer's "uptake" of these 
acts (ibid.: 15,117). 
Again, it is perhaps better to illustrate these conditions with the aid of 
some examples. Firstly, there must be appropriate conventions. The 
utterance of "I do" at a marriage ceremony can be an illocutionary act 
of marrying only if there is such a convention in society to make this 
utterance the act of marrying. Secondly, the circumstances of 
utterances must be appropriate. The marriage ceremony must not be 
interrupted and must be conducted according to proper procedure, and 
the person who utters "I do" must be the right person; the person must 
not be already married, and so on (ibid.: 16-17). One might say of this 
rule, briefly, that an illocutionary act must be performed by the right 
person in the right context in order to be successful. ThirdlY, the 
speaker should have appropriate thoughts and intentions. The person 
who says "I do" must have the intention to marry, and if not, it would 
be a case of, what Austin caHed, "abuse". In this case, the 
illocutionary act is actually performed, but we might say that it is 
"insincere" or "an abuse of the procedure' (ibid.: 16, also 39-52), and 
hence is still a case of "unhappy" illocutionary acts. Fourthly, and 
finally, illocutionary acts require "uptake' by the hearer. The 
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illocutionary act of marrying in saying "I do" must be understood by 
the audience as the act of marrying. 
Elocution andpomography 
So far I have delineated the main concepts of speech acts. I will now 
explain how the theory might offer an insight into the problems of 
pornography. The key concept here is, of course, that of illocution. To 
use Austin's terminology, it can be said that the standard debate about 
the problems of pornography surrounded its locutionary and 
perlocutionary aspects. It was about its locution, because what was 
called into question was often the content, or what is being expressed, 
in pornographic materials. Some were concerned about the morality of 
sexual explicitness, while others criticized the degrading images of 
women in the representations. It was also about its perlocution, 
because it was contested that pornography causes harmful effects upon 
its audiences and also causes harms to women. However, now we 
know that these are not the only aspects of pornographic speech; there 
are also its illocutionary dimensions to be considered. 
Austin's theory of speech acts prima facie seems to offer conceptual 
resources, and also a certain advantage, to the feminist argument that 
pornography also constitutes certain actions (I set aside potential 
difficulties arising from the application of the theory for the 
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moment). Austin was at pains to point out that the purpose of 
statements is not merely to refer to some facts or events or to be "true 
or false" statements. lie maintained that we generally do many more 
things with our words; we characteristically perform some distinct 
acts in making utterances. Thus, the idea that pornography is only 
"referential" (cf. MacKinnon, 1996: 21,26,28), or that it is just a 
"description" of some viewpoints and ideas, which are either true or 
false, seems to overlook this perfornzative aspect of, pomographic 
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speech. Austin also took care to distinguish the effects or 
consequences that an utterance may bring about from the acts 
constituted by that utterance itself. In brief, what is distinctive about 
the concept of illocution is that it enables one to address directly the 
nature of a particular utterance: what it is that the speaker is 
essentially doing in making that utterance; how it is to be taken; or 
what it basically is. Is saying "I apologize" the very act of apology, or 
reporting of an apology? Is a particular statement an order or a request? 
Is it meant to be a simple prediction or rather a promise? What does it 
essentially amount to? Here the notion of illocution attempts to 
explain how a particular utterance is to be taken, or what it essentially 
is. Thus, also, an analysis of pornography's illocution attempts to 
explain what pornographic speech essentially is. If the feminist 
analysis is successful, it will be shown that pornography performs 
subordinating speech acts; that it essentially is subordinating speech. 
3. Langton's speech act analysis 
Langton argued that Austin's theory could "illuminate" the feminists', 
such as MacKinnon's, claim that pornographic speech constitutes an 
act of subordination of women. At least, she said, it will be shown that 
their argument is conceptually sound and coherent, and that "the 
accusation of trickery and conceptual confusion levelled at this claim 
may be misguided" (Langton, 1993: 297; 1998: 262). In this section I 
will focus on Langton's original analysis of pornography's speech acts. 
In order to demonstrate that the feminist claim is defensible from a 
speech act perspective, Langton first sets out to define what 
subordinating speech is, or what subordinating illocutions are. She 
offers an example of a legislator promulgating a discriminatory law in 
the context of apartheid -" 'Blacks are not permitted to vote' "- and 
argues that such a statement can be subordinating for three reasons. 
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Namely, "[t]hey rank blacks as having inferior worth. They legitimate 
discriminatory behavior on the part of whites. And finally, they 
deprive blacks of some important powers: for example, the power to 
go to certain areas and the power to vote" (Langton, 1993: 303). 
Because of these three features, "(unfairly) ranking" some people as 
inferior, "legitimating" discrimination against them, and "(unjustly) 
depriving" them of certain powers, the legislator's speech is 
considered to be subordinating. 
In saying, "Blacks are not permitted to vote! ', the legislator is 
performing illocutionary acts; i. e., the illocutionary acts of ranking, 
legitimating, and depriving. These acts are hence subordinating 
illocutionary acts. 7 The acts of ranking, legitimating, and depriving are 
what Austin termed as verdictive and exercitive illocutions. Perhaps it 
is relevant at this point to introduce different types of illocutions 
classified by Austin. As mentioned earlier, speech act theory is partly 
"taxonomic", and different theorists offer different versions of the 
taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In the case of Austin, he classified, 
illocutionary acts into five major groups; what he called, "verdictives", 
"exercitives", "commissives", "behabitives", and "expositives" 
(Austin, 1976: 148-164). Of these "verdictives", "exercitives", and 
"expositives" are most pertinent to this discussion, and therefore I will 
only explain these. 
Verdictive illocutions are acts of judgement that establish some matter 
of fact, such as a jury's verdict or an umpire's decision at a game 
(ibid.: 153). Exercitives essentially consist in "exercising of powers, 
rights, or influence", and are typically associated with such acts as 
"appointing", "ordering", "awarding", "warning", etc. Some of the 
exercitive acts are based on verdictive acts (ibid.: 155-156). Although 
verdictives and exercitives are sometimes confused, the former is akin 
to a "judicial act", which delivers ajudgement that something "is so"; 
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while the latter is similar to legislating or executive acts, which enacts 
a "decision that something is to be so" (ibid.: 155, emphasis added). It 
is said that exercitives are more of a "sentence" than a "verdict" (ibid.: 
155), which carries out a certain power based on a verdict. Finally, the 
class of "expositives" refers essentially to those acts of explaining and 
elucidating the speaker's standpoint in the course of conversation or 
argument; which also includes such acts as arguing, stating, accepting, 
affirming and denying (ibid.: 161-163). 
Thus, Langton argues that the subordinating speech of the apartheid 
legislator is performing verdictive and exercitive illocutionary acts. It 
is firstly verdictive, because it gives an "authoritative" judgement, 
delivering an assessment on the "rank! ' of people. Secondly, it is 
exercitive, because the speaker exercises power to legitimate a 
discriminatory act and deprives black people of their right to vote. As 
both verdictives and exercitives are sensitive to the proper authority of 
the speaker, Langton calls these "authoritative illocutions" and argues 
that subordinating speech is a species of these authoritative speech 
acts (Langton, 1993: 305). 
Langton then draws an analogy between the authoritative, 
subordinating speech of the apartheid legislator and pornographic 
speech. According to some feminist arguments, it is often said that 
pornography "ranks" women as sexual objects and "legitimates" 
violent sexual behaviour. These acts, "rank! ' and "legitimate', which 
are verdictive and exercitive illocutions, resonate with the mentioned 
legislator's illocutionary acts. Pornography is, therefore, "first, 
verdictive speech that ranks women as sex objects, and second, 
exercitive speech that legitimates sexual violence', and thus it too 
appears to perform "an illocutionary act of subordination" (ibid.: 307- 
308). iI 
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However, this is not a straightforward conclusion about pornography's 
illocutions. As mentioned earlier, Austin thought that certain 
"felicitous" conditions, such as conventional procedures, must be 
fulfilled in order for an utterance to achieve its illocutionary act. For 
Austin, the illocution is mainly an act conforming to the conventions, 
and for both verdictives and exercitives, the most crucial condition is 
said to be the speaker's rightful a*Uthority in the field concerned. To 
explain, when an umpire shouts "fault" at a match, his illocutionary 
act can count as a verdictive; his illocution is successful. Whereas 
when a spectator says "fault", it would not count as a verdictive, and 
the illocutionary act is unsuccessful. The spectator attempts to do a 
verdictive illocutionary act, but it simply fails, because he is not the 
right person, or does not have right authority, to do so (ibid.: 304,311). 
Analogously, Langton thinks that pornography can count as verdictive 
or exercitive subordinating speech, or can successfully perform its 
illocutionary act of subordination of women, only if this condition of 
the -speaker's authority 
is satisfied; that is, it is only when the speakers, 
i. e., the pornographers, are actually in such a position to deliver an 
authoritative judgement about women and sex, their saying so and so 
will, in effect, count as so and so (ibid.: 311). Otherwise, the attempt 
of the pornographer's speech to deliver a judgement about women 
simply "misfires"; producing what Austin called an instance of 
"infelicites"; an "unhappy" performance of illocutions. 
There are some questions regarding Langton's analysis of 
pornography's illocutions. An immediate question that might be raised 
seems to be that of determining the speech acts, or the illocutionary 
acts, of pornography. Austin's theory was primarily concerned with 
single, individual utterances, such as, "I warn you"; "I promise you"; 
or "I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow". "Pornography", on the 
other hand, normally refers to a class or group of speech, which 
consists of numerous utterances. The problem seems to arise partly 
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because of this plurality of pornographic utterances. Or, the problem 
may be the appropriate interpretation of these utterances (especially 
when pornography is in a pictorial form). Although Langton suggested, 
based on some feminist discussions, that a pornographic utterance can 
be interpreted as "ranking" of women as sexual objects, some might 
question this assumption. Austin classified illocutionary acts 
according to the verb used in the utterance (the first person singular 
present indicative active form: such as "I rank", "I promise", etc. ). 
The verb "rank" is in fact classified under the category of the 
verdictive. Although the pornographer's utterance may be interpreted 
as "I rank women as X", what happens if it is taken instead simply as 
"I state that women are X" or "I affirm that women are X"? According 
to Austin, such verbs as "state" and "affirin" are called "expositives" 
(Austin, 1976: 162), which is said to be mere exposition of one's 
viewpoints, although he leaves room for disagreement as to whether 
these expositives should not also count as verdictives, exercitives, or 
other illocutions. 
Indeed, Langton acknowledges the difficulty of determining 
pornography's illocutions. As in other cases where there is 
disagreement concerning the interpretation of illocutionary acts, 
pornography may too "[fall] short of the paradigm case for the given 
illocution (Langton, 1993: 308). But in the end, she concludes that, if 
the most important ': felicity" condition is satisfied, then, under this 
circumstance, pornography nonetheless performs subordinating 
illocutionary acts (ibid.: 311). As we have seen, she argued that 
subordinating illocutionary acts are verdictive and exercitive 
illocutions of ranking, legitimating, and depriving. But verdictives and 
exercitives are authoritative illocutions and can only be carried out by 
the persons who have rightful authority. The felicity condition for 
subordinating speech acts is therefore the presence of the speaker's 
authority. Ultimately, Langton appears to think that, whatever the 
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expression (locution) of pornography is taken to be (ranking, stating, 
affirming, etc. ), it can perform verdictive or exercitive acts, and hence 
subordinating speech acts, under the right circumstances; i. e., when 
the speaker, the pornographer, has authority in the sexual domain. 
The conclusion that she draws here is instructive, but also potentially 
problematic; the question of subordination crucially rests on the 
pornographer's authority, and yet this is the issue that remains 
unresolved in her analysis. Langton argues that the question of the 
pornographer's authority is basically an "empirical", "contingent", 
and "context-dependent" matter, and as such cannot be addressed 
from "the philosopher's armchair" (Langton, 1993: 312; 1998: 264). 
Whatever authority the pornographer is deemed to have, it would be 
likely to be different from the one that is had by, say, a political leader 
or a judge. Is the pornographer in our society really an authoritative 
figure, who could make verdictive utterances? I will return to this 
issue of authority later in the chapter, but for the moment will 
continue the investigation of pornography from the viewpoint of 
speech act theory. 
4. Definition of pornography 
Langton's analysis of pornography's illocutionary acts is illuminating; 
however, it also raises further issues that need to be addressed. I will 
now turn to these issues and consider whether or not we could have a 
different explanation of pornography's subordinating speech acts. I 
will start with the question of a definition of pornography. 
in examining Langton's analysis of pornography's illocutions, J 
mentioned a difficulty of applying speech act theory to pornography. 
The reason is partly because of the plurality of pornographic speech, 
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and Austin's theory was not originally concerned with this type of 
speech. It may be thought that it is still possible to speak of some 
common speech acts of pornography, but this would invite the 
question of what such common speech acts are, and ultimately, what 
is primarily meant by "pornography". 
The issue, in fact, relates to the definition of "pornography". In her 
analysis of pornography's illocutionary acts, Langton did not offer any 
explicit definition of pornographic speech. It might be argued that she 
did not need one for her particular enquiry; for it can be claimed that, 
however pornography is to be defined, as long as it satisfies the 
paradigm of subordinating speech, then it will be said to be 
subordinating speech, and this will meet her objective to show that 
pornography can constitute subordination of women. On the other 
hand, however, she took MacKinnon and Dworkin's definition of 
pornography seriously, and her analysis attempts to lend support to 
their claim that "pornography is subordination of women". Langton's 
characterization of pornography's speech acts (ranking, legitimating, 
and depriving) is also based on other feminists' claims about what 
pornography normally "does" (Langton, 1993: 307; 1998: 262-263). 
There is, therefore, a certain indication that she also has a certain idea 
of what pornography is, although it is not altogether clear from her 
analysis. 
I think there is a need to be a little clearer about the meaning of 
"pornography" involved. The reason is as follows. I have mentioned 
that "pornography" normally refers to a class of speech, and hence it 
consists of a number of utterances; and therefore there seems to be an 
associated difficulty of determining pornography's (representative) 
illocutionary acts. However, it is also thought that it is still possible to 
speak of some common speech acts of pornography. It would seem to 
help here to offer a kind of "definition" of pornography, or specify 
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more clearly what its defining features are, in order that it would be 
easier to speak of such common speech acts of pornography. This 
definitional issue, moreover, also relates to the question of the kind of 
pornography involved; what is that which is really referred to by the 
term "pornography". Depending on what speech is actually included 
under this terminology, it would seem to make a difference to the 
feminist claim that "pornography is subordination of women". For one 
thing, the feminist criticism is plausibly not concerned with gay, 
lesbian, or child pornography. Some types of pornography, therefore, 
should be excluded from the present consideration. 
I would thus like to set out a kind of "definition" of pornography for 
the purpose of my enquiry, albeit not being too restrictive about its 
scope from the outset. I will first offer a certain minimal definition of 
pornography, and specify the kind of pornographic speech to be 
observed. 'Iben, I will consider, in the subsequent sections, what 
speech acts pornography seems to perform, and whether or not these 
acts can be regarded as subordinating acts. Defining the features of 
pornographic speech is, however, often very difficult and has proven 
to be contentious. The two American governmental commission 
reports on pornography and obscene publications (i. e., the Johnson 
Commission report in 1970 and the Meese Commission report in 
1986), as well as the Williams Report did not agree on the meaning 
and connotation of the term "pornography" (Hawkins and Zimring, 
1991: 20-29). Nonetheless, according to the latter, "pornography" is 
said to have at least the following two characteristics: 
[A] pornographic representation is one that combines two 
features: it has a certain function or intention, to arouse its 
audience sexually, and also a certain content, explicit 
representations of sexual material (organs, postures, activity, 
etc. ). A work has to have both this function and this content to 
be a piece of pornography (Williams, 1981: 103). 
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The definition of pornography given by the Williams Report in fact 
lays down important features of pornography. It defines pornography 
in terms of its "content" and "function or intention", and indeed 
contains a minimal sense of pornographic speech. It also seems to 
accord with most people's idea of what pornography is. I will 
therefore adopt this sense of pornography; however, the definition is 
still too general, and the type of pornographic speech that is relevant 
needs to be specified. For the present purpose, I am only concerned 
with pornographic speech which is aimed at heterosexual male 
audiences and which involves depictions of adult women, and thus not 
with gay, lesbian, or child pornography. I am concerned with those 
speeches whose content centrally features female nudity, or involve a 
description of women's sexuality, sexual nature, or women's and 
men's sexual roles. These sexually explicit contents are then typically 
used to stimulate or excite male audiences sexually. Thus, for the 
purpose of this chapter and the rest of the thesis, what I mean by 
pornography has these two characteristics: firstly, it has a sexually 
explicit content (depictions of female nudity, or descriptions of female 
sexuality or male and female sexual roles); secondly, it has a function 
or intention to sexually stimulate or excite its audiences (especially 
male heterosexual audiences). 
I will consider pornography as a kind of speech (indeed, as will be 
argued, a type of human communication), and my investigation is not 
necessarily restricted to established materials or publications on the 
market, whether in written or pictorial forms, although most 
pornographic speech in practice probably consists of such materials. I 
will also use "pornography" and "pornographic speech" 
interchangeably, and "pornographers" are anyone who makes 
pornographic speech and not restricted to occupational pornographers 
(although, again, a lot of them are perhaps those people). In practice, 
pornographers and their audiences may include women, not only men, 
41 
but I assume here that most of pornographers' audiences are male 
audiences. 
5. Pornography as communicative speech acts 
Based on Austin's theory of speech acts, Langton has argued that 
pornography can constitute subordinating illocutionary acts, although 
she also added that this ultimately depends on the pornographer's 
authoritative status in the domain of sex. In this section I will 
reexamine pornography's illocution. The issue, firstly, is about the 
type of speech acts that pornography is more likely to perform. Austin, 
as we recall, stated that illocutionary acts are performed by 
"conforming to conventions". The point that I want to raise here with 
regard to Langton's analysis is that pornography does not seem to be 
such a "conventional" speech act. In this section I will firstly suggest 
that, if pornography performs any speech acts, it rather performs a 
different kind of speech acts. I will then offer an alternative analysis 
of pornography's illocutions based on this different notion of speech 
acts. 
Conventional and communicative speech acts 
Austin's speech act theory attaches great importance to the role of 
conventions - extra-linguistic, social institutions, appropriate 
procedure - for the successful performance of illocutions. As we have 
seen, for example, a marriage oath of "I do" would not count as an 
illocutionary act of marrying unless there is an appropriate convention 
and unless it is uttered by the right person under the right 
circumstances. However, Austin sometimes treats the convention as if 
it were involved in all speech act situations, and this can certainly be 
questioned. That some utterances are conventional means that their 
illocutionary acts can count as acts of certain sort by virtue of there 
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being some institutional or agreed-upon rules, and it often involves the 
saying of particular, obligatory words, such as when the speaker's 
saying of " 'Three no trumps' " counts as "bidding" in the game of 
bridge (Warnock, 1973: 71). Yet, a number of ordinary speech acts 
seem to be performed without invoking any such conventions or 
particular phrases. Austin's theory also says that an utterance must be 
issued by the right person in the right context. Not, of course, that 
anyone can utter the word " guilty, " and make the defendant guilty 
(Bach and Harnish, 1979.110). Nonetheless, it is also not the case that 
every act of utterance depends on the status of the speaker for its 
performance. Anyone can utter, "Could You open the door", and the 
illocutionary act of request can be fulfilled. 
P. F. Strawson also comments on this point. He explains that the 
words and sentences we use are in fact ruled by "linguistic" 
conventions, which lay down the meaning of our speech ("cats" refer 
to cats, for instance). What Austin remarks is however that 
illocutionary acts must conform to "extra-linguistic", social 
conventions, in addition to these linguistic conventions (Strawson, 
1964: 443). But, as Strawson points out, for the illocution of an 
utterance, say, " 'The ice over there is very thin' ", to have a meaning 
of "warning", there need not be any conventions at all, other than the 
"linguistic" conventions which supply the meaning to words (ibid.: 
443-444). Indeed, if the speaker wants to warn the hearer in saying, 
'7he ice over there is very thin", the essential factor involved in the 
performance of this illocution is only the recognition on the part of the 
hearer of what the speaker is attempting to do, and not any social 
conventions. The hearer's understanding of the illocutionary force of 
the statement (i. e., a warning) is all it takes for the fulfilment of the 
illocutionary act in this case. It should be noted that Austin did not 
clearly explain the relation between illocutions and conventions, and 
he left unexplained what he really meant by the term "conventions". 
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But if conventions are to be understood as highly institutionalised 
rules or procedures, then, most speech acts do not seem to be affected 
by these. Thus, conventions are not required in all speech situations, 
and this has already been frequently commented upon by theorists 
(e. g., Bach and Harnish, 1979; Hornsby, 1994; Searle, 1979; Warnock, 
1973). 
Some theorists therefore hold that most illocutionary acts are 
performed not by confonnity to extra-linguistic conventions, but by 
the speaker's communicative intention and the hearer's recognition of 
that intention (Bach and Harnish, 1979; Bach, 1998; cf. Hornsby, 
1994). Therefore, it is better to broaden our perspective and consider 
this communicative nature of our speech acts; my attention will now 
move from "convention" to "intention" in the performance of speech 
acts. paying attention to this communicative intention, as I will argue 
later, will make it more plausible to apply the concept of speech act to 
pornography. 
If one intends to warn, advise, praise the other, etc. in performing 
some communicative speech act, the act is successful if the other 
person understands the speaker's intention to warn, advise, and praise, 
etc. In a communicative situation, the speaker normally intends to 
mean something by saying something, and the hearer is expected to 
understand the speaker's meaning. The importance of the speaker's 
intention is also articulated in Searle's theory of speech acts, although 
Searle also acknowledges the role of conventions. He says that human_ 
linguistic communication typically involves some sort of 
communicative intention on the part of the speaker that is aimed at a 
certain audience, thus distinguishing itself from a non-human, or 
"natural phenomenon": 
When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be -an' 
instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the I- 
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things that I must assume is that the noise or mark was Produced 
by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with 
certain kinds of intentions. If I regard the noise or mark as a 
natural phenomenon like the wind in the trees or a stain on the 
paper, I exclude it from the class of linguistic communication, 
even though the noise or mark may be indistinguishable from 
spoken or written words (Searle, 1969: 16-17). 
Thus, most illocutionary. acts are also considered as such linguistic 
communicative acts, and the speaker's communicative intention and 
its recognition by the hearer become the key factors for the 
performance of these acts. 
The notion of the speaker's intention was earlier expounded by H. P. 
Grice. Grice equated the particular meaning of a particular statement 
by a speaker (call him A) with A's intention to produce certain belief 
in the hearer by means of the hearer's recognition of A's intention. 
For "A to mean something by x ... A must intend to induce by xa belief 
in an audience, and he must also intend his utterance to be recognized 
as so intended ... the recognition is intended by A to play its part in 
inducing the belief' (Grice, 1989: 219). To explain this concept, 
borrowing Strawson's example, when a speaker A says to a hearer H, 
"The ice over there is very thin", A intends to produce in H's mind a 
certain belief (that the ice is dangerous and he should not step on it) by 
H's recognition of A's intention to induce that belief. Grice' 
,s 
notion 
of the speaker's intention is thus called "reflexive intention"; it is an 
intention that must be recognized to achieve its purpose (Bach and 
Hamish, 1979: 12-15). 8 
Searle incorporates this Gricean reflexive intention into his theory of 
speech acts. He provides a major premise about communication in 
general, and a further premise about a speech act; namely, a condition 
for a successful illocutionary act: (i) a communication consists in the 
speaker's attempt to "get" the hearer to recognize the speaker's 
intention to communicate a particular thing, and (ii) the illocutionary 
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act is successful if the speaker manages to get the hearer to recognize 
what the speaker is attempting to do; the fulfilment of an illocutionary 
act "consists simply in the hearer understanding the utterance of the 
speaker" (Searle, 1969: 43,47). Thus, if someone says, "Good 
morning", to another, and the hearer understands that he is being 
greeted, the communication is successful. Similarly, if I congratulate 
you on your job promotion, saying, "That is wonderful", and you 
understand that you are being congratulated, then my illocutionary act 
of congratulating is successful. 
Although I have emphasized the role of intention and recognition in 
the performance of illocutionary acts, two additional points have to be 
made to this observation. The first is that, although the speaker's 
communicative intentions are no doubt central in some illocutionary 
acts, intentions alone do not fix the meaning of such illocutions. We 
know that it is not all up to the speaker to mean whatever he or she 
wants to mean with their words. Illocutions also depend on locutions; 
therefore, how an utterance is to be taken is also a function of the 
conventional meaning of the words used in locutions. The second 
point - to be noted is that the criteria of "conventional" and 
"communicative" are not mutually exclusive categories. One can 
perfectly imagine a speech act situation involving both a conventional 
(i. e., extra-linguistic, institutional) procedure and the speaker's 
communicative intention. For instance, a marriage ceremony usually 
involves both. Likewise, a policeman's utterance, " 'You're under 
arrest' ", involves the conventional procedure for arrest as well as the 
act of communication (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 117). It is only that, 
in some speech situations, a successful illocutionary act requires an 
extra-linguistic convention, whereas in many other cases, it does not. 
The basic contention of Grice and Searle seems to be right; that is, 
human, linguistic communication, as long as it is a form of 
"communication" and distinguishable from something like a personal 
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scribble in a notebook, anticipates some audience and is loaded with a 
certain communicative intention, and this intention is essentially 
meant to be recognized. 
This reflexive illocutionary intention should be distinguished from 
other ulterior intentions, purposes, or motivations of the speaker 
behind a particular utterance. This intention refers to the speaker's 
intention to produce a certain knowledge or understanding in the 
audience by saying certain things. In performing a communicative 
illocutionqy act, the speaker normally intends to create an 
"illocutionary effect" in the audience, the "effect" here, however, 
being simply "the [hearer's] understanding the utterance of the 
speaker" (Searle, 1969: 47). To illustrate this point, when a speaker 
says to a hearer, "The ice over there is very thin", the speaker's 
ultimate intention - one might say the perlocutionary intention - is to 
ensure, by warning, that the hearer will not step on the ice. But the 
illocutionary intention is just that the hearer understands the speaker's 
utterance as a "warning" and not as something else, such as a 
statement of "description". When I therefore use the term "the 
speaker's intention" or "illocutionary intention" in the following, it 
simply means the speaker's intention to achieve "uptake" of the 
utterance in the audience. Normally, it is said that the hearer has to 
infer the speaker's intention from its locution, as well as the context of 
the speech. 
From what we have observed so far and from the speech act theory of 
Austin, I think we can say the following. In speech act situations, 
there is a certain presumption on the part of the speaker; that is, the 
speaker usually presumes that his or her utterance will be taken as an 
act of certain sort, by virtue of some conventions, or by recognized 
intentions, or by some combination of these. In fact, in the case of 
communicative speech acts, the speaker and the hearer must share 
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between them not only linguistic competences but also certain 
minimal understandings about facts of life and human acts in general 
(what it takes to warn, apologize, promise, etc. ). Otherwise, this 
system of intention-recognition would not normally work. In this 
respect, it can be said that communicative illocutionary acts also 
require certain "felicity" conditions for their performance. 9 
Searle also says that to perform illocutionary acts is to "express" 
certain "psychological states" of the speaker, whether it is a belief in 
something, a request, an order, a preference, or pleasure (Searle, 1979: 
4). Hence, to say something and thereby to perform some illocutionary 
acts is basically to put forward one's own feelings, thoughts, or stance 
towards something, and it is assumed that these are recognized and 
understood by the hearer(s). 
Pornography and its illocutions examined again 
Thus, it seems that pornography is more aptly a type of 
"communicative' speech, rather than "conventional". Pornography's 
speech acts are performed when the hearer recognizes the intention of 
the speaker, or understands what the speaker is trying to do with his 
speech. In what follows, I want to offer a different interpretation of the 
illocutions of pornography, based on the notion of "communicative 
illocutionary acts". The attention to human communicative intention 
would, in my view, make it easier to apply the concept of speech acts 
to pornography; for pornography, whatever form it is in, generally 
also seems to involve a communicative intention of the speaker, and 
comes under the broad category of human communicative acts. 
Langton also argued that the pornographer's speech acts acquire some 
illocutionary meaning only under some specific social circumstances. 
Nonetheless, it could be argued here that the pornographer is in any 
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case performing some intentional speech acts, whatever is his social 
status. For the present, I will set aside the question of subordination 
and consider what his speech acts might be. However, I need first to 
attend to an issue that might be raised against my analysis. 
Mary Kate McGowan, in examining Langton's analysis of 
pornographic speech, argued that pornography cannot be treated as 
communicative speech, since it essentially functions below the level 
of our conscious awareness. She argued that pornography should be 
rather seen as a type of "unconscious conditioning", than a form of 
communicative speech with its characteristic intentions and 
recognitions (McGowan, 2003: 168-169). 
It might be indeed contended that pornography involves an aspect of 
"unconscious conditioning", that pornography somehow affects its 
audiences' natural drive, giving a sexual stimulus for example, 
without their conscious awareness of this mechanism. But 
pornography is likely to work at the conscious level as well. Deborah 
Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer, in examining the relation between 
sexual violence and pornography, questioned the simple 
"behaviouristic" or "stimulus-response" type explanation of 
pornography's effects on its audiences. They argued that human 
beings do not simply react to stimulus like animals, but crucially 
"interpret" the meaning of words and symbols conveyed to them. 
Humans are never "passive and unreflecting objects" but rather active 
interpreters (Cameron and Frazer, 1992: 368-371). 
What is likely to happen therefore when an audience encounters a 
pornographic speech is that he interprets the meaning of such speech. 
He understands that the pornographer is trying to tell him something, 
and usually understands what he is trying to tell him. In encountering 
pornographic speech, the audience interprets the , meaning. of , the 
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"message" of the pornographer (e. g., the sexual meaning of a woman 
in the content of the speech and also what the pornographer is doing 
with this particular speech). It may be said that it is only because the 
audience interprets and understands the meaning of pornographic 
speech, he can be sexually aroused. It involves in the process a 
conscious interpretation of a certain meaning of the speech. 
It was also said earlier that to perform illocutionary acts is essentially 
to put forward one's own feelings, thoughts, and attitudes about 
certain matters. It seems right to say that pornography too expresses 
some such "psychological states" of the speakers. It too tries to tell 
certain things to its audiences. This is true even when pornography is 
purely in a pictorial form. "Tbe noise or mark! ' which the 
pornographer Produces is different from the "noise or mark" created 
by non-human phenomena exactly because, in the former case, 
someone is typically trying to say something to someone else. Thus, 
pornography also involves communicative intentions, performs 
communicative illocutionary acts, and shares a generic feature of 
human linguistic communications. It is generally aimed at certain 
audiences, carries some reflexive intentions, and expresses certain 
thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes of the speakers. 
Pornography, whether in written or pictorial forms, in general 
involves these reflexive intentions of the speaker. I therefore believe 
that we can treat pornography as. communicative speech and as 
performing some communicative illocutionary acts. We would, 
however, also have to consider whether or not a certain background 
condition is satisfied for a "happy" performance of pornography's 
communicative acts. The "felicity" condition for communicative 
illocutions usually means that there is already some minimally shared 
understanding between the speakers and the hearers about the facts of 
life or about human acts. When the speaker says that "the ice is thin", 
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he usually presumes that there is already a shared understanding 
between him and the hearer about the facts of life; namely, that when 
ice is thin, it breaks. The speaker counts on this hearer's 
understanding to make his utterance understood as warning. Moreover, 
in the case of pornographic speech, there must be some minimally 
shared understanding between pornographers and their audiences in 
order that their communication will succeed. It seems that this 
condition is more or less satisfied for pornographic speech. Normally, 
there is a common understanding between pornographers and their 
audiences about the sexual connotation of women in society and also 
as to what, in general, sexual activity entails, or what makes things 
sexual. 
Now I would like to offer an alternative account of illocutionary acts 
of pornography. In determining pornography's illocutions, the 
definition of 'Pornography offered earlier would seem to help. It was 
said that pornographic speech has a sexually explicit content 
(depiction of female nudity, female sexuality, or male and female 
sexual roles); and it is used, or has a function, to sexually stimulate or 
excite its (male heterosexual) audiences. In general, the 
pornographers' intentions are to put forward their beliefs or attitudes 
about sex, women, or women's sexuality in order that this can excite 
audiences. It seems more or less the case that pornographers are at 
least telling these things to their audiences. In fact, in telling these 
things, pornographers are often identifting and characterizing women, 
their sexuality, and men's and women's sex roles. 
I therefore think that pornographers generally have these intentions to 
identify and characterise sex and women and perform these speech 
acts. These acts are then recognized by the pornographers' audiences 
and thus successfully performed. This appears to be a typical pattern 
of their speech acts. However, some may contest this claim; what if 
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their speech acts deviate from this pattern? Or, if pornographers do not 
have, or deny having, such intentions? Pornographers may also say 
that they themselves do not believe in their own descriptions of sex 
and women. Or they may say that their intention is rather to affirm and 
celebrate women's beauty. 
Although it seems right that many speech acts are intentional and 
communicative acts, and I argued that pornographic speech acts are 
not exceptions to this, it is not all a matter of the speaker's intention 
for a particular utterance to have a particular meaning. Earlier I 
suggested that the meaning of communicative speech acts is also 
constrained by the literal meaning of the words used and by the 
context of the utterance. In the case of pornography, it seems that the 
meaning of their illocution is constrained by its content, as well as by 
the fact that it is usually directed to heterosexual male audiences in 
order to arouse them sexually. In most cases, then, what the 
pornographer is doing in making a pornographic speech at least must 
involve telling his audiences what sex is like and what women are like. 
Austin argued that, in a case where the speaker ýoes not have 
corresponding intentions, thoughts, or feelings in making a particular 
utterance (such as when someone says "I promise", without in fact 
intending to keep the promise), it would constitute a kind of speech 
act which he called "abuse" (Austin, 1976: 16; see also the earlier 
reference in Section 2). If the speaker in fact does not have 
corresponding thoughts or feelings in making an utterance, we may 
say that it is not the right way of using the words, or it is a kind of 
"abuse" of the way that words are usually put to use. Austin, however, 
argued that, in a case like this too, the illocutionary act is still 
"achieved". It seems to mean that the utterance would still be taken as 
the act of a certain sort by the audience, because of the explicitness of 
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the meaning of the words used and the context of the speech (although 
he also added that this is not a "happy" perfonnance of speech). 
The same thing might be said of the poM'Ographer's speech acts. 
When he claims that he has no intention to identify or characterize 
women and sexuality, when in fact he can be taken to be doing so, it 
might be a case of "abuse"; we will still consider him as doing these 
speech acts. 
Thus, it appears that pornographers are identifying and characterizing 
women, their sexuality, and male/female sex roles; they are putting 
forward their beliefs, thoughts, or attitudes. These illocutionary acts of 
pornography basically fall into the category of "assertives". according 
to Searle's classification of speech acts, and "expositives", in Austin's 
(Searle, 1979: 12-13; Austin, 1976: 161-163). Searle explains that 
when one makes an assertive illocutionary act, one is saying in 
principle that "something is (or is not) the case", whether in a strong 
form of assertion or a weak form of suggestion, and this statement 
could be assessed as true or false. 
The illocution of pornography may be claimed to be a "directive", 
again according to Searle's list, and an exercitive according to 
Austin's; the pornographer may be advising or inviting his audiences 
to do some acts (ibid.: 13-14; Austin, 1976: 155-156). But this claim 
is stronger, and at least it seems we can say that pornography's 
illocution is one of assertives or expositives. And these illocutionary_ 
acts of identifying or characterizing usually appear to be recognized 
by the pornographer's audience, and therefore, their illocutionary acts 
are in general successfully performed. 
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6. Pornography's subordinating speech acts 
I have thus argued that pornography is more likely to be performing 
"communicative" illocutionary acts; that it generally performs 
illocutionary acts of characterizing and identifying women, their 
sexuality, and male/female sex roles; and these acts are normally 
successfully performed. However, I have not yet considered whether 
or not these acts can constitute subordination of women. As we have 
seen, Langton argued that the speaker must have "authority" to 
perform subordinating speech, and thus that pornography must also be 
authoritative to achieve its subordinate acts. If pornographers are not 
authoritative in the relevant domain of sex, then, Langton concludes, 
pornography does not subordinate. I will address in this section 
whether or not the speaker's authority is really necessary for 
subordinating speech. I will ask whether or not pornography may be 
said to perform subordinating speech acts, even without the condition 
of the pornographer's authority. 
Whether or not some speech can be regarded as subordination of 
course depends on the idea of what subordinating speech is. We would 
first therefore need to reexamine this notion. For this purpose, it 
appears it is useful to draw on discussions of other controversial 
speech, such as racist or hate speech. It has been contended that this 
kind of speech also harms and subordinates some groups of people. 
Andrew Altman, in explaining the wrongs of hate speech, also used 
Austin's distinction between perlocution and illocution. He argued 
that what the critics of hate speech are often concerned about is not 
really the perlocutionary effects of such speech but rather its "speech- 
act wrong", the illocutionary acts of subordination of racial minorities 
performed by the utterances (Altman, 1993: 309). He claims that such 
illocutionary acts constitute a wrong, because they perform "the act of 
treating someone as a moral subordinate! ' (ibid.: 309-3 10). 
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Altman then explains that "treating persons as moral subordinates 
means treating them in a way that takes their interests to be 
intrinsically less important, and their lives inherently less valuable, 
than the interests and lives of those who belong to some reference 
group" (ibid.: 3 10). There are many ways of treating someone as one's 
subordinate, he says, including such acts as "slavery", "genocide", and 
"segregation". Slavery and genocide, according to him, are "natural" 
ways of subordinating people, by their violation of the universal moral 
law. Segregation is also "natural" in this sense, but it also invokes a 
particular social means of subordinating someone. Importantly, 
however, "the language of racist, sexist, and homophobic slurs and 
epithets provides wholly conventional ways of treating people as 
moral subordinates" (ibid.: 310). Hence, some utterances, which 
employ "slurs" and "epithets", are subordinating speech, because they 
resort to the "conventional" means of "[putting] down" some people, 
marking them out as having "inferior moral standing" (ibid.: 3 10). 
Altman considers that only those kinds of speech, such as hate speech 
which uses the language of "slurs" and "epithets", are examples of 
subordinating speech. However, some utterances may not explicitly 
use such conventional vocabularies and yet may still perform 
subordinating illocutionary acts. Although this was perhaps not 
intended by Altman, I think that the basic sense of subordinating 
speech acts can still be gained from the notion of "treating someone as 
a moral subordinate", or treating someone in a way that his or her 
"life' and "interests" are "less valuable" than those of some others. To 
treat someone as inferior, or as one's subordinate, may also be to 
assert one's own superiority, one's relative power and privilege over 
the other. If speech subordinates, then, it must express and enact such 
an attitude or thought. This is, however, admittedly still a crude notion 
of subordination, and is by no means a "definition" I of what 
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subordinating speech is. Nonetheless, I would like to use this notion 
tentatively as a possible measure. It seems to be also in line with the 
basic sense of subordination suggested by Langton; she says that she 
largely agrees with MacKinnon, who is quoted as saying more 
generally that "to subordinate someone is to put them in a position of 
inferiority or loss of power, to demean or denigrate them" (Langton, 
1993: 303). 
I would therefore suggest that subordinating speech first and foremost 
expresses and enacts such an attitude, thought, or belief. If 
pornography can count as subordinating speech, it must also perform 
such an illocutionary act. There are, however, two points to add to this 
claim. First, we have to remember that we are here not considering 
whether or not pornography has actual perlocutionary potential of 
subordination. We consider only whether or not it performs an 
illocutionary act of subordination. Second, I suggest that pornography 
may be seen as performing subordinating illocutionary acts, if their 
basic illocutionary acts (such as the acts of identifying or 
characterizing) show the features noted earlier (e. g., treating someone 
as morally inferior). Ordinary illocutionary acts, whether 
communicative or conventional, assertive or exercitive, may be said to 
constitute subordinating speech acts by virtue of such features. 
Therefore, the aspects of subordination are themselves independent of 
such a condition as the speaker's intention and its recognition. 
When subordinating speech acts are considered in this way, the 
condition of the speaker's authority ceases to be an essential factorfor 
the performance of subordinating speech acts. If the pornographer 
does not have authority, his speech acts would not be verdictive; his 
speech, of course, would not be an authoritative illocution that lays 
down a "truth" or "facV', such as a jury's verdict. Nevertheless, his 
speech acts might still have features of subordinating speech. If 
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pornography treats women fundamentally as men's subordinates and 
enacts the hierarchical relationship between men and women in its 
performance of illocutions, then it could be seen as subordinating 
speech. In the following, I will discuss a few examples to see whether 
this may not be right. 
An example of pornography given by Andrea Dworkin, which was 
captioned as "Beaver Hunters", may count as such an illocutionary act 
of subordination (Dworkin, A., 1981: 25-26). In this example, a naked 
woman is seen tied onto the hood of a jeep, and two men, dressed as 
hunters, are seen inside the jeep. The rope wraps all over the woman's 
body and ties her firmly to the front of the jeep. Her head is turned, so 
she remains anonymous; only her genitals are shown. The caption of 
the photograph reads, according to Dworkin, that these hunters 
" 'Stuffed and mounted their trophy as soon as they got her home' " 
(ibid.: 26). Dworkin argues that the paradigmatic theme of 
pornography is "male power". We could indeed see that the power is 
asserted in this representation. We cannot deny that it expresses it; it 
expresses the theme of "who has the power to do what to whom". 
Dworkin suggests that the woman in this photograph has "no self' 
(ibid.: 26). She is deadly inert, with no trace of her own expression. 
We in fact do not know what kind of person she is, or what feelings 
she has. The pornographer characterizes the woman here as a mere 
"trophy", a thing to be "possessed", or a thing to be "stuffed and 
mounted". In characterizing the woman as an inert object for mere 
sexual use, the pornographer in effect denies her full autonomy and 
expression of feelings. In making this speech, then, the pornographer 
is asserting men's power over women; what men can do to women. It 
is asserting particularly that men can sexually subordinate women. It 
is thereby treating women's feelings and interests as inherently less 
significant than those of men. The pornographer is here not merely 
presenting his "viewpoint", but actually acting out this viewpoint. In 
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this respect, this pornographic speech is performing illocutionary acts 
of subordination of women. 
Dworkin's example is nevertheless what some would call a "violent" 
type of pornography. A majority of pornography may be just "graphic 
explicit" representation of female nudity. Feminists, including 
Langton, have however contended that this type of pornography is 
problematic too; it ranks women as inferior sex ob ects. We will now 
consider whether or not this kind of pornography also performs 
subordinating speech acts. 
In order to address this point, I will draw on the observation by John 
Berger and others about what they see as the different modes of 
existence of men and women. According to Berger et al., the basic 
fact of a man's existence is that he is promised "power". He exerts his 
power towards an object which is always outside of himself. A man's 
presence suggests that he is capable of exercising his power (Berger, 
et al., 1972: 45-46), and thus he is essentially an actor who can act on 
his will. In contrast, a woman's existence is fundamentally defined in 
terms of her relation to others. A woman's life is essentially that of 
being watched, observed, and "surveyed" by others (ibid.: 46). Since 
they were born, women have learned to be conscious about their 
appearance and behaviour, especially how they appear to male 
observers. A woman comes to know that she is being watched, and 
therefore she also constantly watches her appearance and movements 
and checks how they might look to others. She is thus always_ 
"accompanied by her own image of herself'. "Her own sense of being 
in herself is supplanted by a sense of being appreciated as herself by 
another" (ibid.: 46). 
Berger et al. observe the differences in the modes of being between 
men and women as follows: 
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One might simplify this by saying: men act and women appear. 
Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. 
This determines not only most relations between men and 
women but also the relation of women to themselves. The 
surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed female. Thus 
she turns herself into on object - and most particularly an object 
of vision: a sight (ibid.: 47). 
Berger et al. suggest that this is the basic structure of relation between 
men and women in the West (and they also suggest that this has been 
so historically). Men are the actors, who watch and "survey" women. 
Women are the objects, who are watched and surveyed by men. 
Women's existence is dependent not on how they think they are but 
how they are appreciated by the male gaze. What Berger et al. 
implicitly suggest here is that, in this structure of relations, women 
essentially play the subordinate role to men; their lives and interests 
have to adjust to those of men, and their status is often relegated to 
that of object. Although I leave open the question here whether or not 
this is really the fact of "most" relations between men and women as 
Berger et al. claim, it seems that we can draw a parallel between this 
relational structure and what some pornographic speech appears to do, 
in merely representing nude female bodies or their sexuality. Here 
pornographic speech acts enact this hierarchical relation in which 
women are fundamentally "objects" whose value is determined by 
male "surveyors". The depiction of women in this kind of 
pornography is not really expressing women's own sexuality or 
feelings; in fact, the expression of female sexuality is quite often made 
to respond to their viewers' preferences. Pornography speaks abour 
women, but it speaks in a manner that it is not women's own 
subjective feelings that determine their own sexual identity, but it is 
crucially the potential male observer's viewpoint that determines it. It 
is how women appear sexually to those men that pornography speaks 
of. Here women's own subjective feelings are intrinsically less 
important compared to the man's, "the surveyor's", point of view. 
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This type of pornography, in characterizing women and their sexual 
bodies, in effect places women in the position of objects. Feminists' 
claim that pornography treats women merely as sexual objects, 
therefore, does not seem to be implausible; pornography appears to be 
treating women in the way that their interests and feelings do not 
count as much as men's. 
I have thus observed two types of pornographic speech. One is more 
blatant than the other, but both appear to treat women as having 
inferior standing and enact gender hierarchy in its illocutions. In 
particular, the one asserts that women can be sexually subordinated 
and the other puts women in the position of mere sex objects. If the 
feminists' concern about pornography is right, much of it may now be 
performing such subordinating speech acts. As long as it performs 
these acts, pornography may be said to be subordinating speech - it 
performs illocutionary acts of subordination - iffespective of the 
pornographer's authority. 
7. The question of authority 
I have so far argued that pornography may be considered as 
illocutionary acts of subordination even without the condition of the 
speaker's authority. It not only voices certain viewpoints but also acts 
out these viewpoints; it treats women as men's subordinates. 
There seems, nonetheless, a point to be acknowledged about the status 
of the speaker's authority, and I will deal with this point before I make 
a concluding remark. Even though pornography may perform 
subordinating acts, as I have discussed, these may not be thought to be 
so problematic, in terms of its social implications, if the status of 
pornographic speech in society is in fact quite low. If pornographers 
are indeed social "underdogs", whose influence reaches, only a 
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minority of members in society, then their speech will not seem to 
have much impact. If, on the other hand, they are deemed to have 
some significant status in the sexual domain, then their speech will 
certainly have more relevance. It seems to me that, in case where 
pornography is authoritative, its subordinating speech acts simply 
would have much more social and political significance. Although I 
suggested that the speaker's authority is perhaps not necessary for the 
performance of subordinating speech acts, it is to be acknowledged 
that, in case where the speaker is authoritative, such speech acts would 
acquire more important character. 
This point can perhaps be further explained, using Austin's concept of 
"force". He summarized the idea of this "force" of an utterance as 
"how ... it is to be taken" (Austin, 1976: 73). One might use the word 
"meaning" for "force" as well, but Austin wanted to distinguish the 
notion from the traditional sense of "meaning" as "sense and 
reference" (ibid.: 100). As we have seen, "how an utterance is to be 
taken" is not only a matter of the meanings of the words used 
(important as these may be) but also a function of the speaker's use of 
these words, or illocutionary acts. In Austin's theory, "forces of 
utterances" came to surround "forces of illocutions". Although what 
the speaker is doing with his or her words is relevant to the force of 
utterance, the social conditions or circumstances of the speaker also 
seem to change the character of this force. In the case of authoritative 
speech, I think that the authority of the speaker gives an additional 
dimension to its force; hence, how an authority's utterance is "to be 
taken" is ultimately different from nonauthoritative speech. 
Searle explained that certain social factors do affect the force of 
illocutions. Such factors as the relative position or status of the 
speaker and the hearer can change the illocutionary force of an 
utterance. Thus, the same utterance (i. e., having the same locutionary 
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content) made by a different speaker can carry a different illocutionary 
force. For instance, "[i]f the general asks the private to clean up the 
room, that is in all likelihood a command or an order. If the private 
asks the general to clean up the room, that is likely to be a suggestion 
or proposal or request but not an order or command" (Searle, 1979: 5- 
6). Here the institutional hierarchy makes the general's utterance an 
order and the private's a request. The factor of the relative standing of 
the speaker and the hearer involves not only such institutional facts 
but also a sheer power difference. Thus, according to Searle, "an 
armed robber in virtue of his possession of a gun may order as 
opposed to, e. g., request, entreat, or implore victims to raise their 
hands" (ibid.: 7). 
If we take Searle's last point that the relative power difference 
between the speaker and the hearer can affect the force of illocutions, 
this is perhaps one way in which a derogatory remark may have more 
subordinating force. An epithet such as "nigger" or "faggot" may not 
actually causally create the subordinate status of the addressee; 
however, if the speaker represents a relatively powerful group in 
society and the hearer a less powerful and stigmatised, the illocution 
of the utterance would have more force of a "put-down". This 
illocutionary force of subordination derives from the background 
social context, from the associated meaning of words and their 
everyday use, which are intertwined with the reality of social 
inequality. It reflects the social fact that the group which the speaker 
represents is a powerful one and that it is generally in the position to 
look down on a member belonging to the less powerful and 
stigmatýsed group. 
What about when the speaker represents not sheer power but a certain 
position of authority? According to Searle, when an ordinary person 
asserts that something is the case, it is likely to have the force of 
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"assertive", whilst when someone in authority asserts that something 
is the case, it has the force of "assertive declarations" (ibid.: 20, 
emphasis added). An authoritative utterance by a judge or an umpire 
can issue a judgement, assessment, or decision about certain facts. In 
doing so judges or umpires may simply make some "factual claims", 
or descriptive statements, such as "you are guilty" or "you are out". 
The significance of such authoritative utterances is said to be that at 
the same time they have the illocutionary "force of declarations"; "[ilf 
the umpire calls you out (and is upheld on appeal), then for baseball 
purposes you are out regardless of the facts in the case, and if the 
judge declares you guilty (and is upheld on appeal), then for legal 
purposes you are guilty" (ibid.: 19). The chief characteristic of the 
illocutionary force of authoritative speech, which distinguishes it from 
nonauthoritative speech, is this "force of declarations". Although in 
real life there may be recourses to appeal against the authorities' 
decisions, authoritative illocutions in principle have this force to lay 
down a "truth", to deliver a judgement, as to certain matters of fact. 
Thus, once a judge declares you "guilty", you are guilty. The 
authorities' saying so and so count as so and so by virtue of some 
already existing institutional rules (a judge's remark in an appropriate 
situation is a verdict). This is perhaps true of not only the institutional 
authority but of an authority based on expertise or specialized 
knowledge; a professor's (not a student's) and a doctor's (not a 
layman's) utterances usually carry the force of declarations. 
Langton elaborated this nature of authoritative illocutions. She argued 
that authoritative speech is distinctive, because it has two kinds of 
power to "construct reality". First, authoritative illocutions, such as 
Austin's verdictives, create reality by their "constitutive" dimension, 
or "by making it count as so" (Langton, 1998: 268). Langton's 
discussion of this "constitutiW' power of authoritative speech is 
similar to Searle's notion of "force of declarations" described earlier: 
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"when [verdictives] bring it about that something counts as thus and 
so, it is 'taken to be' thus and so. When someone in authority says, 
'This is how it is, it is 'taken as being' that way" (ibid.: 266). The 
second way in which authoritative illocutions create reality is by their 
causal or perlocutionary effect. When an umpire declares that the ball 
is out, he not only "confirms" the state of affairs but also actually 
subsequently creates that reality, in the sense that the reality [i. e. "the 
score, and the beliefs of the crowd" (ibid.: 266)] comes to accord with 
the umpire's words. Thus authoritative, verdictive speech has two 
ways of constructing social reality. If this force of verdictive is applied 
to subordinate people, then its effect would be exactly to create such 
reality. "If you are authoritatively ranked as inferior, you count 
socially as inferior and in this sense your social being is constructed as 
inferior, where the construction concerns how you stand in the eyes of 
others" (ibid.: 266-267, emphasis added). 
Once the umpire declares that the ball is "out", it is out, for the 
purpose of the game. And this force of declaration has the power to 
subsequently create the belief - that the ball is out - in the mind of 
others. Authoritative speech in this respect has more potential to 
create the reality of society than nonauthoritative one. It follows, then, 
that if pornographers have authority in the domain of sex, their 
utterances can carry this illocutionary force of declarations and the 
power to construct reality. Pornographers' utterances would carry 
more weight by their declarative force; and their saying of so and so 
will be believed to be so and so by their audience as their causal effect. 
If women are ranked as inferior by the pornographer's speech acts, 
they would be regarded as inferior "in the eyes of' their audiences. 
Thus, we may say that, if pornographers are authoritative, their 
subordinating speech acts would more effectively subordinate women 
in reality. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined, through the application of speech act 
theory, the feminist claim that pornography constitutes subordination 
of women. In contrast to Langton, I argued mainly that pornography is 
more likely to perform "communicative" illocutionary acts, and that 
these acts may still be considered as subordinating speech acts, even 
without the presence of the pornographer's authority. Pornography 
expresses and enacts gender hierarchy, treats women as men's 
subordinates, through the performance of its illocutions. By virtue of 
such features, I suggested that they may be regarded as subordinating 
speech. 
Nonetheless, I also acknowledged that these subordinating acts would 
carry more social weight if the speaker, the pornographer, has some 
authoritative status in the relevant domain. If they are authoritative, 
then their speech would carry the illocutionary force of verdict or 
declaration and have more power to effect social reality according to 
their claims. Indeed, if they are authoritative, the social status of their 
speech seems to be higher. 
As the status of the speaker is an extra-linguistic element, this issue of 
the pornographer's authority lies outside the scope of speech act 
theory. However, for the debate on pornography and subordination of 
women, this issue of authority ultimately seems to require further 
attention. To be sure, feminists like MacKinnon are keen to emphasize 
the role of pornography in the subjection of women, and therefore, its 
social significance may in the end become a crucial matter. Although 
speech act theory helps to explain the perfonnative and constitutive 
aspect of pornographic speech, and thus illuminates the feminist 
argument about constitutive harms of pornography, it now appears 
that the issue also needs to be explored further from a different 
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dimension. The issue now involves the social status or social 
significance of the pornographer and pornographic speech. 
Notes 
I The argument against paternalistic or moralistic intervention is, of course, a 
familiar liberal one, represented in such works as Mill's On Liberty. Leslie 
Green also mentions the implications of paternalism and moralism reflected 
in the pornography debate (Green, 1998,2000). A forceful defence of 
pornography made on the grounds of individual autonomy is given by 
Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin, 1986). Dworkin argues that even though the 
majority of citizens in society do agree on certain kinds of morality and even 
though the community as a whole would be better off by protecting such 
morality, individual persons have the "right to moral independence". which 
the majority cannot override: "People have the right not to suffer 
disadvantage in the distribution of social goods and opportunities, including 
disadvantage in the liberties permitted to them by the criminal law, just on 
the ground that their officials or fellow-citizens think that their opinions 
about the right way for them to lead their own lives are ignoble or wrong" 
(ibid.: 353). Thus, the people's right to produce and consume pornography 
would be defended according to this principle of "moral independence". 
Although I do not directly engage with Dworkin's arguments, over the 
course of the thesis, I will question whether Dworkin is not failing to realize 
the extent to which women are facing certain social and political 
disadvantages, because of (if not exclusively due to) the practice such as 
pornography. 
2 As Green also notes, even if there is such evidence of a causal link between- 
pornography and various harms to women, there is, of course, the issue of 
"moral responsibility" of those individuals who actually carry out harmful 
acts (Green, 1998: 289). Thus, the case of pornography involves the problem 
of "mental intermediation" (Sadurski, 1996: 715). 
3 To be precise, in this context, MacKinnon argues that there is "complex 
causality" bet%yeen pornography and its harms. MacKinnon's understanding 
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of causality, however, certainly differs from the "linear" variety discussed in 
my preceding paragraphs. Here she also points to constitutive nature of 
pornography's harm; the harm is constituted in its action; "the way [it] 
targets and defines women for abuse and discrimination" and undermines 
women's standing in its speech. As I also discuss later, what she suggests is 
that the harm done is first and foremost to women as a group and not to 
individual women in particular (MacKinnon, 1987: 156-157). 
4 In the original texts that I consult (Austin, 1961,1976), Austin's 
terminology and key concepts are often italicised or capitalized. I will 
mostly omit these original emphases in my quotations. 
5 Searle's concepts of "utterance acts" and "propositional acts" seem to 
suggest the same level of speech acts as Austin's "locutionary acts". 
6 MacKinnon did not rely so much on Austin's speech act theory, partly 
because, she says, he did not "generalize' the concept of speech acts to all 
types of speech. She explains: "Austin is less an authority for my particular 
development of 'doing things with words' and more a foundational 
exploration of the view in language theory that some speech can be action" 
(MacKinnon, 1996: 121, n. 31). 
7 From Austin's theory we know that the saying of certain words in a certain 
specific context constitutes the performance of a specific act. Speech act 
theory addresses the meaning of individual utterances. The question that 
could be raised regarding Langton is then how we are to generalize from the 
case of one speech act to pornographic speech acts overall, which is not just 
one but many. I will return to this point later. 
'To be precise, Grice's notion of the speaker's intention enumerated here is 
the intention to produce a perlocutionary effect in the hearer (belief), and 
differs from the kind of intention involved in illocutionary acts. Searle 
amends Grice's theory and incorporates it into his own. The point here is 
that Grice stressed the importance of the speaker's intention in an utterance. 
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9 Hornsby names the felicity condition that enables illocution "reciprocity" 
(Hornsby, 1994: 192). For communication the speaker typically relies on "a 
certain receptiveness" on the part of the hearer. "When reciprocity obtains 
between people, they are such as to recognize one another's speech as it is 
meant to be taken" (ibid.: 192). See Chapter Five for further discussion. 
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Chapter Two 
Authority of Pornography 
This chapter pursues the question of the "authority" of pornography 
raised in the previous chapter. I will first discuss how the social 
meaning of pornography might be explained. For this purpose I will 
borrow and rely on ideas from the philosophy of the "Background". I 
will argue that the contemporary pornographer may be said to be 
"authoritative", in the sense that his role reflects, and embodies, 
certain distinctive values and norms of society. The significance of 
pornography seems to emerge once the relation between pornography 
and its wider context is carefully studied. 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded that pornography is likely to be 
subordinating speech, but it also raised and acknowledged the 
importance of the authority of the speaker, the pornographer. The 
question is now whether or not the pornographer has any "authority". 
Some may argue for the authoritative status of pornography by 
pointing to the existence of "power" - men's power over women. In 
fact, much emphasis has been made in the feminist literature on 
pornography on the relation between "male power" or "'male 
supremacy" on the one hand and pornography on the other: "Ibe 
major theme of pornography as a genre is male power" (Dworkin, A. 
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1981: 24); "[pornography] is a way of seeing and using women. Male 
power makes authoritative a way of seeing and treating women" 
(MacKinnon, 1987: 130); "[t]he power of pornographers is based on 
the collective power of men over women" (Kappeler, 1992: 98; also 
Kappeler, 1986; Itzin, 1992a). This view suggests that pornography 
can be authoritative simply because it reflects or represents the 
viewpoint of the powerful; it suggests that the perspective of the 
powerful imposes itself as what is true, objective, right, and legitimate 
(especially, MacKinnon, 1982,1983). 1 
Liberal theorists, however, tend to deny pornography's social power, 
and besides, even if they accept that pornography reflects men's all- 
pervasive power, they would argue that power is not the same as 
authority. There is in fact an important and rather complex relation 
between power and authority; nonetheless, these are not regarded as 
conceptually synonymous. Joseph Raz says, for instance: 
It is clear that not every power amounts to an authority. My 
neighbour can stop me from growing tall trees in my garden by 
threatening to bum rubbish by my border. He, therefore, has 
some, power over me but no authority. Nor does his power turn 
into an authority just by the fact that I acquiesce and do not pick 
a fight with him (Raz, 1988: 24). 
Green similarly suggests that power by itself does not constitute 
authority, although it is sometimes an essential condition to justify the 
claim to authority. An authority's claims typically affect (and possibly 
alter) the beliefs and actions of others, but "[aluthority ... differs from 
other forms of effective social power in that it works not through brute 
force or manipulation, but through the giving and accepting of reasons 
of a certain kind" (Green, 1998: 293,309, n. 25). In other words, if 
some entities are considered as authoritative, what they claim must be 
perceived to be "binding" or "legitimate" by other members of society. 
Equally, if the pornographer is to be authoritative, the norms which he 
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represents must also be seen to be 'legitimate" and widely accepted in 
society. 
Liberal theorists are generally dismissive of the thought that 
pornography could have any authority. Wojciech Sadurski is one such 
theorist. In countering Langton's suggestion that the pornographer 
might indeed be authoritative in the sexual domain of life, he argues 
that the pornographer simply does not meet the criteria of authority. 
He claims that the pornographer in our society is rather like the 
character of "low type", whom Austin mentioned in his examples of 
speech acts; that is, the pornographer is like someone who 
illegitimately tries to name a ship; someone who attempts to do some 
act despite not having the rightful authority to do so. In the case of the 
pornographer, he is attempting to give a "verdict" on appropriate 
sexual behaviour, in spite of lacking this authority. Sadurski believes 
that this should be obvious to anyone; no one recognizes the 
pornographer's "legitimate right to issue a verdict" on sexual conduct 
or on women, and it is even "counter-intuitive" to suggest that they 
have such authority over these matters. He shores up his claim by 
citing a survey which reported that both male and female adolescents 
say they regard pornography as the "least important source of sexual 
information" (Sadurski, 1996: 720-722, n. 26). 
Green shares Sadurski's view. He thinks that pornographers 
essentially fail to pass the test of authority. Whatever norms they may 
stipulate to their audiences, pornographers fail to meet the conditions_ 
of "legitimacy" and "efficacy", which are crucial for someone's being 
authoritative. Pornographers are likely to lack those qualities, because 
their norms are significantly offset by other contending, "putative 
social authorities", such as "the state, the family, and the church". 
Green concludes that pornography in our society is nothing but "low- 
status", 'despised speech, which is only "tolerated" for the sake of our 
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commitment to such political values as freedom of speech (Green, 
1998: 292-297). 
The liberal theorists' views are actually in line with a common 
perception about the status of pornography. It does seem prima facie 
counter-intuitive to suggest that pornography is authoritative and 
respected speech. To some, even the combination of "authority" and 
"pornography" sounds oxymoronic. Moreover, the authority of 
pornography seems to be denied just as its effects are denied. Recall 
the earlier discussion in Chapter One, which introduced some 
sceptical views about the causal effects of pornography on sexual 
crime or sexual attitudes. The causal connection may be invoked in 
the opposite direction; it might be argued that the fact that there is not 
much proven influence of pornography suggests that it does not have 
any authority. 
In fact, it appears to me that both positions are unsatisfactory. The 
power argument, though it looks attractive, to the extent that one 
agrees that men generally do hold social power, is still vulnerable to a 
criticism that "power" is not the same as "authority". The power 
argument does not explain the "legitimacy" of pornographic speech in 
society and does not satisfactorily answer a Green-type objection that 
pornographic norms are inevitably challenged and undermined by 
other authorities, values, and norms in society. Furthermore, even if 
pornography is a function of power, it still does not explain why the 
viewpoint of the powerful successfully maintains itself, not being 
destabilized by the presence of other views. In short, although an 
aspect of power might be present, it alone does not explain the special 
status of pornography. 
The liberal (and the commonsensical) view on the other hand seems to 
preclude rather too readily any significance of pornography. They 
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seem to do so because they rather start from an assumption that 
authority is something that we always openly revere, or that an 
authority is an entity whose legitimacy we explicitly recognize and 
endorse. They seem to hold these assumptions and argue that it is 
patently obvious that pornography cannot be authoritative. It can 
nevertheless be argued that the kind of "authority" involved might 
require a rather different explanation, and therefore that the notions 
that are typically associated with the concept of authority, such as 
explicit recognition or acceptance of legitimacy, may actually prevent 
us from seeing what is involved by giving us certain perceptions about 
what authorities are to begin with. 
It appears to me, therefore, that these liberal and feminist arguments 
have not fully explained the social meaning of pornography. How 
might it be, then, better explained? In this chapter I will attempt to 
explain this social meaning and significance of pornography, first 
borrowing ideas from, what may be called, the philosophy of the 
"Background" (for an account of this concept, see Hekman, 1999: 
120-149; see also Searle, 1995: 127-147; and Taylor, 2004: 25). What 
I call the idea of the "Background" in this chapter, however, is 
particularly informed by the thoughts of Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
some communitarian thinkers. The philosophy of the Background tells 
us that the possibility and intelligibility of our particular beliefs, 
speech, and actions derive from, and depend upon, already existing 
and shared understandings, standards, norms, or practices of society. 
Particular beliefs, speech, and actions, if they are meaningful therefore, 
reflect or invoke such understandings, norms, etc., and their meaning 
becomes fully intelligible against the background of such a shared 
framework. I will argue that pornography can also be understood in 
the same manner; even pornography, which some see as only loathed 
and detested speech, is also part of the society's cultural form, and its 
meaning derives from its social context. Pornography reflects some 
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distinctive moral and cultural values and norms of society; perhaps not 
only that; it has come to embody these very values and norms in 
present-day liberal societies. 
Although in the previous chapter I examined pornography's individual 
speech acts, in the present chapter, I treat pornography as a category 
of speech, or speech activity, and attempt to explain its social meaning 
and significance. In Section 2,1 summarize some key ideas of the 
philosophy of the Background, especially focusing on that which 
appears in the later Wittgenstein's thought. In Section 3,1 apply the 
concept to pornography, and argue that it probably reflects some quite 
familiar and commonly shared values and norms. In Section 4,1 
explain that people who hold these values and norms actually do not 
always have explicit awareness of these values and norms; nor do they, 
therefore, necessarily self-consciously choose or expressly endorse 
what these values and norms embody. These values and norms are 
more likely to involve people's unquestioned and unexamined habits 
of thought, everyday assumptions, or what Charles Taylor called the 
"imaginary" understanding. It is because of the nature of the way 
these values and norms are usually held that they are often not directly 
contested by other moral values. In Section 5,1 point out the relation 
between such implicit, imaginary understandings and the notion of 
authority. Society has such understandings, values, and norms, which 
may be only implicitly assumed by members of society but still play a 
major role in shaping and guiding their everyday attitude, thinking, 
and behaviour. What pornography reflects can also be said to be such 
implicit but distinctive values and norms. In section 6,1 will argue that 
the role of the contemporary pornographer is special, furthermore, 
because it is the social role that embodies and exemplifies these values 
and norms. It is the "exemplar" that carries and demonstrates these 
cultural understandings for other members of society. 
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In order to avoid possible confusion, I wish to clarify the terminology 
before I proceed. In the previous chapter I explained my use of words 
such as the "pornographer" or "pornography" (see Section 4, Chapter 
One). By "pornography" I referred to the type of speech which has an 
explicit sexual content and which is intended to stimulate heterosexual 
male audiences. This definition basically remains the same. But 
pornography is also seen as a form of meaningful human activity. I 
mean by "pornographer" anyone who makes pornographic speech or 
pornographic utterances, and therefore the use is not restricted to 
occupational pornographers, although, in real life, a large number of 
"pornographers" are probably such professional producers of 
pornography. But the pornographer here does not necessarily mean an 
occupational role but rather refers to a role which one engages in 
when one makes pornographic speech. 
2. The "Background" 
I start this section with a particular example given by Peg O'Connor. 
O'Connor reflects on the spate of church burnings and bombings 
which occurred in the southern United States in the 1990s (O'Connor, 
2002: 41-59). A number of African-American churches were also 
involved in these incidents. The National Church Arson Task Force 
(hereafter the Task Force), which led the enquiry concluded that there 
was no "racially motivated conspiracy" behind these attacks. The Task 
Force's announcement somehow brought a sense of relief to the public, 
who thought that the matter had therefore been "dealt with" and_ 
resolved. O'Connor says that she anticipated that more public 
discussion regarding the whole incident would follow, but she found 
little. She argues that the way the public reacted to the Task Force's 
report was rather troubling. There was a certain tendency or 
complacency on the part of the white people to "slip easily from the 
conclusion that there was no racially motivated conspiracy behind the 
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burnings to the more sweeping conclusion that the burnings were not 
racially motivated at aIr' (ibid.: 43); or to think that, even if there 
were any racist acts, these were ultimately the acts of some wayward 
individuals, who are different and distinguishable from the rest of the 
population (ibid.: 43). 
O'Connor argues that people overlooked the true implications of the 
incidents, because they tried to uncover their meaning by looking into 
those incidents alone. The Task Force, which investigated individual 
acts of burnings, thought they found no obvious connections among 
them; hence they concluded that these were essentially individually 
motivated acts, with no further implications. This conclusion led the 
public to assume that the incidents represented nothing but 
exceptional, deviant acts of a small minority in society. However, 
what the Task Force did not consider further, and what the public did 
not question, according to O'Connor, was the background condition 
against which these incidents took place. 
After all, she suggests, the significance of these incidents comes to 
light only if we take into account the whole historical and social 
context of American society. The social context in which these 
burnings occurred encompasses the history of slavery, racial divisions 
and tensions, resentment, and other general "social and economic 
injustices" towards ethnic minorities. Historically speaking, African- 
American churches were repeatedly targeted for burnings in the 
antebellum South, as well as after the Civil War, and also during the 
civil rights movements (ibid.: 46-47). In short, O'Connor thinks that 
there is actually a complex of "attitudes, " beliefs", and "unthinking 
habitual actions", collectively shared by the white population, which 
are in the background of individual racist actions, such as church 
burnings, and which ultimately make these actions "possible and 
intelligible" (ibid.: 48). Individual actions, even including abominable 
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ones such as these, are enabled, and are given sense, by some 
commonly shared mentality and practices. 
O'Connor explains that this is a Wittgenstein way of looking at human 
behaviour, and argues that his notion of the background helps us to 
understand the meaning of social practices. Wittgenstein's notion of 
"the background" - or "form of life", rather, as it is usually referred to 
in the philosopher's text - features largely in his later works. The 
concept of the "background", or a thought akin to it, is in fact not 
unique to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but can be seen in many other 
theorists' works, including those of Pierre Bourdieu, Searle, and 
Taylor (Bourdieu, 1990,1992; Searle, 1995; Taylor, 1993,2004). 
Susan Hekman argues that the notion of the "background" actually 
permeated much of the late twentieth century philosophy - Hans- 
Georg Gadamer, Michael Oakeshott, and Michel Foucault, to give a 
few examples. According to her, they are the thinkers who expressed 
similar thoughts. Following Searle, Hekman calls this concept "the 
Background" (Hekman, 1999: 121-122), and I also adopt this 
terminology. In this section I mainlYl focus on the Wittgensteinian 
notion of the "Background". 
The first thing to be noted might be that what is actually to be 
included under the notion of the Background is broad, and it does not 
specify any particular social phenomena. It may rather generally refer 
to a social setting or social context. Wittgenstein nevertheless had a 
certain specific idea when he used the term "form of -life'. For 
Wittgenstein this notion is meant to signify the whole "natural and 
cultural circumstances", which are "presupposed" by members of a 
particular society and make up the worldviews of these members 
2 (Sluga, 1996: 22). Wittgenstein suggests that our beliefs, worldviews, 
as well as language, always presume such a shared framework or 
system, the Background; they are always part of a shared social life, 
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enmeshed, and interconnected with other various activities of the 
community. The idea of the Background tells us that the possibility 
and intelligibility of any particular beliefs, views, or activity 
ultimately derive from, and depend on, this Background. Any 
particular ideas, behaviours, and uses of language, if they are 
meaningful, always reflect or invoke already existing "common 
understandings", "standards", "norms", or "rules" in society, and can 
be made sense of against such understandings, standards, norms, rules, 
etc. 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein explains that we all have a certain 
"Picture of the world", or ideas about how the world works. We share 
certain ideas about reality and facts of life; we take for granted certain 
things in the world and normally do not doubt these things. We do not 
doubt, for example, a certain fact such as "the earth has existed during 
the last hundred years", or a mathematical proposition that "12 x 12 = 
144"; nor do we doubt simple and obvious facts that we have 
ancestors, or that people do not fly to and fro between the moon and 
the earth, or that solid objects like tables and chairs do not disappear 
suddenly (Wittgenstein, 1974: 20e, #138,8e, #43,31e, #234,16-17e, 
#106-108). He says that we believe in these things and do not doubt, 
not really because we have "satisfied" ourselves of these facts. It is 
rather because we already "inherited" these worldviews; we 
"inherited" them from society, which already firndy holds these views. 
Our particular worldviews hence come from the Background: "I did 
not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the 
inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false" (ibid.: l5e, #94). 
For one thing, therefore, the Background serves as the standard for 
judgements. It gives the conditions for doubt, "correctness, truth or 
I 
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falsity, rationality and justification" (O'Connor, 2002: 31) for 
members of society. There is always such a shared background, or a 
system of beliefs, within which individual beliefs have their sense. 
Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses how children are inculcated into a 
particular system of beliefs: 
The child learns to believe a host of things. Le. it learns to act 
according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of 
what is believed, and in that system some things stand 
unshakably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What 
stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or 
convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it (ibid.: 21e, 
#144). 
If a child insisted on asking whether or not the earth really existed 150 
years ago or whether objects do not really disappear while he is not 
watching, he would be told that he still has not leamed what he is 
supposed to learn ("He has not learned the game that we are trying to 
teach him" (ibid.: 40e, #315)). After a while the child would be told 
that he should stop doubting these things, for certain things in life just 
cannot be doubted. If an adult were also to doubt the existence of the 
earth 100 years ago, he would receive a very curious "reaction" from 
those around him. 
Wittgenstein's main concern in On Certainty is epistemological, 
which surrounds such questions as doubt and certainty; therefore, his 
discussion there centres on the kind of background understandings, 
which are deeply embedded in the society's world-picture, and are 
usually taken as "certain" by the members of society. However, othef 
kinds of ideas, beliefs, and knowledge-claims are also said to 
presuppose and invoke the Background. For example, someone may 
try to offer a reason for doing a particular action, or try to offer a 
justification for some belief. He may try to justify a certain 
knowledge-claim by invoking another knowledge-claim. But giving a 
reason or justifying a knowledge-claim needs to be made in a way that 
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is intelligible to other members of society. In the end, giving reasons 
and justifying knowledge always take place within an already shared 
system of knowledge, and are done by invoking available sets of 
knowledge and beliefs (cf. Kober, 1996: 416). 
The nature of the Background is fairly broad, as stated earlier. It 
encompasses a particular society's shared understandings and 
practices. It can include customs, institutions, values, and beliefs, and 
practices, which carry out these values and beliefs. According to 
Michael Kober, Wittgenstein's idea of a world-picture, for example, 
comprises such things as 
traditions, tales, or legends ... the world's shape and processes (the seasons, the weather, the behaviour of plants and animals, 
the sexes, reproduction of the species, etc. ) as well as political 
structures, instructions of medical and/or psychological 
treatment, and religious beliefs - in brief, all those matters which 
may be of interest in a community's life (ibid.: 418). 
What is included in the Background does not need to be rigidly 
structured and systematized (ibid.: 418); however, what is important 
to the idea of the Background is still the idea of a certain shared or 
common framework: shared understandings, norms, or practices, of a 
given society, which give meaning and significance to particular 
beliefs and behaviour. The Background is also that which enables 
common practices, a common social life, to take place (cf. Hekman, 
1999: 122). What we will be focusing on in the discussion to follow, 
however, is the particular Background of a specific society; that is, 
that of a cotemporary Western liberal society, especially Britain and 
the United States of America. This will become relevant when we 
address the meaning of pornographic speech. 
Wittgenstein also thought that language is governed by the standards 
in the Background, or "rules". Use of language is an application of 
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such rules, and therefore understanding of language involves 
cc 'mastery' of a technique", learning the rules or "custom7' by which it 
is used (Wittgenstein, 2001: 50e, #150,68e, #198-199). Like Austin, 
Wittgenstein too thought that speaking a language is an activity, but 
he seemed to have gone further than Austin in emphasizing the extent 
to which language is embedded in society's form of life. The use of 
language is not an independent activity, severed from other human 
practices in the community, but rather "woven" into them. He called 
this activity, "consisting of language and actions into which it is 
woven" a "language-game" and stressed that "games" mean activities, 
which are "part of' the community's form of life (ibid.: 4e, V, l0e, 
#23). 
Earlier I cited O'Connor's interpretation of racist actions in American 
society. But already before O'Connor, Peter Winch extended 
Wittgensteinian philosophy, i. e., the idea of the Background, to the 
realm of social sciences and understanding of human behaviour in 
general (Winch, 1970a, 1970b, 1990). Winch argued that a human 
behaviour, if it is meaningful, must be governed by standards or rules 
existing in society. The question as to why humans act in a certain 
way can only be intelligibly answered in relation to their social setting. 
The explanation of human behaviour, therefore, should appeal to the 
"institutions and ways of life" of the society concerned (Winch, 1990.: 
83). 
Winch explains this by saying that human behaviours are often_ 
elucidated in terms of "reasons" and "motives". But "reasons" and 
"motives" are in turn made intelligible against certain "standards" or 
criteria already available in society. For example, a sociologist may 
offer an explanation of why a person N voted for the Labour Party at 
the last general election (ibid.: 45-46). He may say that N voted 
Labour because " 'that is the best way to preserve industrial peace' ". 
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But this reason, "to preserve industrial peace", can only make sense in 
terms of A"s understanding of certain social relations and standards 
existing in that society; that is, A"s understanding of what it means "to 
preserve industrial peace"; of existing social relations; of the form of 
government and its policies. In short, A"s own understanding of how 
this particular expectation is usually met in his society. ITs reason, in 
this sense then, invokes, and can be intelligible in the light of, the 
existing mode of social relations. 
Someone's "Motive' may also be explained in a similar way. Winch 
argues: 
To say, for example, that N murdered his wife from jealousy is 
certainly not to say that he acted reasonably. But it is to say that 
his act was intelligible in terms of the modes of behaviour which 
are familiar in our society, and that it was governed by 
considerations appropriate to its context. These two aspects of 
the matter are interwoven: one can act 'from considerations' 
only where there are accepted standards of what is appropriate to 
appeal to. The behaviour of Chaucer's Troilus towards Cressida 
is intelligible only in the context of the conventions of courtly 
love. Understanding Troilus presupposes understanding those 
conventions, for it is from them that his acts derive their 
meaning (ibid.: 82). 
The theory of the Background therefore emphasises that our particular 
beliefs and behaviours must presuppose a social setting or the 
Background, and their meaning derives from this Background. 
Particular beliefs and behaviours, if they are meaningful, invoke or 
reflect some shared understandings, practices, standards, rules, or_ 
norms already existing in society, and they can become fully 
intelligible only against such understandings, practices, standards, etc. 
There are, however, two further points to add here; one is that this 
notion of rules, norms, and standards should not be taken to mean that 
members of society always self-consciously choose or adhere to such 
rules, norms, or standards, and I will discuss this further later. To be 
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sure, Wittgenstein often stressed that children are 'trained" to master 
the use of language, and are inculcated into particular worldviews of 
the community. But what we adopt from the Background has not 
always resulted from such deliberate training and inculcation; nor are 
the norms or rules followed consciously. What I wish to point out here 
is that what members of society think and do reflect already available 
sets of norms and standards, and they can be elucidated in terms of 
such norms and standards. 
The other point is that the notion of standards. norms, or rules need 
not imply that people's activities always follow strict patterns. For one 
thing, whether or not activities follow such a strict pattern depends on 
the nature of the activities themselves. For example, "calculus" may 
indeed involve strict applications of a rule, but other activities may not 
exhibit such "exactness" (cf. Hintikka and Hintikka, 1986: 197-198). 
Wittgenstein certainly argued that learning of language is "a mastery 
of technique". hence following of a "rule or "custom". However, he 
also cmphasised the "multiplicity" of ways in which our words are put 
into use; what we call language, he argued, does not have 
"something ... common to aIr', but only "relationships". "similarities", 
or " 'family resemblances' " (Wittgenstein, 2001: 27e-28e, #65-67). 
7bcre are, for instance, language-games of "ordering" " "requesting", 
and "making a joke"t etc., but there are numerous sentences we can 
create, or numerous ways in which we can engage in these language- 
games (ibid.: l0e, #23). This suggests that the "rule-following" in 
language does not need to imply a rigorous application of rules. 
3. Pornography and the Background 
The notion of the Background similarly 'applies to pornography. - 
Pornography does not appear out of nowhere, but it too presupposes a 
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shared social setting, and its meaning derives from this Background. 
Wittgenstein also stated: 
How could a human behaviour be described? Surely only by 
sketching the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all 
mixed up together. What determines our judgement, our 
concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an 
individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, 
the background against which we see any action (Wittgenstein, 
1967: 99e, #567). 
Thus, take pornography on the one hand and "the hurly-burly of 
human actions" on the other. If we compare pornography and some 
other practices that take place in society, we may notice some 
similarities or relations among these activities. We may see, for 
example, some recurrent images in advertisements or television 
programmes, or encounter similar storylines in novels and magazines. 
In any society or culture, there are norms of sex and gender. Society 
has sexual values and norms, some of which may be found often in 
banal expressions of sexuality. People also have norms of gender; they 
have ideas about the male and the female; the ideas of their nature, 
sexuality, etc. In short, there are some quite familiar and common 
ideas, values, and norms surrounding sex and gender, which are 
reflected in everyday, ordinary practice. What pornography reflects 
are, therefore, such ideas, values and norms. 
O'Connor notes that the aspects of the Background are often so 
"familiar" that they might escape our attention. "As Wittgenstein says, 
'The aspects of things that are most important to us are hidden from u§ 
because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice 
something - because it is always before one's eyes. )' " (O'Connor, 
2002: 5; Wittgenstein, 2001: 43e, #129). What pornography reflects, 
therefore, may too have escaped our attention because of such 
"simplicity and familiarity". 
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O'Connor also points out that, in the ordinary use of the word, the 
backgrounds are usually considered as those which "set foreground 
objects in relief' (ibid.: 2). This is pertinent to our discussion here, for 
if we take pornography in "the foreground", so to speak, and see it 
more carefully against the background of its social setting, 
pornography's meaning indeed seems to emerge more clearly. Once 
we attend more closely to the relation between pornography and its 
Background, we may not be able to assume so easily that it is only a 
minority and marginal activity, which has not much to do with the 
wider society. It is also argued that "[p]arts of [the] backgrounds can 
stand out in relief when we look more closely at particular objects in 
the foreground" (ibid.: 3). By investigating the meaning of 
pornography, we would come to consider also what are those values 
and norms that make pornography possible and intelligible. Thus, 
attending to pornography will eventually highlight certain parts of the 
Background. Those Background values and norms related to 
pornography are examined in detail in Chapters Three and Four. 
4. Values, norms, "social imaginary" 
I have suggested that pornography reflects some rather familiar and 
common values and norms that members of society share. I want to 
elaborate a little further on the way these values and norms are usually 
carried and expressed. I want to point out that people who share these 
values and norms actually may not always have explicit understanding 
of these values and norms; nor do they, therefore, always self- 
consciously follow them or overtly endorse what they stand for. These, 
in other words, involve people's implicit understanding and 
unquestioned habits of thought. I will illustrate this by drawing on the 
idea of the "social imaginary" offered by Taylor. 
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Taylor also attended to the role of the Background, or "background 
understanding", in human practice (Taylor, 1993,2004). Our beliefs, 
theories, everyday activity, and our sense of relation to the world 
around us - these are ultimately given their meaning and content in 
relation to background understandings. But Taylor remarks further 
how some background understandings differ from our more explicit 
beliefs and ideas. 3 
In fact, we may distinguish, in line with Taylor, different levels of 
human understandings. These understandings may all relate to the 
same subject matters, but the level of explicitness or our reflection 
involved is different. Thus, at one level, we have a range of explicit 
beliefs and understandings. These are our "well-formulated" 
understandings, concepts, and theories; it articulates clearly our 
thoughts about society, God, nature, etc. Social scientists, according to 
Taylor, have long been focusing, perhaps too narrowly, on this level 
of thought. But below this explicit, or theoretical understanding, we 
have a body of less explicit understanding. Taylor argues that this is a 
set of largely "unformulated (and in part unformulable) 
understandings". To be sure, these understandings may be rendered as 
explicit and formulated into "beliefs", but they are normally not 
"functioning as such in the world" (Taylor, 1993: 215-216). An 
example of such "unformulated" understandings might be our familiar 
and taken-for-granted assumptions about the world, the kind of 
"world-picture" discussed by Wittgenstein. It includes, for example, 
our assumption that the earth did not come into existence just "five 
minutes ago", or that there will not be a "huge pit" in front of our 
house as we set off in the morning. Perhaps it is undeniable that we 
have such understandings. It is only that we normally do not reflect 
upon these things; they are only implicit in the whole way of our 
interaction with the world (ibid.: 215). 
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Such implied understanding, or one may say "pre-reflective" level of 
thoughts, also includes our "embodied" social and cultural 
understanding, which Bourdieu called "habitus". The "embodied" 
understanding or "habitus" is reflected in the ways we conduct 
ourselves in various social situations (ibid.: 217-218). We learn and 
pick up particular attitudes, manners, and outlook from a particular 
cultural setting. We learn and pick up, for example, the appropriate 
manner towards the elderly from the way others usually behave 
towards them. The "habitus" or "embodied" understanding thus 
shapes our attitudes and behaviour, and teaches us how to behave 
appropriately in various social contexts, but it then "become[s] 
unreflecting, 'second nature' to us" (ibid.: 217). We come to know 
how to conduct ourselves without reflecting upon what to do; we 
come to know, so to speak, our way around without consulting any 
guidance. Taylor argues that such embodied understanding in fact is 
wider. We may have explicit beliefs and doctrines about society and 
God, but our sense of relations to these things are also importantly 
shaped and nourished at the level of such embodied understanding. 4 
Taylor, however, points out another level of less-than-explicit 
understanding, which he calls "the symbolic", or the "social 
imaginary" (ibid.: 218,219). It is a kind of understanding that lies 
somewhere between the embodied understanding and the doctrinal or 
well-formulated understanding. Taylor explains that the "social 
imaginary" means "whatever understanding is expressed in ritual, in 
symbols (in the everyday sense), in works of art"; it differs from the 
embodied understanding in that it is "more explicit" than that, and 
involves a certain "mimetic or an evocative dimension, and hence 
points to something which they imitate or call forth" (ibid.: 218). It 
also importantly differs from the doctrinal understanding, for it is 
usually not "submitted to the demands of logic", or examined against 
"a metadiscourse', etc. (ibid.: 218). 
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Taylor expanded the notion of the "social imaginary" in his later work. 
He explains that, by the social imaginary, it is meant "the way 
ordinary people 'imagine' their social surroundings", social reality, or 
social relations; the way they imagine "how they fit together with 
others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the 
expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions 
and images that underlie these expectations" (Taylor, 2004: 23). In 
short, the social imaginary is a loose, unorganised, and unformulated 
thinking, but it is still significant in that it is widely shared, "common 
understanding that makes possible common practices" (ibid.: 23,25). 
It is indeed important to notice, firstly, how this imaginary 
understanding differs from theory. An imaginary is "often not 
expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and 
legends" (ibid.: 23). And unlike theory, it is more widely shared by a 
large number of people in society. Although the imaginary is not well- 
formulated, conceptualised understanding, it still importantly informs 
and enables people's common practices. People in a democratic 
society, for instance, know what it means to participate in "a general 
election" or "a demonstration", without having to be told about the 
meaning of these matters. Common practices like these are made 
possible by the already shared and implicit imaginary understanding 
of a democratic nation (ibid.: 24-26). 
Now what I want to suggest in relation to pornography is that the 
values and norms reflected by pornography are usually carried and 
expressed at the level of such social imaginary. These are probably 
different from deeply embedded worldviews, because they are 
certainly more explicit and call forth some images and ideas. But they 
also importantly differ from well-formulated or "doctrinal" 
understanding, because they are usually not held as explicit ideas as 
such. They do not reflect consciously and carefully examined thoughts, 
88 
but rather involve our much looser understanding. They are likely to 
be our unexamined and unquestioned habits of thought, everyday 
assumptions, or just the way ordinary people casually "imagine" and 
expect social reality. And thus they are often given expression in 
"images, stories, and legends", or "work of art". These values and 
norms of course could be made explicit, conceptualised and explained, 
but they are often not articulated in those terms. 
These values and norms are therefore not always self-consciously 
chosen or explicitly endorsed. It is true that, when we adopt a 
particular belief, or choose to take a particular action, we often engage 
in conscious decision-making. We consider alternatives carefully and 
chose one course of belief and action over another. When theists 
become atheists, for instance, they examine the arguments for and 
against these alternatives and make conscious decisions (Taylor, 1993: 
219). But it is not the case with the mode of the values and norms that 
I have been discussing. People have not considered the good and the 
bad of them carefully, but may have just "inherited", or picked them 
up, from their social surroundings, and practice them without 
questioning very much. It is therefore possible that, after some 
reflections, they might actually come to say quite contrary things to 
what those values and norms usually stand for. For instance, people 
may share certain ideas of femininity, which are often expressed in an 
informal, private setting - such ideas that good women are modest, 
fine cooks, etc. But if they are questioned formally, they may say that 
these are not really important attributes of women. 
In the original context where Taylor advances the notion of social 
imaginary (Taylor, 1993), he is engaged with the question of transition 
of pre-modernity to modernity. He argues that this transition cannot be 
explained wholly in terms of our change in "explicit beliefs". "Some 
important shifts in culture, in our understandings of personhood, the 
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good, and the like ... can only be seen if we bring into focus the major 
changes in embodied understanding and social imaginary which the 
last centuries have brought about" (ibid.: 220). 1 mention this passage, 
because the point contained in this paragraph importantly applies to 
the present issue - although, of course, the issue of pornography is 
much narrower than that of "modernity". Human practice cannot be 
explained solely by looking at explicitly held ideas and beliefs - they 
are also critically shaped by the embodied and imaginary 
understanding. Pornography, also, cannot be adequately explained in 
terms of explicit ideas and beliefs alone. 
Green's, and also Sadurski's, mistake therefore consists in this. They 
have given only restricted attention to explicitly articulated ideas and 
beliefs. It made them easier to assume that, because pornography may 
have a minority of followers, the wider society does not endorse 
pornography. Green, particularly, thought that society has these 
explicit ideas, such as law or church doctrine, which universally 
condemn and devalue pornography's norms (Green, 1998: 292-297). 
However, the consequence of their thought is that they missed the way 
the practice of pornography reflects, and is maintained by, the implicit 
social imaginary. It is because of the way the values and norms 
reflected by pornography are only implicit, and not consciously 
examined or questioned, that these are not directly contested by other 
moral values and beliefs. And it is also because of the way these 
values and norms involve implicit assumptions and habits of thought 
that they are not so overtly endorsed by people who actually share 
them. 
5. Social norms and authority 
Thus, I have argued that the meaning of pornography also derives 
from its Background; it reflects some familiar values and norms of 
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society. These values and norms are, however, likely to be different 
from explicitly held ideas and beliefs. 
I want to suggest further that these discussions also have some 
relevance to the notion of "authority". I did not start by discussing the 
notion of authority, but what we usually consider as authoritative 
entities also presupposes society's shared understandings, norms, 
customs, and ways of life. In fact, it is nothing new to suggest that 
authorities reflect the shared values and beliefs of a particular society. 
Ile studies of authority, especially in the tradition of Max Weber, 
have pointed out such relation between authority and shared values 
and beliefs of members of society (Weber, 1978). What we usually 
call "authority" is based on such shared values, beliefs, and norms of 
society, and sometimes these are only implicitly assumed. I want to 
discuss briefly this aspect of authority. 
In the literature on authority we often find two types of authority: 
what may be called "institutional" or "practical" authority, and 
"knowledge-based" or "expert" authority. In the former case someone 
is "in" the position of authority, and in the latter case someone is "an 
authority" in some subject area (Flathman, 1980: 16-17). In the case 
of institutional authorities, it is said that their authority derives from 
the property of offices, and ultimately rules and legislation which 
establish such offices. But when members of society choose to have 
one set of rules and offices over other possibilities, there must be 
some belief on the part of them that this form of rules and offices are 
legitimate or rightful rather than others. There must be some degree of 
shared beliefs about the justification of having such rules and offices. 
When we accept the legitimacy of our tax authority, it is not only 
because its legitimacy has been codified and institutionalised but also 
because we believe in the rightfulness of the system of collecting tax 
in the first place. There are also cases where the authorities' actions or 
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decisions just come to reflect or express the existing values and beliefs 
of society. There is an illustrating example. Raz mentioned that, in 
respect of the conscription imposed in Britain during the First World 
War, "[bly and large, those who approved of conscription when it 
came did so because they believed that it was everyone's duty to serve 
in the armed forces in any case", and to those who welcomed the law, 
"it merely declared what people ought to have done" (Raz, 1988: 45). 
Shared values and norms are also relevant to "knowledge-based" 
authorities. When we consider some persons as authorities on certain 
subject matters, we already share some criteria of considering these 
persons as authorities. The criteria would include, not only the degree 
and substance of knowledge demonstrated, but also the style or 
fashion of presenting that knowledge. The value of the subject matter 
itself would probably also count in considering someone as having 
certain authoritative status. 
Authoritative entities, therefore, are said to reflect some shared values 
or norms of society. But we should note further that there are those 
values and norms which may not themselves be explicitly recognized 
as "authoritative" but still importantly shape and guide people's 
everyday thinking and behaviour. Richard Flathman specifically 
attends to the relevance of "conventions, customs, practices, norms, 
and ways of thinking" in any society (Flathman, 1980: 25-26). He 
argues that such "conventions", "customs", and "ways of life", may 
not always be grasped as "authoritative" as such by the members of 
society but nevertheless Play a significant role in guiding their day-to- 
day conduct. He calls such customs, practices or norms the 
authoritative, and argues that what we usually call authorities are also 
ultimately founded on such set of values and norms and cannot be 
grasped independently of them. 5 
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Thus, society may have such values and norms - or social imaginaries 
- which may not be thought of as "authoritative" but nonetheless 
importantly affect people's everyday attitude and behaviour. In 
relation to pornography, I want to suggest that what it reflects are also 
such implicit yet distinctive values and norms. These values and 
norms may not be explicitly considered as, or taken to be, 
"authoritative", "legitimate", or "right" by the members of society but 
nonetheless still serve ps certain "standards" in society, by which 
people learn how to relate to others, how to conduct themselves, and 
also what to expect from others, in some social situations. To borrow 
Taylor's phrase again, they come to "imagine" and expect some 
aspects of social reality, especially sexual/gender relations, in terms of 
this set of values and norms. They offer people certain expectations 
about how these relations usually occur; how the ideas of masculinity 
or femininity are normally expressed; and therefore the thoughts of 
how they themselves should behave. They still fashion people's 
attitudes, thinking, and behaviour in a distinctive manner. In this 
regard, these values and norms are said to have some significant 
meaning. 
6. Pornographer as a "social character" 
I have thus argued that pornography reflects some distinctive values 
and norms of society, which may not be expressly endorsed by those 
who actually share them but nevertheless shape and guide their day- 
to-day attitude and behaviour. People normally do not give much 
thought to these values and norms but probably only habitually and 
unquestioningly follow them. 
In this final section I want to attend to an argument that some social 
roles are special because they embody certain moral and cultural ideas 
of society. It can be argued that pornographers in the present liberal 
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society have a similar status; their role is unique, because they not 
only reflect particular norms of society but they are the ones who 
symbolically express them. 
The idea that some social roles embody particular ideas and values of 
society was put forward by Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, 1985,25- 
36 5). MacIntyre argues that, in many societies, we may find what he 
calls "characters". By this he means some particular social roles that 
emblematise the moral and cultural values unique to the society. 
Maclntyre used the idea of character chiefly to portray the "social 
content" of the modem emotivist age. He suggested that the characters 
of any particular society represent special social roles with which 
some moral, philosophical, and cultural values and ideas of that 
society are associated. His use of the word "character" is intentional, 
because of its connotation of a setting and some associated or invested 
meaning. It is sometimes said that literary characters - those which 
appear in stories and novels - express and "embody" particular ideas 
which the authors wish to call forth (Gass, 1970: 52). Similarly, 
MacIntyre claims that there are social characters who embody 
particular ideas of the age and the society. 
The social characters are, according to Maclntyre, more than just 
ordinary social roles or occupational roles. They are special because 
of the way they relate to their social - settings. The characters can 
reveal the "content" of the social and cultural space. The specificity of 
particular cultures can be seen through the specificity of its range of 
these roles, the characters. To give some examples, "the culture of 
Victorian England was partially defined by the characters of the 
Public School Headmaster, the Explorer, and the Engineer; and that of 
Wilhelmine Germany was similarly defined by such characters as 
those of the Prussian Officer, the Professor, and the Social Democrat" 
(ibid.: 28). These characters, "Victorian Public School Headmaster", 
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the "Prussian officee', and the "Professor, etc. had unique roles in 
their cultures, because they embodied, in their roles, some significant 
sets of values and ideals specific to their society. Looking at the range 
of characters in any society therefore offers us an insight into the 
complex of values, norms, and ideals that characterize the society 
concerned. 
The characters are also unique in the way certain ideas are embodied 
by the role as well as by the person who inhabits the role. MacIntyre 
stresses the "fusion" between the role and the personality in the case 
of characters, or the agreement between the ideas already assumed by 
the roles and the ideas and actions of the individuals who occupy these 
roles (ibid.: 27,29). This is so because characters are the living 
embodiment of social ideas. Their behaviour is constrained, because 
they are the figures who exempliA certain moral and cultural standards 
for the rest of the public. 
To understand how the role of characters and their personality fuse, 
MacIntyre asks us to imagine a "set of stock characters" cast in a 
drama, such as a Japanese Noh play or an English morality play. 
These characters are "immediately recognizable to the audience", who 
would know straight away what "plot and action" are to come from 
the actors. This is so because the roles are already invested with 
certain ideas; the possible range of the characters' actions is already 
importantly "defined". This is the same with social characters. We 
recognize social characters and recognize how they would think and 
behave, because they are the "exemplars" of a certain way of life. 
Tbus, characters receive expectations from the public: -"[T]the 
requirements of a character are imposed from the outside, from the 
way in which others regard and use characters to understand and 
evaluate themselves" (ibid.: 29, emphasis suppressed). ., - 
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MacIntyre argues that the characters are "moral representatives of 
their culture and they are so because of the way in which moral and 
metaphysical ideas and theories assume through them an embodied 
existence in the social world. Characters are the masks worn by moral 
philosophies" (ibid.: 28). However, moral ideas presupposed and 
embodied by the characters need not be universally supported. In fact, 
MacIntyre's own aim in the discussion of the social characters is to 
bring to our attention and critique the characters of our own time, who 
embody and practice the values and norms of emotivism - morality 
which he argues characterizes the culture of many advanced societies. 
Characters "articulate the ways of life available in any society - both 
those that should be achieved, and those that should be avoided" 
(Code, 1995: 74). 
It should be also added that there is no reason to suppose that what the 
characters express are explicitly formulated moral and metaphysical 
ideas and theories of society. MacIntyre also says that theories and 
ideas can manifest themselves in society in different ways; sometimes 
as "explicit ideas in books or sermons or conversations"; in other 
times "as symbolic themes in paintings or plays or dreams" 
(MacIntyre, 1995: 28). What the characters may stand for can be what 
is usually implicit, or only symbolically expressed in society. In fact, a 
character may embody a social imaginary. 
Perhaps it could be argued that the pornographers in today's liberal 
societies are such social -characters. I argued that pornographers 
reflect some shared values and norms related to sex and gender; in fact, 
it may be said that they are the embodiment of these values and norms. 
They emblematise those values and norms surrounding sexuality and 
gender relations, which have become more pronounced in recent times. 
Pornographers, nevertheless, have existed for centuries, and in this 
respect it might be thought that there is nothing particularly unique 
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about the existence of this social role. However, so too have existed 
the engineer, the headmaster, and the professor, in many societies for 
many centuries, and they were not always characters in MacIntyre's 
sense (certainly, engineers and explorers in contemporary Britain 
would not represent what they represented in the nineteenth century). 
There is actually a comfortable "fit" between the characters and the 
social setting (cf. Rorty, A., 1976: 301-323). Some social roles 
become characters; they come to embody certain moral and cultural 
ideas of a particular social space. It is in this respect that MacIntyre 
seems to say that characters manifest the social "content" of a 
particular society. 
I would argue therefore that the pornographer in the present liberal 
society occupies a similar status to a MacIntyrean character; he is the 
living "exemplar", or embodiment, of certain values and norms of the 
society. It is in this sense that some distinctive social norms are 
reflected and also symbolically embodied by the role of pornographer 
that I argue he is "authoritative". 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to show that pornographic speech can 
be authoritative, drawing on some ideas from the philosophy of the 
"Background". I firstly argued that the social meaning of pornography 
would be better understood if we attend to its relation to the shared 
Background. Pornography presupposes this Background; it reflects 
some distinctive values and norms related to sex and gender. 
Following MacIntyre's idea of "social characters", I also argued that 
the contemporary pornographer is such a character, who embodies and 
exemplifles in his role these values and norms. It is in these aspects of 
the pornography's role that I claimed that it has an authoritative status. 
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I also pointed out the way these values and norms are not ordinarily 
explicitly understood by the people who follow them. They are more 
likely to involve our unexamined, or unquestioned habits of thought, 
and everyday assumptions; they are usually carried and expressed at 
the level of "social imaginary". I said, following Taylor, that it is 
crucial to take heed of this level of thought - the meaning of 
pornography, also, cannot be fully explained if we attend only to 
clearly formulated and articulated ideas and beliefs. 
Notes 
1 "[M]en creat e the world from their own point of view, which then becomes 
truth to be described. ( ... ) Power to create the world from one's point of 
view is power in its maleform" (MacKinnon, 1982: 537). 
21 owe this idea to Hans Sluga. I slightly modified Sluga's explanation of 
Wittgenstein's concept of "form of life" in which he said: "[Tlbe 
notion ... serves to identify the complex of natural and cultural circumstances 
which are presupposed in language and in any particular understanding of 
the world" (Sluga, 1996: 22). 
3 The way Taylor contrasts "explicit beliefs and ideas" with "background 
understanding" gives one an impression that the former is not part of the 
Background. However, it can also belong to the Background, in the 
Wittgensteinian sense adopted here - every understanding is internal to a 
shared system. However, the point I am making in this section is that, within 
a body of understandings that society holds, there are some understandings- 
which are well formulated and explicitly articulated, while there are others 
which are less significantly so. But the latter type of understanding is also 
crucial in making sense of some human practices. 
'The realm of our unreflective practice or implicit understanding seems to 
have been given more emphasis, especially from the poststructuralist 
standpoint. Instead of focusing exclusively on the well-formulated or 
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formalized concepts and ideas, which represent our reflective activity, some 
theorists directly engage with "images, symbols, metaphors, and 
representations which help construct various forms of subjectivity" (Gatens, 
1996: viii) and which often operate at the level of the unconscious. These 
images, symbols and metaphors, or what is sometimes called "the 
imaginary" have been central to the works of some French philosophers, 
including Luce Mgaray and Mich6le Le Dcruff, but Moira Gatens more 
generally shows the relevance of the notion in the Western philosophical 
tradition, and defends the philosophers' engagement with our "unconscious" 
or "background" practice, partly for its pervasiveness and unrecognised 
influence in our everyday life (ibid.: vii-xvi, especially, xi-xii). David 
Couzens Hoy went as far as to question the usefulness of the concept of 
"consciousness" itself. VVhile his main concern is the notion of ideology and 
"false consciousness". Hoy argues that "the idea of consciousness needs to 
be replaced with other ideas such as 'mentality, ' 'discourse, ' 'habitus, ' or 
'the background' that capture the sense in which the structures of social 
behavior often are below the threshold of conscious decision-making" (Hoy, 
1994: 4,7). 
5 The idea originated from anthropological studies of a group of Native 
Americans, called the Fox (especially referring to the studies by Walter 
Miller, cited in Flathman, 1980: 24-25). He has discovered from the studies 
that there was widespread aversion to hierarchy among this people, and there 
was little trace of the notion of authority, in the two senses of authority 
described above, in their society. Nevertheless, there are plenty of 
"conventions, customs, practices, norms, and ways of thinking" among them, 
which play the role of normative guidance in society. There were no 
apparent authoritative figures in the community, but the set of social- 
arrangements or conventions the Fox had are very much "authoritative" in 
character: they adhered to this social order "largely because they believed 
that the arrangements had a distinctive. standing" (ibid.: 25). 
61 am grateful to Susan Mendus for originally bringing this to my attention. 
99 
Chapter Three 
Sexual Values and Norms 
In this and the following chapter, I carry the arguments of the previous 
chapter further. Although pornography has possibly existed for 
centuries, the social and cultural circumstances surrounding 
pornography have undergone significant changes. It is argued here 
that the pornographer embodies the sexual values and norms of liberal 
society - those values and norms which are usually carried by the 
society's imaginary understanding. This point is specifically explained 
within the context of Western societies. 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter Two, I argued that the meaning of pornography derives 
from, and depends on, its social context, the Background. Although 
pornographic speech may have existed for many centuries, its social 
meaning has not always been constant in the societies where it 
emerged. Its overall meaning, role, and significance seem to have 
changed as its Background changed. The argument in this chapter tries. 
to explain this point further. 
It was argued that the contemporary pornographer is' a "social 
character", who embodies particular values and norms of society. 
Specifically, the pornographer embodies the sexual values and norms 
of the present liberal culture, which are usually carried at the level of 
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the imaginary. In what follows, I will elaborate on what those values 
and norms are. In doing so, I am aware that what I argue may be 
controversial; it may be questioned whether the pornographer indeed 
embodies these values and norms, or whether I have omitted others 
that may be important. Nevertheless, I believe that my argument 
concerning the relation between these cultural norms and pornography, 
and also the status of the pornographer in this culture, appears to be a 
plausible one. 
One thing that is remarkable about the issue surrounding sexuality - 
and most of us would probably agree on this point - is the way this 
expression came to change dramatically in the last century. There is 
now what some would call a "culture of sexual story telling" 
(Plummer, 1996), especially in contemporary Britain and the United 
States. There is a proliferation of sexual stories in books, comics, 
magazines, the Internet, on television, etc.; in short, in the whole array 
of cultural mediums. The twentieth century, especially the latter half 
of it, witnessed a huge increase in the amount of speech about sex. An 
erotic theme is, of course, not only invoked in stories but also 
increasingly in commercial advertisements. There are likely to be 
complex social reasons that led to the rise of this culture, and I shall 
not be able to discuss them fully at present; but I will focus here 
particularly on the spread of some important "ideas', ' surrounding 
sexuality, which seem to underlie crucially the spread of sexual stories. 
It is sometimes suggested that the popularisation of Freudian 
psychoanalysis (theory of "repression") and the movement of ', 'sexual 
liberation" have led to the relaxation of social attitudes towards sex. 
The linkage is indeed plausible, and I do not deny this connection. The 
ideals of liberation of - individual . sexuality and sexual fulfilment 
certainly seem to have encouraged more open talk about sex. However, 
to consider a more general context, it may be the widespread diffusion 
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of liberal ideas, especially of the idea of the sphere of individual 
freedom and choice, that helped to ease society's enforcement of strict 
sexual morality and to create a social atmosphere where sexuality 
came to be expressed more freely. The basic idea of individual liberty 
has extended to the sexual area of life, and this idea gradually spread 
among the ordinary people, changing their everyday attitudes and 
thinking concerning sexual expressions. Expressions of sexuality now 
seem to be not only accepted but also even encouraged in some 
contexts. The current culture of sexual stories can be understood in 
terms of these changes surrounding sexuality. The significance of the 
role of the pornographer can also be seen against the background of 
these cultural values and norms. To be sure, not all kinds of sexual 
stories current in society would be deemed "pornographic"; 
nevertheless, it may be argued that it is this general cultural 
background which permits and produces numerous stories about sex 
that gives meaning and significance to pornographic speech. The 
pornographer may be said to embody this norm of sexual story telling 
and its underlying values. He is the exemplar in society, who carries 
out these cultural ideas to the full. 
I therefore think that the pornographer generally embodies the values 
of sexual freedom in liberal society, but there is another tendency in 
the present culture, which seems to make pornography, or some types 
of pornography, special. There is a tendency in stories, especially 
fictional stories, to depict extreme sexualities, or to combine a sexual 
theme with some shocking activities, such as violence, cruelty, or 
murder. These stories in fact combine a sexual theme with some 
extraordinary motifs, something that would transcend the boundary of 
ordinary human experience. It appears that the linking of sex and such 
extreme themes is in fact not a rare combination in the tradition of the 
Western culture (cf. Cameron and Frazer, 1992), and the trend seems 
to be accentuated with the overall growth of sexual stories, as well as 
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other stories dealing with shocking subjects. It looks as though such a 
motif could not be simply dismissed as an offensive aberration; it 
rather appears to be a powerful theme that draws people's attention 
and imagination from time to time. The idea that sexuality involves 
transcendence of the ordinary is one of the symbolic ideas about sex 
which recurs as a motif in stories, and it has been given more 
expression by the present culture of sexual stories. It has been, of 
course, known that some pornography is concerned with such a theme; 
in fact, it is the perfect example of speech that contains this theme. It 
might be said that it is the pornographer who most clearly expresses 
this cultural idea surrounding sexuality in society. 
Ibus, in this chapter, I will try to explain the relation between the role 
of the pornographer and these cultural values and norms. However, 
first, I will restate a general case for thinking that the contemporary 
Pornographer is different from those of previous centuries. 
2. The past and the present 
If pornography is special in the present age, what is it which makes it 
so special? Some may raise this question, because of the fact that 
Pornography is not a recent invention; it existed throughout the past 
centuries, even including Victorian England. The etymology of the 
word "pornography" tells us that it derives from the Greek words 
pome (prostitute) and graphe (writing), therefore suggesting that 
something like pornography has existed since the time of ancient 
Greece (when Andrea Dworkin said that pornography is " 'the graphic 
depiction of whores' " she was probably thinking about this 
etymology (Dworkin, A., 1981: 9)). HistoricalV speaking, 
pornography has been offered on "the market" for centuries; it has 
regularly found a group of willing audiences, whose needs it has 
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catered to. What then makes contemporary pornography different 
from its predecessors? 
An obvious point that might occur to anyone's mind is a certain 
transition that happened in the last century: the twentieth century 
witnessed the movements of the so-called "sexual revolution" or 
"sexual liberation", and there was a relaxation of people's attitudes 
towards sex. It is therefore tempting to say that pornography reflects 
this overall trend. What makes contemporary pornography special is 
that people are nowadays more open about matters concerning sex. 
Whereas our forbearers were on the whole sexually "repressed" and 
more cautious about discussing sex, we are largely "de-repressed", 
more "liberated"; therefore, we produce significantly more speech 
about sex and sexuality. And pornography is the embodiment of this 
norm - so goes the reasoning. However, there is a certain influential 
argument which claims that sexual speech in earlier centuries was not 
simply suppressed or silenced in the way that is commonly thought. 
Michel Foucault's account of the history of sexuality in the West is 
perhaps well-known in this regard. A straightforward suggestion that 
there was a sudden expansion in talk about sex in the twentieth 
century, therefore, apparently runs counter to his claim. 
Foucault's argument challenges the more conventionally received 
view about sexuality in the West, especially the simple "repressive" 
argument about sexual discourse in earlier centuries. Contrary to such 
a view, he argued that, since the seventeenth century, there has been a 
"discursive explosion" or "proliferation of discourses", surrounding 
the subject of sex (Foucault, 1998: 17-18). Foucault's point is not that 
there were no codes of conduct about the speakable and the 
unspeakable concerning sex, but that, around the cluster of some 
subject matters, there has been a continued growth or "multiplication" 
of speech about sex over the last four centuries. He'argued that this 
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discursive expansion especially "gathered momentum from the 
eighteenth century onward" (ibid.: 18), revolving around such issues 
as "population", "pedagogy", and "medicine / psychiatry". 
Foucault explains that the issue of population became increasingly a 
political and economic concern in European nations in the eighteenth 
century. "Subjects" were no longer just "people", but perceived to be 
the nation's "wealth", "manpower", and "labour capacity", 
necessitating that political authorities regulate, control, and manage 
the sexual affairs of their citizens. Thus, "fb]etween the state and the 
individual, sex became an issue", and governments began to intervene 
directly and sought to "[regulate] sex through useful and public 
discourses" (ibid.: 25-26). Since the eighteenth century, there has also 
been a proliferation of discourse surrounding the issue of adolescent 
sex in the educational institutions. "[T]he sex of children and 
adolescents" was not simply a hushed topic; "[o]n the contrary ... it 
multiplied the forms of discourse on the subjecf', which was, 
according to Foucault, "a constant preoccupation" of those 
educational institutions (ibid.: 29). The development of modem 
science also expanded discourse on sex, especially in "medicine" and 
"psychiatry", which attempted to uncover the aetiology of mental 
illnesses, spurred further talk about sex and sexuality of individuals 
(ibid.: 27-3 1). 
Jeffrey Weeks's study of the history of sexuality in Britain echoes 
Foucault's argument to some extent. Discourse on sex was not simply 
silenced in previous centuries, but it steadily grew around some 
subject areas. Weeks also argues that the public concern over the 
question of population led to "a significant expansion of writings on 
sexuality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (Weeks, 
1989: 141). Also, as scientific knowledge progressed, sex and 
sexuality became "an object of study" itself, which produced further 
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interest and discourse concerning sex. Some influential works on 
human sexualities or the sexual instinct, including those by Havelock 
Ellis and Sigmund Freud, appeared around this period. Sexologists 
like Ellis attached a "social importance" to the realm of the sexual, 
and painstakingly analysed and catalogued different manifestations of 
human sexuality (ibid.: 141-159). Weeks also suggests that the early 
feminists, i. e., those in the nineteenth and at the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries, though they were primarily concerned with the 
achievement of women's voting rights, were also interested in such 
matters as "voluntary motherhood" and "women's control over their 
own body", and these issues did raise some public discussions over 
sexuality (ibid.: 162-163). 
Some historical accounts therefore deny that speech about sex was 
simply silenced in earlier centuries. Sex and sexuality have been 
major public concerns, and they have been discussed, debated, and 
scrutinized, especially around the domains of "populatiow', 
"pedagogy", medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. It may be indeed 
not so accurate to suggest, in a simplistic manner, that talk about sex 
or sexuality was generally suppressed before the mid-twentieth 
century but that this radically changed afterwards. Nevertheless, there 
were, of course, some major changes; both Foucault and Weeks would 
agree that there was stricter sexual morality in previous centuries and 
that there was a considerable increase in the overall speech about sex 
in the last one hundred years. And the change was not merely a 
quantitative one; there was some significant qualitative change in the 
way sex came to be discussed in the last century. We may agree that 
there was a certain change in the kinds of sexual discourse that we 
encounter, and that people's attitudes towards sex and sexuality, as 
well as the expression of these, have undergone a noticeable change. 
If the contemporary pornographer is said to be special, we would have 
to take into account such qualitative changes in the Background. Even 
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though the pornographer existed in ancient Greece and Victorian 
England, the social context surrounding pornography must have 
changed significantly, and this needs to be considered in order to fully 
understand the present status of the pornographer. 
Peter Wagner studied the history of the erotic art and literature in the 
eighteenth century England and America (Wagner, 1988). While he 
observes that the origin of pornography "at leasf' goes back to the 
sixteenth century, he also mentions that 
the function of pornography in the various societies from 1500 
to 1800 was not the same. Initially, pornography served 
entertaining and didactic purposes and gradually became a 
vehicle of protest against the authority of Church and State, and 
finally against middle-class morality. By the eighteenth century, 
pornography was like a chameleon, appearing in various 
guises ... and assuming different functions (ibid.: 6). 
Wagner also suggests that the increase of scientific and medicinal 
knowledge in the Enlightenment led to growing interest in sexuality, 
producing numerous publications on the topic. These books on sex 
and sexuality, which often contained vivid descriptions, were taken 
advantage of, so to speak, by some pornographers who used them for 
their own purposes. But pornographic material was also used as a 
medium of social protest against the established authority of church 
and state during the Enlightenment period. In the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, however, the socio-political dimension of 
pornography withered away, and talking of sex became an end in itself 
- it came to be seen just as "immoral story" about sex, upsetting an& 
destabilizing the moral order of the day (ibid.: 6,846). 
Thus, according to Wagner, pornography between the sixteenth and 
the eighteenth centuries was not always the same; it assumed varied 
roles and functions, depending on the exact context in which it 
occurred. It was sometimes a medium for sexual education, sometimes 
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an instrument for social protest; but in other times, it was a pure 
entertainment in itself. It was assigned different meanings and 
functions, reflecting the different social matrices of the time. It seems, 
and it is indeed very plausible, that the Background of pornography 
shifted once again in the twentieth century. What happened in the last 
century is likely to include a significant change within the complex of 
ideas, values, and attitudes concerning the sexual domain of life; 
whether people began to hold new sets of ideas or some older ones, 
they came to be embraced positively. There seem to be now different 
understandings, or a different "social imaginary", concerning sex and 
sexuality, and consequently, the social meaning of pornography has 
also changed. What Wittgensteinian philosophy suggests, which was 
discussed in the earlier chapter, is precisely this aspect. Every 
particular speech and activity is integrated into the Background, or the 
form of life. It is interwoven with other beliefs, ideas, and practices 
shared by members of the community. If the Background changes 
significantly, so do the meanings of particular speech and activity. 
Pornography's significance has also changed over the last century; to 
use Wittgensteinian terminology, it has become a different "language- 
game! ý 
3. Sexual freedom 
The "culture of sexual stories" 
Ken Plummer discusses the emergence of a new culture which became 
distinctive around the late twentieth century. He calls it "a culture of 
sexual story-telling" (Plummer, 1996). The idea of "stories", Plummer 
tells, has recently gained a significant currency in social theory, but 
the kind of stories which Plummer is concerned with are "sexual 
stories", or "the personal experience narratives of the intimate" (ibid.: 
34). By these sexual stories or sexual narratives he means such stories 
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as "told by men and women of coming out as gay and lesbian; of 
women who discover they 'love too much; or tales told by the 
survivors of abortion, rape and incest; or of 'New Men' rediscovering 
their newly masculine roots through mythical stories" (ibid.: 34); in 
short, the kind of stories that are most likely to be found in popular 
television talk shows ("OpraW'), autobiographical accounts, or self- 
help books. 
Plummer seems to be right in saying that there are now more and 
more instances of individuals narrating their sexuality or sexual 
experiences. But the types of sexual stories we encounter nowadays in 
general may well extend beyond such first-person narrative models 
that Plummer mainly talks about. In fact, I would like to use the 
notion of a story more widely here in order to include also those 
which are told to respond to individuals' sexual needs (e. g., sex 
guidebooks), or which largely feature sexual contents, or which are 
intended to arouse the audience sexually (pornography). What is 
commonly happening, nonetheless, seems to be summarized by the 
view that more and more stories are told, centered on individuals' 
sexuality, sexual needs, and sexual relations. Although, as stated 
earlier, not all sexual stories in society are considered as 
"pornographic", and, conversely, not all pornographic speech may be 
technically called "stories", there seems to be nonetheless an 
important connection between these different types of sexual speech, 
and the social meaning of pornography also seems to be better 
understood against the background of this particular culture. 
Among the possible reasons given by Plummer for the rise of this 
"culture of sexual story telling", two are especially noteworthy., One 
of the factors is the "growth and proliferation of communications" or 
mass media, which has steadily expanded since the nineteenth century 
(ibid.: 35-36,38-39). The possible media of communication in which 
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(sexual) stories can be told now include not only conventional print 
media, such as books, newspapers, or magazines, but also television 
chat shows, the Internet, etc. Plummer argues that the modem media 
have broken down the "traditional boundaries around stories", shifting 
the "social spaces" of story tellers and audiences. Stories which 
previously were only local can now be transmitted on a mass, global 
scale, the result of which is that story tellers may find it now easier to 
find more sympathetic listeners. He says that stories are told when 
they find such appreciative community of listeners, or a "community 
of support". It is true that stories are told more when there are some 
understanding audiences who are willing to listen. Modem media can 
transmit a single story on a massive scale, but at the same time they 
also make it possible to generate customized stories for a small 
number of audiences with special needs. These stories then serve to 
give a sense of community to audiences who come to sympathize with 
one another. Communities of gays and lesbians may be an example of 
such specialized ones. Stories are again created, distributed, and 
recited within these communities. The modem mass media are, in 
short, a vital infrastructure, upon which various stories flourish. 
Plummer also mentions "consumerisa' as another key factor that 
gave rise to the expansion of sexual stories (ibid.: 39-40). Like so 
many other goods and services, sex also has been turned into "a 
commodity", an object to be consumed. Since generally sex "[sells] 
well", it is now sold not only as a product in itself but used in 
advertisements to boost sales of other products. As the law of 
capitalism operates wherever profits are to be reaped, it is logical that 
there has been a huge growth of sexual stories circulating in the 
market. 
These two reasons, the expansion of modem mass communications 
and consumerism/capitalism, certainly seem to be important factors 
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which led to the growth of. sexual stories. Modem technologies make 
it physically possible for stories to spread, and the consumerist culture 
and the drive for profit give a further incentive for stories to be told. 
Although these are no doubt significant reasons, they are, however, 
not the only ones. In fact, alongside the proliferation of 
communications and consumerism, there has been a development of 
important moral "ideas" surrounding the sexual domain of life, which 
influenced the present trend of sexual stories. Indeed, one may argue 
that, without the development of these ideas, various sexual stories 
that are current today may not have emerged in the way they do now. 
People, of course, would not tell stories, especially intimate ones, if 
the social atmosphere were very hostile to them. Many societies 
impose strict sexual morality, and this also has been the case in 
societies with a strong Christian tradition. If that morality is to be 
relaxed, however, this perhaps would not be explained solely by the 
emergence of modem social organization. There must be also some 
ideas which influence the individual to think that speaking of sexuality 
in public is not an immoral or shameful thing to do. These ideas then 
first legitimated, and then encouraged, the appearance of 
contemporary sexual stories, and the other factors, such as mass 
communications and consumerism, may be said to have facilitated this 
process. 
Background ideas 
In thinking about the possible ideas which have helped to create the_ 
climate of sexual stories, an obvious one might be that of "sexual 
liberation". The liberation movement certainly seems to have 
contributed to the rise of sexual stories, inasmuch as its objective was 
not only the emancipation of people from various forms of oppression, 
as testified in feminist and gay movements, but also ultimately the 
achievement of individual sexual freedom or sexual "fulfillment". 
III 
Popular guidebooks giving advice on sexual practice or different 
sexual techniques seemed to have increased in number and variety 
during or after this liberation period (Jeffreys, 1990: 91-144). It is 
sometimes suggested that the sexual liberation movement itself owes 
its development to the popularization of Freudian psychology or 
psychoanalysis, especially to psychoanalytic talk of sex as a "need" or 
"tension" that must be "reduced" (May, 1972: 23). The concept of 
"repression" certainly does not have a positive connotation in the way 
it is ordinarily used. Modem psychoanalysis very plausibly spread the 
notion among the public that personal happiness or well-being also 
consists in the satisfaction of these individual sexual "needs". 
Although the sexual liberation movement and Freudian 
psychoanalysis are probably both important contributors to the rise of 
sexual stories, there has been a gradual but steady diffusion of another 
significant idea surrounding the sexual domain of life, which, I believe, 
is most crucial in thinking about the present culture of sexual stories. 
Since the nineteenth century sexuality has increasingly, if gradually, 
come to be recognized as forming an important component of the 
individual's life. Historians of sexuality, such as Foucault and Weeks, 
suggest that the evolution of modem science and medicine led to a 
significant increase in interest in human sexuality and writings on this 
subject. We may say that the scientific "will to knowledge" or 
investigative spirit inevitably had spread into the area of human sexual 
behaviour, and produced more writings on this topic. Although the 
social influence of sex research in the nineteenth century was by and 
large still very limited, and researchers in general took care not to 
upset the conventional morality, some sexologists such as Ellis started 
to claim openly that sexuality deserved serious attention "because of 
its significance for the whole existence of the individual and society" 
(Weeks, 1989: 142). As already mentioned, the development of 
modem psychology and psychoanalysis also contributed to the 
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growing awareness of the importance of sexuality to the individual's 
life. 
But alongside this growing interest in sexuality in the field of science, 
there emerged a more critical view, which called for a relaxation of 
excessive societal control over individuals' sexual conduct. Freud is 
one of the earlier figures who voiced such a view. He famously 
highlighted the tension between the demands of civilization and 
human instincts (Freud, 1991b) and also exposed the relation between 
the suppression of sexuality and nervous illnesses (Freud, . 
1991a), 
although he himself sometimes vacillated, when it came to the 
question as to how one might conceive of the proper balance between 
the two sides. Nonetheless, Freud's experience in psychiatry 
occasionally led him to express his concern that strict social controls 
over sexual conduct may turn out to be an unjust burden to individuals. 
He once observed: "The requirement ... that there shall be a single kind 
of sexual life for everyone, disregards the dissimilarities, whether 
innate or acquired, in the sexual constitution of human beings; it cuts 
off a fair number of them from sexual enjoyment, and so becomes the 
source of serious injustice" (Freud, 1991b: 294). Freud's theory of 
repression and the tension between social structure and the 
individual's sexuality later come to be synthesized with more radical 
social criticisms, such as that of Herbert Marcuse (Marcuse, 1987). 
It seems, however, that it was ultimately the overall infiltration of 
influential liberal ideas, especially the distinction between the public 
and the private realms of conduct, that helped to ease excessive social 
interference in the individual's sexual behaviour, and spread the 
notion that the sphere of sexuality essentially falls in the realm of the 
private in which the individual should exercise his or her autonomy. 
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Mill's On Liberty, published in 1859, charted the distinction between 
seýf-regarding and other-regarding domains of life. In the former, 
actions of the individual concern no one but himself, while in the 
latter, actions may concern others in society. In the self-regarding 
sphere of life, Mill argued that the individual remains "sovereign"; his 
"independence" is "absolute", insofar as the actions would not harm 
anyone (Mill, 1975: 11). Society may, of course, render judgements, 
pass opinions, and even show "distaste" towards certain individual 
conduct, but short of causing definite harms to others, the individual is 
"the final judge" of deciding what to do or what not to do (ibid.: 72). 
Mill thought that when society intervenes in the individual's affairs, it 
often intervenes wrongly; the interference is frequently nothing more 
than the majority's attempt to enforce its own moral preferences. 
However, Mill firmly believed that there are domains of human life in 
which the individual's own feeling outweighs the preferences of any 
other: "[T]here is no parity between the feeling of a person for his 
own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding 
it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the 
desire of the right owner to keep it" (ibid.: 78). Mill therefore 
forcefully argued for the domain of human conduct which ultimately 
belongs to the sphere of the individual's discretion and autonomy. 
Mill's doctrine came to be reflected in the enforcement of law and to 
affect practically the sexual life of individuals. The case of the Report 
of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution in Britain 
(hereafter the Wolfenden Report) is a pertinent example. The Report, 
which appeared in 1957, recommended changes in the law governing 
homosexuality and prostitution, and specifically suggested that, with 
regard to homosexuality, private conduct between consenting adults 
should not be a crime, and with regard to prostitution, only the public 
solicitation should be illegal. H. L. A. Hart notes the "strikingly 
similar" tone between the Wolfenden Report and Mill's position in On 
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Liberty (Hart, 1963: 14-15). The Report set out that "[the function of 
the criminal law] ... is to preserve public order and decency, to protect 
the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide 
sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others... " 
(United Kingdom 1957: 9-10), which thus made explicit the grounds 
for making "offensive" public solicitations illegal, but not the act of 
prostitution itself. With respect to the decriminalization of private 
homosexual practices among adults, the Report justified it because 
"[there] must remain a realm of private morality and immorality 
which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business" (ibid.: 24). 
Hart defends the line taken by Mill and the Wolfenden Report against 
some critics. In response to those who argued that the law should be 
properly invoked to protect positive morality of society, Hart argued 
that the fact that a certain conduct is regarded as immoral by 
conventional morality is not a sufficient reason to justify its 
prohibition (Hart, 1963: 24); that is, for the legal enforcement of 
morality, one must consider the balance between any conceivable 
harms of individual conduct and the misery inflicted by the legal 
punishment of these conducts. Hart generally considered that "the 
suppression of sexual impulses ... affects the development or balance 
of the individual's emotional life, happiness, and personality" (ibid.: 
22), and that the punishment of homosexual conduct would generate 
more personal miseries than the case where there are no such 
punishments. With regard to the issue of homosexual conduct, he 
therefore argued that it should incur a punishment only if it causes a 
harm to others; that is, if it offends "public decency" (ibid.: 44-45). To 
those who say that there are people who get "harmed" by the "bare 
thought" that someone is engaging in an "immoral" conduct in private, 
Hart insisted that in this case the value of the'individual's liberty 
prevails over any claims of "harrif' caused to others' seýsitivifies. In 
this context he clearly defended personal liberty and autonomy, 'in a 
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manner similar to Mill. He said: "[L]iberty to do those things which 
no one seriously objects" is "nugatory" (ibid.: 47). 
Hart notes a similar development in America in the 1950s. The 
American Law Institute is said to have recommended that all 
consensual adult sexual relations should be exempt from the criminal 
law, for " 'there is the fundamental question of the protection to which 
every individual is entitled against state interference in his Personal 
affairs when he is not hurting others' " (American Law Institute 
Model Penal Code, cited in Hart, 1963: 15). The actual 
decriminalization of homosexual conduct in Britain took another 
decade after the appearance of the Wolfenden Report, but the 
emergence of the Report seems significant, because it seems to mark 
the development of influential liberal ideas represented by Mill. 
Millian liberals, of course, usually object to society's moralistic and 
paternalistic interference with the individual's private conduct. Weeks 
mentions that the Wolfenden Report constituted a "hallmark" of the 
series of liberalization policies that emerged in Britain around the 
period ("the laws governing gambling, suicide, obscenity and 
censorship, Sunday entertainment" and the reforms of laws on 
abortion and divorce), and suggests that similar reforms also took 
place in other liberal democratic countries in the 1960s (Weeks, 1989: 
249,251-252). 2 In mid-twentieth century, the sexual domain of life, as 
well as other domains of human conduct, seemed to be acknowledged 
more and more as belonging to the realm of personal choice, and this 
came to be reflected to a significant degree in public policies. 
More recently, Martha Nussbaum has raised the same issue of law and 
sexual morality, and restated Mill's principle (thus defending the same 
position as Hart's) regarding the sexual life of individuals. Nussbaum 
first raises these questions: "To what extent should a 'moral 
argument ... be permitted to ground a legal restriction on sexual 
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conduct? To what extent should we refuse to aflow legal interference 
with people's sexual choices, however immoral? " (Nussbaum, 2000: 
21-22). She then answers that "a Millian no-harm principle in the 
sexual domain seems the one that best supports our desire to conduct 
our lives in accordance with our own moral views and with our sense 
of our equal dignity as citizens"; and that "[i]f people are told what 
not to do with their lives in the intimate area of sexual conduct, this 
seems especially invasive of their humanity" (ibid.: 22). 
The liberal idea of autonomy and the realm of the private therefore 
extended to the sexual domain of life and came to affect thinking 
surrounding sexual morality. Its first obvious effect was to de- 
legitimate the state's unnecessary intrusion into the individual's sexual 
life. Matters concerning sex or sexuality basically fall within the realm 
of the non-political and private in which the individual is to exercise 
his or her personal choice, and coercion is only justified when it is 
thought that the individual's behaviour causes harm or a definite risk 
of harm to others, or that it breaches the code of "public decency". 
Within certain limits imposed by the harm principle, the individual is 
free to act according to his or her moral views in relation to sexual 
matters. 
From theory to imaginary 
To go back to the issue of "sexual story telling", I have argued that it 
is not only the growth of modem communications and consumerism 
that led to the proliferation of sexual stories. They are no doubt 
significant factors, yet it is also important to take into account the 
development of crucial moral ideas surrounding sexual conduct. 
Indeed, I like to connect the present trend of sexual stories with the 
transformation of the Background initiated by psychoanalysis, the 
sexual liberation movement, and liberal theory, but especially, the 
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outcome of the spread of liberal ideas of individual liberty and the 
sphere of the private, because of its more steady and pervasive 
diffusion (Freud's own view as well as the ideology of "sexual 
liberation" and "fulfillment" also fundamentally share the value of 
individual freedom). Liberal ideas led to the view that the sexual 
domain of life essentially belongs to the private realm in which 
individuals exercise their freedom and choice, as long as they do not 
harm others. These ideas helped to liberate the sexual life of the 
individual from excessive social interference, and this played an 
important part in the spread of sexual stories. 
This is, however, not to say that everyone now concurs with liberal 
ideas, or shares the same attitude towards the issue of sexuality, or that 
most sexual stories can now be told freely. Sexual issues are in some 
respects still very polemical, especially those surrounding minority 
sexualities, and they are frequently the subject of debate in academic 
as well as nonacademic forums. 3 At the explicitly verbalized level, in 
particular, sexuality can be a site of contestation, and every now and 
then there are loud protests, such as those coming from religious 
conservatives, at open sexual expressions. Still, if we glance at 
people's overall everyday attitude and behaviour concerning sex or 
sexual speech in the present liberal society, it would seem that there is 
a distinctive current, and this reflects the liberal values that I have 
sketched. At the imaginary level, the liberal attitude toward sexuality 
is becoming more and more widely shared. That is likely to explain 
the proliferation of current sexual stories and the fact that sexual talk 
would not cause so much shock or offence as it might have done" 
decades ago. What some consider the "croticisation" of social life' is 
therefore closely related to - among other things, such as the 
transformation of social structure discussed earlier - the general 
reception of liberal thinking surrounding sexuality. One might say that 
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the liberal theory has now largely come to influence people's ordinary 
thought and behaviour. 
Taylor mentions how theoretical ideas may gradually penetrate into 
society's imaginary understanding (Taylor, 2004: 24,29). Ideas 
previously held by a few elites may eventually come to be shared by 
the wider society, giving rise to "the new outlook", "new practices", 
and then finally become settled as "taken-for-granted" assumptions of 
the society. A similar thing has probably occurred to the idea 
surrounding expressions of sexuality. The idea that the sexual domain 
of life essentially belongs to the realm of the private, in which the 
individual should exercise choice, has come to be shared by the wider 
society and is now carried by its imaginary understanding. As long as 
it is carried by the imaginary understanding, it is, of course, not as 
coherent or as clearly articulated as in theory. Many people may now 
just habitually follow what others do and do not reflect on the 
meaning of their practice. Nevertheless, what plausibly happened 
when the liberal idea permeated into people's common imaginary is 
that they came to think that the individual has freedom to make 
choices concerning sexual matters, and excessive interference with 
this liberty is inappropriate; and that there is nothing wrong in 
principle with talking about sex, and expressing one's sexualfeelings 
and needs (as long as this does not harm or offend anyone). It is not 
merely that people have become more "tolerant" towards others' 
expressions of sexuality as a result; but they themselves have come to 
exercise this freedom more positively. This new understanding 
surrounding the expression of sexuality thus encourages more sexual" 
stories to come forward, and therefore there are more sexual stories in 
books, magazines, on television shows, etc. 
The culture of sexual story telling, therefore, can be explained in 
terms of these changes in thinking and attitude surrounding sexual 
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expression. Previously there might have been more moral constraints 
surrounding sex, but today it is increasingly linked with personal 
liberty, choice, and needs. To be able to talk about sex and express 
one's sexuality is an important aspect of this individual sexual 
freedom. The social meaning of the pornographer can also become 
intelligible against the background of this culture, which produces a 
whole array of sexual narratives - from popular sex guides to 
household dramas and tabloid tales. The common social imaginary 
about sexuality now gives significance to the role of the pornographer. 
The pornographer may be the paradigmatic sexual story teller in 
society; he makes the most explicit sexual speech, openly celebrates 
(and makes most of) the freedom to do so, and encourages others to 
share this freedom. In short, as a MacIntyrean character, he embodies 
in his role the culture of sexual story telling and its underlying value 
of individual sexual freedom. He demonstrates, and carries out, a way 
of life, which exemplifies these cultural understandings. 
It might be of interest to note, however, that this new climate of sexual 
freedom has ironically created a different kind of constraint or 
pressure on some individuals. A more open attitude toward sexuality 
may seem to fulfill a genuine promise of individual freedom in the 
sphere of sex. However, to those who are unable to express sexuality 
or who feel uneasy about such expressions for whatever reasons there 
is a different pressure. As more sexual stories are circulated in society 
and the expression of sexuality is now becoming increasingly a 
common affair, there seems to be. an atmosphere that presses 
individuals not to be diffident about sex or speech about sex. It might" 
have been the case that in previous centuries society imposed stricter 
sexual morality, and whether it caused significant misery to some or 
not, individuals could shift the blame upon society. Now with 
society's interference largely gone, the question of how to handle sex 
has largely become a matter of individual choice and adcquacy. That 
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apparently produces a burden upon some individuals, who feel 
ashamed if they cannot experience or express their sexuality in the 
way that others do. Rollo May observes this problem from the 
standpoint of a psychiatrist: 
Where the Victorian didn't want anyone to know that he or she 
had sexual feelings, we are ashamed if we do not. ( ... ) Our 
patients often have the problems of frigidity and impotence, but 
the strange and poignant thing that we observe is how 
desperately they struggle not to let anyone find out they don't 
feel sexually. The Victorian nice man or woman was guilty if he 
or she did experience sex; now we are guilty if we don't. ( ... ) In 
past decades you could blame society's strict mores and preserve 
your own self-esteem by telling yourself what you did or didn't 
do was society's fault and not yours. ( ... ) But when the question is simply how you can perform, your own sense of adequacy and 
self-esteem is called immediately into question, and the whole 
weight of encounter is shifted inward to how you can meet the 
test (May, 1972: 15-16). 
May's idea is that the spread of new sexual freedom in societies like 
America or Britain actually caused another kind of "straightjackef' to 
some individuals concerning their sexuality. If more and more social 
emphasis is laid upon expressions of sexuality, the opposite tendency 
would come to be something undesirable. The deeper psychological 
issue is not one that can be discussed here, but the point is indicative 
of an interesting aspect of the culture that we are observing - the idea 
was that people should be free to express sexuality or achieve sexual 
fulfillment; but among some people, this "should be free to express" 
has been turned into "must express". Expression of sexuality is 
perceived as a binding norm, ironically constraining freedom of some, 
individuals. 
4. Sex and extreme themes 
The culture of sexual story telling and the value of sexual freedom 
which underlies it are embodied in the role of the pornographer. But 
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there seems to be a further reason which makes pornographic speech 
significant in our culture. The ideas of sexual freedom have led to the 
increase in sexual stories, but this overall trend has also led to the 
growing interest in diverse sexual practices (sex guidebooks such as 
Alex Comfort's Joy of Sex may reflect such interests). The sheer 
availability of the number of sexual stories gave people an opportunity 
to be acquainted with a variety of human sexualities, and the ideal of 
"fulfillmenf' gave a certain license to people to experiment with 
different sexual styles and techniques, in order to satisfy their specific 
individual "needs". There are also some reports that there is now more 
interest in what might have been regarded as unconventional or 
eccentric forms of sexual practices. 5 It may be that such a tendency 
has also been largely created, as Plummer pointed out, by the growth 
of modem communications. Today's mass media make it easier to 
spread diverse stories to wider audiences. The communication 
medium, including the Internet, probably has a particular role to play. 
The Internet originally enabled a production of "customized" sexual 
advice for a small number of audiences with special needs; but as such 
stories are transmitted worldwide, they may engender more potential 
customers, who happen to have contact with, and take interest in, 
these stories. 
What I want to focus on in this section is, however, a certain tendency 
among popular stories, especially among fictional stories. It seems 
that there are now more stories told, which combine sexuality with 
some shocking themes, Such as cruelty, violence, or even death. Some 
stories may depict 'extreme' sexualities, such as sadistic or 
masochistic ones, while others may narrate sexual aggression or 
sexualized murders. In the stock of Western stories, there is actually a 
recurring motif which connects sex with some extraordinary events 
that would transcend, or transgress, the boundary of everyday human 
experience. Traditionally speaking, the combination of the erotic and 
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extraordinary seems to be indeed one of the symbolic themes in the 
Western discourse and narratives (see below). Such a theme appears 
to be attracting more attention and is given more expression in popular 
cultural representations, which may in part reflect the rising interest in 
different sexualities; mentioned earlier, but perhaps it is more likely to 
do with other reasons, such as the overall increase in sexual stories, as 
well as other stories which centrally depict shocking and violent 
themes. Against this background, one may again notice the 
significance of the place of the pornographer in society; some argue 
that the theme of sex and transcendence of the ordinary is exactly 
what pornography is all about - pornographic speech deals with the 
subject of human sexuality in its extreme form. Although it may be 
accurate to suggest that some pornography, not all, has been 
concerned with such a theme, it does seem to point to an important 
feature of some pornographic speech. 6 There is a recurrence of sex 
. 
and extreme themes in popular Western stories, and we may say that 
this is exemplified in some types of pornographic speech. 
The point about extreme themes may be understood if we glance at 
popular sexual stories offered by the mass media. Mainstream films 
also employ such a theme occasionally. Paul Verhoeven's well-known 
film, Basic Instinct, is such an example. The film is a story about a 
bisexual woman, who is suspected of being a serial sexual murderer, 
who commits murder after the climax of a sexual act. Other popular 
films, such as Dressed to Kill, Fatal Attraction, and Jagged Edge, are 
also known to invoke the theme of sexuality and sexualized murder 
(Smith, 1996: 31-45). 7 
Some suggest that it is quite understandable for works - of art to 
concern themselves with the subject of extreme sexualities, and that 
the aim of pornography is exactly to engage with this theme. Susan 
Sontag offers such a view (Sontag, 1983). Sontag herself considers 
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pornography to be a form of "art" or "literature", and argues that the 
subject of its theme is an exploration of human sexuality. She says 
that human sexuality, at least potentially, has a very extraordinary 
dimension; it has a "dark", dangerous, even aggressive and vicious 
side. Everyone, for instance, she says, feels erotic attraction towards 
something cruel, offensive, or "vile and repulsive" (in "dreams" for 
example). What is so remarkable about human sexuality is that it 
involves some powerful "demonic forces", which drive one "close to 
taboo and dangerous desires", ranging from "impulse to commit 
sudden arbitrary violence upon another person" to the "yearning for 
the extinction of one's consciousness, for death itself' (ibid.: 221-222). 
In short, human sexuality potentially contains very "extreme forms of 
consciousness, " and "belongs... among the extreme rather than 
ordinary experiences of humanity" (ibid.: 221). What the artist, like 
the pornographer does, is, therefore, to push the boundary of normal 
erotic experience and to explore its extreme forms. He aims to render 
the "dark" side of sexuality visible to the audiences (ibid.: 212). 
Sontag mentions Story of 0 as an example of such an extraordinary 
erotic story. In the story, the heroine, named only as "0", lives the life 
of a sexual slave under the control of her lovers. 0 undergoes a 
succession of tortures and humiliations, and seems to descend 
gradually towards the annihilation of her ordinary existence as a 
human being. But we are told that this annihilation is exactly what she 
aims; by devoting herself as a passive being, she wishes to "reach the 
perfection of becoming an object" (ibid.: 220). "0 progresses ... toward 
her own extinction as a human being and her fulfillment as a sexual 
being" (ibid.: 222). O's sexuality here is in fact a quite masochistic 
one. By devoting herself as a sexual object, she attains her sexual 
fulfillment. If 0 retains a degree of self-respect and moral conscience, 
however, she would not be able to achieve this fulfillment. 0 then ha 
,s 
to make a choice. Sontag suggests that, whether we like it or not, 
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one's "sexual fulfillment" and "personal fulfillment" (that which one 
obtains as a moral and social being) are perhaps quite "distinct" ones. 
For some people, therefore, to achieve sexual fulfillment means to 
discard his or her moral and social consciousness. It could require, in 
fact, transgression of the accepted boundaries of conduct, or as Sontag 
puts it, "transcendence" of one's ordinary existence as a human being. 
Sontag argues that this is what pornography generally does: its aim is 
to "drive a wedge between one's existence as a full human being and 
one's existence as a sexual being" (ibid.: 222-223). In normal life, 
people may be too reluctant to drive such a "wedge" (ibid.: 223), but 
may still want to explore it in imaginary form. Sontag argues that the 
artists' position is very unique in this regard; they are privileged to 
investigate such extraordinary experience of humanity in their works 
(ibid.: 212). 
The idea is, therefore, that human sexuality contains a very dark, 
extreme side, and the fulfillment of this sexuality comes to involve 
transcendence of ordinary human experience. Artists are privileged to 
explore such motifs, and the pornographer especially does that. But 
there is a slightly different explanation for the combination of sex and 
extreme themes in stories. It is suggested that the theme is rooted in 
the patterns of Western discourse, which provides the idea that 
transcendence or transgression offers particular sexual pleasure and 
satisfaction. 
We may first note that the depiction of extreme sexualities is, in itself, 
strictly speaking, not a recent invention. Cameron and Frazer point out 
how the themes of the erotic pleasure and cruelty significantly 
featured in Romantic literature, the most notable one being that of 
Marquis de Sade (Cameron and Frazer, 1992: 371-372). According to 
Cameron and Frazer, Sade's erotic works actually reflected his ideal 
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of human transcendence, which was in its own way influenced by the 
Enlightenment thinking of the day. Sade philosophized that it is by 
"transgressing" the bounds of conventional morality exemplified by 
the state and religion, man would "transcend" his limitations and 
achieve real freedom. Sade came to combine this idea of 
transcendence/transgression with the idea of sexual pleasure, and 
expressed it in his novels. 
What featured in Sade's works does not seem to have died away today. 
In the tradition of the Western narratives and fiction, the idea of 
transcendence is occasionally connected with the theme of extreme, 
transgressive acts, and the ideas of transcendence or transgression are 
contexualised in an erotic theme. Cameron and Frazer argue that there 
are in fact threads of ideas and discourse in the West that would make 
possible the association of such themes as sex, transgression (murder), 
and transcendence. For example, there are "popular representations, 
many of which portray the murderer as a rebel and a hero: true crime 
magazines and journalism, crime fictions, waxwork museums, movies, 
'bodice ripper' Gothic novels", etc. (ibid.: 373). 
The subject of sex and murder may be more explicitly invoked in 
films and fiction, but it can also be featured in other forms of 
discourse, such as medico-scientific literature, including forensic, 
criminological, and psychiatric journals (ibid.: 375). There are, in 
short, a nexus of discourses that would offer a source of inspiration to 
people and enable them to link sex with transcendence and_ 
transgression, and to acquire the idea that transcendence or 
transgressive human acts would offer particular erotic thrills and 
pleasure. 
Whether it is sexuality that at bottom contains a dark impulse, as 
Sontag suggests, or it is the ideas of transcendenceltransgression that 
126 
become eroticised by the forms of discourse, the idea which seems to 
emerge is that human sexuality involves a dimension that transcends 
the sphere of ordinary experience. This is one of the symbolic cultural 
ideas surrounding sexuality, which recurs as a distinctive theme in 
stories. To be sure, ordinary people may not necessarily have an idea 
that our sexuality involves an "extreme form of consciousness", nor 
do the storytellers always consciously invoke the ideal of 
transcendence when they present extreme stories. But perhaps the 
"imagery" is something that they acquire from the stock of available 
stories. Surely, a sex act that defies the ordinary experience, or the 
combination of the ideal of transcendence and sex, is such a powerful 
theme that it is likely to attract people's attention and imagination. 
Cameron and Frazer suggest that the forms of discourse in the culture 
offer * individuals a variety of meanings, ideas, or modes of 
interpretation about sex. It may be indeed that the range of available 
stories now offered in society makes people easier to come up with 
extraordinary themes. There is an overall increase in stories, not only 
sexual stories, but also others, which generally deal with unusual 
human events, such as mystery, violence, and crimes. Newspapers 
also daily report real-life shocking events, which is also a form of 
discourse that would offer images and ideas to individuals. 
Pornography seems to occupy a unique status in this culture. 
Pornography, especially hardcore pornography, is known to depict 
extreme sexual activities - sadistic, masochistic, even repugnant and 
violent sexual acts. What the pornographer is dealing with in 
outrageous sex scenes, etc., however, may not be simply a subject 
matter that interests only a minority in society, but rather a reflection 
of a certain distinctive idea surrounding sexuality. The pornographer, 
of course, may elaborate and exaggerate this theme in a way that other 
stories, such as popular novels, may not do, but what he invokes also 
seems to be importantly connected with these other stories. What he 
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depicts may be inspired by other narratives, but his stories could also 
become a source of inspiration for other artists and story tellers. The 
pornographer, however, is the one who most clearly renders this idea 
of sexuality in society. 
5. Conclusion 
Freudian psychoanalysis, the sexual liberation movement, and liberal 
theory seem to have affected greatly the social imaginary surrounding 
sexuality in the twentieth century. Especially liberal ideas of 
individual liberty and the sphere of the private permeated into the 
common imaginary and changed people's thinking and attitude 
towards expressions of sexuality. I have argued that the pornographer 
embodies the present culture of sexual story telling, and its underlying 
value of sexual freedom in liberal society. I have also pointed out a 
particular tendency among stories in the Western culture; that is, a 
tendency to connect a sexual theme with some extreme human 
activities, such as cruelty, violence, or death. The idea that sexuality 
involves transcendence of the ordinary is one of the distinctive 
cultural ideas surrounding sexuality, which recurs as a theme in these 
stories. The pornographer most paradigmatically deals with and 
expresses this idea in society. The meaning of pornography seems to 
become more intelligible against the backdrop of this culture, which 
contains these sexual values and norms. 
Notes 
1 Other reasons which Plummer gives are the rise of "cultural 
intermediaries", such as television talk show hosts, who let people talk about 
their sexual stories in public, and the "individualistic 'therapeutic/expressive 
culture', which fosters the telling of self narratives" (Plummer, 1996: 40). 
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2 Weeks argues that the purpose of the Wolfenden Report was in fact more 
the state's attempt to "search for a more effective regulation of sexual 
deviance". What the Wolfenden Committee primarily considered was, 
according to him, "not how to liberalize the law ... but whether the law was 
the most effective means of control" (Weeks, 1989: 242). Thus, he argues, 
the Street Offences Act which later came into effect enforced the form of the 
state's control of individuals' sexual behaviour (ibid.: 252). (Public 
solicitation continued to be illegal. ) In short, Weeks sees the Report more as 
the state's strategic response to, and another means of controlling, sexual 
misconduct of individuals. I would not dispute pragmatic implications of the 
Report, which itself does not offer many moral arguments. However, it still 
seems to me right to say that it did reflect some important moral claims, 
which were significantly underpinned by the liberal idea of the separation 
between the public and private spheres of life. 
3 Plummer suggests that the polemics surrounding sexual stories often 
actually contribute to a further increase in these stories, by drawing more 
public attention and interest (Plummer, 1996: 40-41). 
This idea is derived from Weeks (Weeks, 1989: 25 1). 
5 It is reported that there is a rising demand for "rough, unprotected", "anal" 
sex in the sex industry, and prostitutes in Britain, especially migrant women 
from Eastern Europe, are being forced into such dangerous sex practices 
(Cowan, The Guardian, 11 February 2005, p. 13). 
6 This way of characterizing pornography, I believe, would not necessitate a 
change of my definition of pornography. The minimum definition of the 
term that I adopted could still accommodate this special type of pornography-. 
Whereas someone like Susan Sontag seems to think that this is the essence 
of pornography, I only mean to suggest that perhaps some pornography 
exhibits this feature. 
7 Smith contends that such stories are imbued with "misogynistic" biases. I 
will discuss the implications of cultural norms in the final chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Gender Norms, Male Power, 
and Pornography's Authority 
1. Introduction 
The analysis of the sexual values and norms and their relation to 
pornography in the last chapter was made in a quite gender-neutral 
way; that is, it did not make any specific references to the aspect of 
gender relations with regard to these matters. Such an approach to 
sexuality would in fact seem to appear "incomplete', or even "flawed", 
from some feminists', especially radical feminists', perspective. For 
they would ask, undeniably, how it would be possible for anyone to 
separate an analysis of sexuality from an analysis of gender; they 
would argue that "sexuality itself is a social construct, gendered to the 
ground" (MacKinnon, 1991: 198, emphasis added). From their point 
of view, the argument in the last chapter left unanalysed what they see 
as crucial in the domain of sexuality, namely, the disparate situation 
and experience of men and women as regards the matter of sex, which 
results from, and typically takes place in the context of, men's powef 
and dominance over women. From their point of view, the analysis 
has in fact left out this vital dimension of hierarchy and power, which 
is integral to sex practices. 
The feminists' critique of pornography, of course, has brought to the 
fore a gender-specific critique of pornography. The critique is not 
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about obscenity or morality as such but about politics; it is about 
"power and powerlessness" - the fundamental inequality between men 
and women (ibid.: 196). Radical feminists, such as MacKinnon, see 
that sex in our society is paradigmatically something that men force 
on women, and reflects the reality of "male dominance" and "female 
submission". Unless this issue is fundamentally addressed, any 
analysis of sexuality, or pornography, for that matter, would be, 
therefore, far from complete from the radical feminists' point of view. 
The reason that the last chapter took up neither the issue of power nor 
gender was simply that this can be dealt with separately and so need 
not be there. As explained earlier, my approach to the question of the 
"authority" of pornography crucially differs from the approach taken 
by others, who take the fact of male power as central to their analysis. 
I hope that the discussion in this chapter will clarify these differences 
further. Later in this chapter I focus on MacKinnon's critique of 
pornography and explain in detail what its problems are, and why it 
fails to explain the significance of pornography in society. 
First of all, however, I turn to the issue of gender. Indeed, 
pornography reflects a different existence of men and women in 
society. In this chapter I pay attention to a particular norm of gender, 
which identifies women primarily with their bodies and sexuality. It is 
sometimes said that women are "the sex", or sexual beings, in our 
society. In a liberal society, this cultural meaning of woman appears to 
have become more and more accentuated with the overall increase of 
sexual stories. Pornographic speech, of course, also reflects and 
invokes it; it in fact socially embodies this idea of woman as a sexual 
being. 
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2. Cultural meaning of woman 
Judith Butler said of gender that it is "a cultural interpretation of sex", 
of our sexed body (Butler, 1987: 128). To the extent that we are all 
our bodies and these bodies are always "already culturally interpreted" 
(ibld.: 128) on the basis of anatomy, none of us is really free to escape 
this cultural imposition of gender. This is true of both men and women. 
We are not only male and female, but expected to be manlike and 
womanlike, and the expectation can be at times quite intransigent. 
Today, cultural interpretations surrounding "woman" may be many 
and various -a woman can be intuitive, emotional, yet attentive, 
caring, and cooperative, etc. But one of the most conspicuous and 
prevalent norms about women is that which associates them primarily 
with the body and sexuality. It appears to me that the popular culture 
of Western liberal societies treats women as though they were 
essentially sexual beings, or sexualises them in the way that the sexual 
and bodily aspects of women are given elaborate attention, as attested 
in many representations (think about, for instance, the roles played by 
"sex symbol" or "sex goddess", like that of Marilyn Monroe (see 
Griffin, 1981: 201-217)). 
It nonetheless seems that being sexual or sexy is commonly thought to 
be a "good" attribute of gender. ' Individual women strive to live up to 
this cultural expectation by carefully selecting their attire and 
cosmetics, and even by undergoing a plastic surgery. Precocious 
young girls soon learn what is essentially expected of "a woman" and 
emulate adults' behaviour. Monique Wittig claimed that "sex is a 
category which women cannot be outside of' (Wittig, 1982: 67). 
Wittig's claim can be taken to mean that the sexual meaning of a 
woman, and hence a certain expectation about her appearance and 
behaviour, always surround her, whether she be a lawyer, entrepreneur, 
teacher, or housewife. 
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There is, however, an ambivalence surrounding the culture's 
association of women and sexuality. Although women are thought to 
be sexual creatures and this attribute is expected or even encouraged 
in some contexts, it is also true that women who are sexual are said to 
be "promiscuous" and morally bad. In fact, the sexual connotation of a 
woman can easily slip into the connotation of her promiscuity and 
licentiousness. The language we use attests to this norm. The English 
language, especially, contains so many vocabularies referring to 
female prostitutes (which is said to be 220 words) that it seems to 
suggest almost that they are the "paradigmatic" women (Stanley, cited 
in Cameron, 1992: 108). A woman can be a "slag", "pricktease", or 
"cunt", and interestingly, formerly neutral or binary words (i. e., 
containing both male and female forms) have come to imply 
something "negative" when connected particularly with women (e. g., 
"harlot", "courtesan" ) (Schulz, cited in ibid.: 108). There is also a 
double standard in the way the culture regards women's sexuality and 
men's sexuality. Men, of course, can also be associated with sexuality 
- in fact unbridled sexuality, as reflected in the characters of Don Juan, 
Casanova, or Lord Byron. Men collectively are, however, never as 
strongly connected with sexuality as women generally are, and men's 
promiscuity is traditionally dealt with more leniently than in the case 
of women. 2 The equivalent of "whore" simply does not apply to 
describe men's sexual (mis-)behaviour. For men's sexual indulgence 
is said to be more than a matter of sex; it is an experimentation of a 
way of life, or an exploration of human freedom. Women's equivalent_ 
behaviour, on the other hand, is thoroughly a fleshly affair; they are 
denounced for "succumbing" to their lust. 
The' ambivalence surrounding women and sexuality is actually 
consistent with the contradictory attitude that the culture shows 
towards the norms of femininity in general. Norms surrounding 
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women in fact often reveal conflicting and confusing ideas of 
womanly characters and womanly virtues. According to Kathryn 
Pauly Morgan, the ideas of womanly virtues, for instance, can make 
such conflicting demands upon women that they can only be described 
as being in a state of "moral madness", or moral confusions (Morgan, 
1987). One way in which women are subjected to such "moral 
madness" is by the phenomenon of "moral metamorphoses" (ibid.: 
212-214). Under the term of "moral metamorphoses", the same 
womanly characteristics are transformed from "virtues" into "vices" in 
some contexts and from "vices" into "virtues" in some other contexts. 
The outcome of such practices is that women may be "simultaneously 
blamed and praised" for displaying the same attribute. Some literature 
(in the tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau), for instance, advises 
women to cultivate the womanly virtues of "submissiveness, frailty, 
fearfulness", or "self-abnegating sacriflce", "dependence", etc. They 
tell women that the appropriate behaviours of good and virtuous 
women are somewhat like those of a "little canary". These same 
characteristics are, however, quickly transformed into "vices" in a 
different context where other virtues are called for. (The 
"metamorphoses" of gender norms depend on whose judgements and 
interests are largely involved. Sometimes one and the same person 
shows contradictory attitudes towards gender. The ambivalence of 
norms of femininity in fact reflects the ambivalence of men's views 
on women. 3) 
Morgan also remarks on different reactions men and women receive_ 
for displaying the same behavioural characteristics. Moral evaluations 
turn out to be "gender mediated". The identical conduct is judged 
differently depending on the sex of the agent; a man's behaviour is 
assessed positively while the same act by a woman is not. A man's 
manner is "praised for being aggressive and assertive", and a woman's 
is decried as being "pushy"; he is admired for "his attention to detail", 
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and she is deplored for "her pickiness"; he is thought "steadfast", and 
she is called "dogmatic and hard"; he has "firm judgements", and she 
has "prejudices and biases"; he is "franle' and she is "mouthy and 
strident", etc. "What are virtues in him are, invariably, vices in her" 
Obid.: 216). 
The norm concerning women and sexuality also reveals similar 
"metamorphoses", ambivalence, and double standards. Woman's 
nature is thought to be sexual, and she is rewarded for being that way, 
while at the same time her sexuality implies promiscuity and she is 
blamed for it. Men can also be sexual beings and indulge in sexual 
activity, but they are not deplored for such behaviour. The crucial 
point, however, is that a woman's identity is, much more strongly than 
a man's, tied to her body and sexuality. She may be blamed or praised 
for having this attribute, but the interpretation of the gender of woman, 
whether positive or negative, frequently revolves around her sexual 
body. 
To be sure, the association of women with the body and sexuality is 
strictly speaking not a recent phenomenon, and may also be found in 
other cultures, too. In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir made a 
philosophical statement about how women's existence is persistently 
reduced to the bodily sphere, their nature often interpreted in terms of 
the feminine body and sexual functions. De Beauvoir also saw that 
these dominant cultural images of woman largely reflect a male point 
of view and male interests. 4 In contrast to men, who have been 
traditionally associated with the realm of "reason", women have been 
principally the embodiment of nature and carnality. She pointed out 
many cultural "myths" surrounding women's bodies, and argued that 
the idea of woman as the body ("the flesh") is also undeniably 
manifest in the tradition of Christianity (de Beauvoir, 1988: 171-229, 
282-292). :, ý -1 ý,, '' 
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Nevertheless, women's association with "the body" appears to be 
especially true in the present culture of the West. The connection of 
women with the body and sexuality is even more pronounced today, 
partly because modem entertainment and advertisement make it far 
easier to spread this image. It is also importantly because the growth 
of contemporary. sexual stories collaborates and promotes the 
sexualisation of women; one could argue that what has been 
principally expressed with the expansion of sexual stories is women's 
sexuality, rather than men's. It looks as though to some people sexual 
liberation principally meant women's more open sexual expressions. 
This in itself need not be a wrong thing; however, the terms in which 
women have to express sexuality are often framed to suit men's 
interests and male sexuality (Jeffreys, 1990). (Tbis may also be 
attested by pornographers' claims that what they do helps to liberate 
female sexuality (MacKinnon, 1987: 134-145). ) 
One may, however, still wonder why men could not be sexualised in 
the same way as women are with the increasingly open expressions of 
sexuality in society. Perhaps, a reason might be that, empirically, men 
have achieved the status of more than body; the social status of men as 
creators and directors of meaning and life has long been established, 
while - those of women, comparatively speaking, less so. Hence the 
difference between men and women - whether or not their respective 
existence is so closely bound with body and sex - is probably not 
unrelated to men's overall dominance and prestige in nonsexual_ 
spheres of life. 
Susanne Kappeler remarks that "[fln our culture, women are 'the 
sex' ". As the gender of "woman" has been culturally reduced to '-'Sex", 
she argues, a woman's body on display necessarily suggests "sex" 
(Kappeler, 1992: 93). Tbus, women are sexual bodies and their bodies 
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imply sex; this idea is, of course, perfectly illustrated by pornographic 
speech. Pornography in our society is the exemplar of this idea of 
woman as sexual being. What the pornographer does, in fact, is to 
give the most concrete expression to this prevalent cultural meaning of 
woman. 
3. Male power and pornography's authority 
In this and the previous chapters, I explained those important values 
and norms which are embodied by the pornographer. There is a shared 
framework in the Background which makes pornography possible and 
intelligible and, as I also argue, "authoritative". In this section I will 
focus on MacKinnon's critique of pornography and explain in more 
detail why her arguments fail to explain the significance of 
pornography in society. Some of MacKinnon's views are shared by 
other theorists and anti-pomography campaigners (e. g., Dworkin, A., 
1981; Itzin, 1992c; Kappeler, 1986,1992), but I concentrate on 
MacKinnon here, for she offered the most systematic criticism of 
pornography. Although MacKinnon offered a powerful critique of 
pornography, explicating its role within the overall system of male 
power and domination, it has not fully convinced her critics of the 
special significance of pornographic speech in society. In this section I 
will argue that MacKinnon, by heavily focusing on the structure of 
power relations, has failed to reveal the complex way in which 
pornography is connected with and supported by the shared social 
imaginary. First, however, I will summarize MacKinnon's key_ 
arguments. 
To understand MacKinnon's criticism of pornography, one also needs 
to understand her overall critique of the reality of sexual relations and 
her critique of male power. What differentiates - MacKinnon's 
feminism from other strands of feminism is her view that women's 
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subordination in contemporary industrial society like America is 
primarily that of sexual subordination. Like others who have raised 
concerns over this issue, she thinks that women's social existence is 
reduced to that of sexual being or sexual object; however, her 
argument makes more explicit the "fact" of male use and control of 
female sexuality. As she bluntly puts it: "A woman is a being who 
identifies and is identified as one whose sexuality exists for someone 
else, who is socially male' (MacKinnon, 1982: 533). Closely analysed, 
the gender of woman, that is, the notions of femaleness or femininity, 
reveals the requirement for women to become sexually attractive and 
accessible "on male terms" ("Good girls are 'attractive', bad girl are 
$provocative' ", and so on). Typical womanly characteristics of being 
"docile, soft, passive, nurturant, vulnerable, weak", etc., also conceal 
men's interest in having access to women's sexuality; "passivity 
means receptivity", and "softness means pregnability", and so forth 
(ibid.: 530-53 1). More fundamentally, however, the significance of 
sexuality to women's subordination arose out of a range of issues that 
concerned feminists for decades, such as "abortion, birth control, 
sterilization abuse, domestic battery, rape, incest, lesbianism, sexual 
harassment, prostitution, female sexual slavery, and pornography" 
(ibid.: 529). The practice of "consciousness raising", in which women 
talked about the most intimate issues and opened their hearts to one 
another, also revealed the reality of women's situation and their 
vulnerability in the domain of sexuality (MacKinnon, 1991: 127,83- 
109). 
MacKinnon believes that society is fundamentally organized along the 
divisions created by sexuality. Sexuality, in her view, is itself a social 
construct, but it divides society into two classes - the male and the 
female, and determines gender, as we know it. Sexuality and gender 
are so constructed and defined that the male dominates the female. 
Sexuality thus emerges as the "linchpin" of gender hierarchy, and as 
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the locus of male power. Men fundamentally dominate, and women 
submit, and this is socially most manifest in the sexual relations. Male 
power, however, is hegemonic; it forces its way of viewing upon the 
world and upon women's existence; women's nature, identity, and 
sexuality are crucially constructed and defined from men's point of 
view (MacKinnon, 1982: 515-516,531,533; 1983: 636). 
MacKinnon says: "Having power means, among other things, that 
when someone says, 'This is how it is, ' it is taken as being that way" 
(MacKinnon, 1987: 164). When the powerful say that something is the 
case, then the world becomes as the powerful claim it is, and this will 
not be negated by what the powerless say to the contrary - this is 
simply the nature of male power. Male power imposes on the world its 
own perspectives. Therefore the powerful can force their own way of 
seeing on others. Power and epistemology are hence closely connected, 
and MacKinnon cites de Beauvoir, according to whom: 
"Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; 
they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with 
the absolute truth" (de Beauvoir, 1988: 175). Men indeed construct the 
world from their own standpoint and that "becomes the truth to be 
described" (MacKinnon, 1982: 537). 
Men's power, however, operates ingeniously. Their perspective is 
often masked as that of a "nonsituated", "disinterested", and 
"objective" observer, thus carefully concealing the power and interests 
on which it is based. MacKinnon argues that this appearance of 
"aperspectivity" and "objectivity" is the key "strategy" for men to 
legitimate and impose their own point of view (MacKinnon, 1982: 
537; 1983: 636). Their perspectives are presented as not being 
particular, but rather universal and objective; as reflecting the reality 
of life and nature - in fact just the way things are. 
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This male stance of "objectivity" socially involves the practice of 
objectification. According to MacKinnon, "sexual objectification" is 
the principal social mechanism that maintains gender hierarchy and 
subordination of women (MacKinnon, 1982: 537-541; 1983: 635). In 
principle, to objectify someone is to turn someone into an object, or 
treat him or her as an object. Women are, in male eyes, sex objects. 
Since objects are something that is "objectively knowable", sexually 
objectified women are claimed to be an "objective' description, that 
which corresponds to reality. In short, through the process of sexual 
objectification, men project their own views of women (and of 
sexuality), legitimate them, and construct the reality of what a woman 
is. Therein, pornography emerges as a crucial medium that achieves 
this dynamic (MacKinnon, 1987: 3). If social reality is that of male 
supremacy, pornography is a primary form of sexual objectification, 
which serves the ideological function and keeps the dynamism of 
gender inequality. 
But how exactly does pornography play a part in engendering the 
inequality of the sexes? MacKinnon frequently says that pornography 
s4sexualizes inequality", or turns male dominance and female 
submission into sex: 
In pornography, there it is ... all the unspeakable abuse: the rape, 
the battery, the sexual harassment, the prostitution, the sexual 
abuse of children. Only in the pornography it is called something 
else: sex, sex, sex, sex, and sex, respectively. Pornography 
sexualizes rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution, and 
child sexual abuse; it thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes, _ and legitimizes them. More generally, it eroticizes the 
dominance and submission that is dynamic common to them all. 
It makes hierarchy sexy and calls that "truth about sex" or just a 
miffor of reality. ( ... ) This is what the pornography means (ibid.: 171, emphasis ornitted). 
Thus, pornography "erotic izes" male dominance and female 
submission. It constructs the reality of sex inequality as sexuality; it in 
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fact turns it into sex, something "enjoyable', it makes sexism and 
hierarchy "sexy" (ibid.: 3,200). Men come to acquire sexual 
gratification by dominating women and women by being dominated 
by men. Pornography also apparently legitimates what it constructs, 
by giving the audience an impression that women "consent" to what is 
being done to them in pornography, or portraying women's sexuality 
as inherently "masochistic" (MacKinnon, 1991: 141). Furthermore, 
pornography poses sex inequality as a natural gender difference; 
women's passivity or men's dominance is claimed to be rooted in 
biological difference or explained as a necessary consequence of 
socialisation, thereby masking the way inequality is "imposed by 
force" (MacKinnon, 1987: 3). 
MacKinnon thus argues for the crucial role that pornography plays in 
creating and "institutionalising" the sexist order of society. However, 
this is the most contentious point on which MacKinnon's critics 
vehemently disagree with her. As we have seen, many theorists are 
generally very dismissive about pornography's significance in society 
and its power to legitimate its views (see Chapter Two; also R. 
Dworkin, 1991,1993,2000; Hawkins and Zimring, 1991; cf, Butler, 
1997; Feinberg, 1985; Segal, 1998). Critics so far have not appeared 
to be convinced by MacKinnon's arguments which link male power, 
objectivity, objectification, and pornography. Although they may 
concede the existing sexist social order, they still do not see the 
significance of the genre of the speech, nor its legitimacy or efficacy 
to impose its views. Critics contend that pornography is widely 
regarded with disrespect; it has neither legitimacy in the sexual 
domain nor the efficacy to convey its sexist messages to the wider 
society. They also do not accept MacKinnon's claim that 
pornography's messages are legitimated because they have the air of 
objectivity. Liberals insist that any sexist views in pornography are 
generally condemned and discredited by the liberal law and the state. 
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Thus, MacKinnon's argument, although it may offer an insight into 
the system of male power, has not fully persuaded her critics of the 
importance of pornography in our society. 
MacKinnon nevertheless has another explanation of why 
pornographic views might be legitimated in our society. 'This is where 
she alludes to the continuity between pornography and the rest of 
social reality, and an example of this appears when she reviews the 
"harm" of pornography. She says that pornography sends harmful 
messages; it constructs the falsehood, the "lies" that women have to 
live with. However, this "harm" of pornography is difficult to see, 
because male supremacy has already succeeded in "making the world 
a pornographic place"; "[s]pecifically, the harm cannot be discerned 
from the objective standard because it is so much of 'what is' " 
(MacKinnon, 1991: 204). In other words, we already live in the world 
where the male viewpoint has become the de facto measure of things. 
What men tell, or what pornography tells, therefore, cannot be 
discredited because there is no other standard against which their 
claims can be compared. "[Women's real lives] are so seamlessly 
consistent with the pornography that it can be credibly defended by 
saying it is only a miffor of reality" (ibid.: 198). 
In discussing the meaning of pornography in the general social context, 
MacKinnon may. have gained potentially more by exploring this 
aspect carefully. Yet, in my view, she failed to do so. An unfortunate 
part 'of MacKinnon's argument is that she has the tendency to 
overgeneralize; that is, when she compares different social practices to 
make her case, she talks as though these were really identical practices, 
in no way distinguishable from one another. Her explanation of sexual 
practices, including pornography, is also often couched in the 
paradigm of "men forcing sex upon women". This tendency is 
apparent in the way that she does not draw any distinctions between 
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rape and ordinary sexual intercourse. She says, for instance: 
"[P]omography converges with more conventionally acceptable 
depictions and descriptions just as rape does with intercourse, because 
both are acts within the same power relations" (MacKinnon, 1991: 
203). As MacKinnon thinks that what a woman wants, or "wills", 
sexually, is already defined in male terms within the system of male 
dominance, she does not find meaningful in making the conventional 
distinction between normal intercourse and rape, by introducing an 
adage of "consent" (MacKinnon, 1983: 650). Rape, in her view, is "an 
undiluted expression of a norm that permeates many ordinary 
interactions" (MacKinnon, 1991: 146). "Compare victims' reports of 
rape with women's reports of sex. They look a lot alike". Also, 
"[c]ompare victim's reports of rape with what pornography says is sex. 
They look a lot alike" (ibid.: 146). In short, in MacKinnon's 
explanation, there is a continuum between pornography, rape, and 
"ordinary" sex, and the relation between pornography and the rest of 
social practices just emerges as the one seamless reality of "forced 
sex". This appears as the lynchpin that explains the "normality" of 
pornography. 
MacKinnon's analysis lays a heavy emphasis on men's control of the 
world and of female sexuality, but it is ultimately unsuccessful in 
demonstrating the special importance of pornography. By pointing out 
what she takes to be the fundamental social structure, which is 
predicated on male power and domination, she seems to think that the 
significance of pornography is explained. Critics however contend 
that the pornographic norms are disapproved of in the wider society. 
MacKinnon's way of generalizing social practices also undermines, 
rather than strengthens, her critique; many find it hard to accept her 
5 conflation of consensual sex and rape. 
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Although I do not deny the implications of power in pornography, I 
argue that the issue would be better explored - rather than deducing 
the significance of pornography from the fact of men's power over 
women - if we attended more to the complex relations between 
pornography and other social values and norms. For one thing, it may 
be better, as I did in the previous chapter, to examine the way in which 
pornography is intertwined with and reflects society's shared values 
surrounding sexuality. 
There are in fact important relations between pornography and other 
social norms, which are critical in thinking about the status of 
pornography in society, but they are not as MacKinnon suggests; the 
relations are more subtle. Wheri MacKinnon considered the relation 
between pornography and other speech practices, for instance, she 
could have pointed out how these individual practices share the 
particular background of the specific culture; these practices 
ultimately reflect and invoke some common background assumptions 
and ideas - people's unquestioned and unexamined acceptance of 
certain norms about women. What we should be looking at is what 
different social practices seem to presuppose. It is perhaps the way we 
see this connection; what the pornographer essentially deals with - it 
is speech about sex, especially speech about women's sex - reflects 
the ideas which are already widely shared and implicitly assumed 
among the members of society. To take the norm of gender discussed 
earlier, the frequent association of women with the body and sex in 
our culture, which is invoked not only in pornography but in other_ 
forms of speech and practice (e. g., dramas and soap operas), makes 
the depictions of women in pornography look "normal", "natural", or 
even "appropriate" ("appropriate to the gender). If pornography 
appears "legitimate" to some, it is because of this connection between 
women and sex. It is this social and cultural context that gives sense 
and significance to what the pornographer does. To the extent that 
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pornography's meaning ultimately derives from shared societal norms, 
it could not be dismissed as isolated, exceptional, or purely 
insignificant, as some theorists seem to suggest. 
It is also the prevailing cultural meaning of woman that would make 
women potentially more "vulnerable" to their demeaning description 
or caricatures in pornography. Gordon Hawkins and Franklin Zimring, 
although overall critical of MacKinnon and Dworkin, acknowledge 
this point. They agree that 
it is not altogether misleading to assert that women are 
differentially at risk from any degradation involved in 
pornography. ( ... ) Whereas male authority figures have long been accepted in modem Western societies, the assumption of 
women of high-status roles that are independent of their sex is 
much less firmly rooted. ( ... ) [A]n extended portrayal of women 
as "voracious cunts, " to use Andrea Dwokin's phrase ... would have more impact on men's comfortably accepting a woman as 
physician or tax accountant than an equally extended portrayal 
of men as aggressive penises would have on women's 
acceptance of the authority of a male doctor or tax accountant. 
The reason would be the greater difficulty men have segregating 
the sexual meaning of women in their midst from social roles 
where feminine sexuality is not relevant to performance 
(Hawkins and Zimring, 1991: 173-174). 
Hence, it appears that the problem with pornography may not be 
solely to do with what is contained, but also with the relative status of 
men and women in society, and also the associated gender norms. It is 
what is presumed by the audience (and by the culture) and the 
association he makes between pornography, mundane norms, and the 
day-to-day gender relations that appears to become problematic. If 
women are habitually seen as sexual things, then it would indeed seem 
normal to treat women as sex objects in pornography, whose status is 
essentially to satisfy men's sexual needs and desires. 
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As argued in the last chapter, pornography not only reflects gender 
norms but also the values surrounding sexual expressions. There are 
now shared values of sexual freedom and proliferation of sexual 
stories, which also makes significant the position of the pornographer 
in the society. The pornographer is "a social character" in a 
MacIntyrean sense; he occupies a special place in the present culture, 
because of the way in which he embodies and articulates these 
Background values and norms. He exemplifies these in a way that is 
clearly visible to the rest of society. Not everyone, of course, is fully 
aware of what the pornographer actually does, but the social presence 
of the pornographer is quite manifest. It is in this way that 
pornography and the pornographer reflect, and embody, distinctive 
values and norms of society, and it is said that they have 
"authoritative" status. 
MacKinnon's argument is occasionally criticized on different grounds. 
Some critics argue that MacKinnon's approach to women's 
oppression is "sexual reductionism! '; for it reduces the issue of 
women's subordination to that of sexual subordination, at the cost of 
addressing other issues, which are deemed of more importance to 
women's situation, such as economic dependence and family structure 
(e. g., Valverde, 1995). This is in fact a common critique made against 
feminists who concentrate on sexual issues. A similar criticism is that 
speech other than pornography also degrades and demeans women; 
women are subordinated by non-sexually explicit speech, perhaps 
more than by sexually explicit speech. It may be true that radical 
feminists like MacKinnon and Dworkin have focused too heavily on 
sexuality, but the charge of sexual reductionism is not warranted 
against those who generally object to pornography. Many women in 
fact agree that sexuality is one of the main areas where women are 
subordinated. The fact that there are gender inequalities in the legal 
and economic spheres does not mean that the sexual sphere need not 
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be addressed. To resolve women's overall oppression therefore 
requires addressing sexual issues, as well as nonsexual matters (Itzin, 
1992b: 14). Moreover, now that we know in particular the important 
place of pornography in our society, we have a good reason to 
maintain objections to pornography. 
Gender norms and the question ofpower 
There are complex connections between norms of femininity, male 
power, and the issue of subordination of women, and I want to remark 
on this, to the extent it concerns the present issue. MacKinnon's 
critique of pornography, as we saw, is also a critique of male 
supremacy. The problem with MacKinnon's approach, however, is 
that it often suggests that what lies behind all this is always men's 
deliberate will to sexually subjugate women. The language of "force" 
frequently surfaces in her writing. For instance, "sexuality [is] a social 
construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women, and 
constitutive of the meaning of gender" (MacKinnon, 1991: 128); 
"[m]en force women to become sexual objects... " (ibid.: 141). The 
paradigm of forced sex has also already been mentioned. 
In MacKinnon's theory, men often appear as collective actors, whose 
power is truly hegemonic and also very systemic; it systematically 
ensures men's control of women's sexuality. She theorizes that male 
power is implicated in state power; the liberal state and law, in fact, 
are framed from a male point of view, and basically safeguard and 
promote. male interests (MacKinnon, 1983). MacKinnon's suspicion 
of the state is fuelled by its apparent unwillingness to support 
women's fight against pornography. She is very critical of . the 
American Supreme Court's decision to strike down the anti- 
pornography ordinance initiated by feminists, while continuing to 
preserve the law of obscenity. The feminist ordinance defined 
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pornography as "a women's civil rights violation" and enabled 
individual women (any Nvoman in fact) to sue for the damages 
resulting from the production, distribution, and consumption of 
pornography. It was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 
1986 on the grounds that it amounted to a "content-based regulation" 
of speech. MacKinnon, however, wonde rs why the obscenity law of 
1973 does not similarly count as a "viewpoint law", which restricts 
speech on the basis of the expressed content (MacKinnon, 1987: 212). 
Under American law, obscenity means 
that which 'the average person applying contemporary standards, 
would find that, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient i, nterest; 
that [which] depicts or describes, in a patently offensive Way, 
sexual conduct as defined by the applicable law; and that which, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value' (Cited in MacKinnon, 1991.: 201-202). 
The obscenity law was never invoked by the state to prohibit 
pornography; it supposedly repudiates it, but also lets it thrive. Thus, 
MacKinnon argues: 
The law sees and treats women the way men see and treat 
women. ( ... ) If part of the kick of pornography involves 
eroticizing the putatively prohibited, obscenity law will 
putatively prohibit pornography enough to maintain its 
desirability without ever making it unavailable... " (MacKinnon, 
1983: 644). 
In MacKinnon's arguments, there emerges a system of male power, 
which permeates every level of the state, and systematically controls 
and binds women. Whether it is ultimately her intention or not, she 
evokes a picture of the ruling power, which is all pervasive, and is 
simply forcing its views upon women against their will. 
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The idea that men force their views on women's existence is also 
shared by de Beauvoir. She quotes an explicitly chauvinist comment 
made by Honor6 de Balzac: " 'The destiny of woman and her sole 
glory is to make beat the hearts of men ... she is a chattel and properly 
speaking only a subsidiary to men' to; " '[play no attention to her 
murmurs, her cries, her pains; nature has made herfor our use.... ' to 
(de Balzac, cited in de Beauvoir, 1988: 285). De Beauvoir thinks that 
men's "myths" of woman have no doubt reflected male "utility" and 
"interests", and "deliberately used by patriarchal society for purposes 
of self-justification" (ibid.: 290). Men have the power, and they 
adamantly refuse to listen to women's voices. 
The'language of force or deliberateness, however, would skew the 
understanding of the issue at hand, i. e., the relation between cultural 
norms, men's power, and women's subordination to men. The gender 
norm that we have been discussing, the norm that women are 
associated with the body and sex, certainly largely reflects men's 
point of view and serves their interests. The existing power relation is 
exercised and reproduced through such cultural norms. Nevertheless, 
it is not, for this reason, always coercively or deliberately imposed on 
women's lives. It appears true that this norm reflects men's overall 
social power and superiority over women, but this power should not 
be thought always to involve coercion or deliberate intention on the 
part of men to enforce their views. 
As Iris Young suggests, if some social groups are oppressed, because 
of the fact that the existing social norms and institutions by and large 
operate unjustly or disadvantageously to their interests, it is not 
necessarily the result of "the tyranny of the ruling group over another" 
or of their "coercive power" to impose their will (Young, 1990b: 41). 
Rather, ' the inequality is maintained because "[flts causes are 
embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols ... underlying 
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institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those 
rules" (ibid.: 41). In a liberal democratic society, where the 
fundamental rights of each citizen are formally protected, oppression 
of some groups is likely to take the form of such "structural" 
constraints, rather than a deliberate policy of the ruling power. 
This does not mean to say that men's power does not involve coercion 
or force, which it undeniably does. The point here is rather to indicate 
the way that this particular cultural norm is expressed and maintained, 
at its mundane level, by ordinary men and women in society. The fact 
that women are viewed and treated as sexual beings probably largely 
reflects the male point of view and benefits men's, rather than 
women's interests. If, however, women face disadvantages or injustice 
as a consequence of this norm (e. g., the practice of sexual harassment, 
pornography), or if the norm of treating women merely as "a sex" 
seems to contradict the democratic principles of gender equality, this 
is not always because men force this norm upon women. It is rather 
because of the "collective consequences" of people's unconsciously 
and unquestioningly following this norm on an everyday basis. Both 
men and women, of course, now share the norm and express it in their 
everyday assumptions and behaviour, but this does not involve their 
self-conscious decision-making. I have earlier suggested that our 
Background contains "social imaginary", the level of unstructured and 
less clearly articulated understanding, which still shapes and governs 
people's attitudes and behaviour. The gender norm in question seems 
to involve the same level of implicit understanding; its meaning or 
implication is not explicitly understood, and this is why it is apt to call 
it "imaginary". Ilie practice of pornography is also sustained by, this 
commonly shared yet less clearly grasped imaginary of society. 
Social norms thus operate more subtly than MacKinnon suggests. 
Many men in liberal democratic society - openly embrace the 
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fundamental equality of men and women, but the same men from time 
to time may treat women merely as sexual objects and find no 
inconsistency among their thoughts. This is plainly because the norm 
usually does not involve the same terrain of thoughts as the ideas of 
equality of human beings. This unreflective following of the norm 
also seems to explain why it is so persistent and pervasive, and the 
reason why pornography, which itself reflects this norm, thrives 
despite the fact that there are other countervailing values in society. 
Thus, in the last chapters, I have been examining the social meaning 
and social status of the pornographer and pornography. I have argued 
that the meaning and significance of pornography would be 
understood if we examine closely the way it is connected with other 
everyday, commonly shared values and norms. Pornographic speech 
reflects the existing values and norms, and it is from these that it 
ultimately derives its sense and significance. 
I have claimed that the pornographer has an "authoritative" status, 
because of the way his role expresses and embodies these shared 
values and norms of society. Now we seem to have an answer to the 
question raised in the first chapter. As an authoritative speaker, his 
speech acts would carry a different force of illocution from 
nonauthoritative speakers. His speech has the force of "verdict" or 
"declaration", and his saying of "so-and-so" would in fact count as 
"so-and-so". His speech, furthermore, would have more power (i. e., 
potential) to bring about, causally, the subordinate status of women in 
reality. 
Notes 
Sally Haslanger defines gender 
_as, 
the role one is assigned to in. society. 
Gender norms are, in her view, "clusters of characteristics and abilities that 
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function as a standard by which individuals are judged to be 'good' instances 
of gender; they are the 'virtues' appropriate to the gender" (Haslanger, 1993: 
89). Haslanger argues that gender roles, like other social roles, have a 
certain "point or purpose". If one performs this assigned gender role very 
well (meaning that it serves the point or purpose), then it is a "good" or even 
"excellent" case of gender. Hence "gender-norms capture how one should 
behave and what attributes are suitable if one is to excel in the socially 
sanctioned gender roles" (ibid.: 89). Although I do not necessarily follow 
Haslanger's definition of gender and gender norms, it is an interesting 
teleological analysis of gender. 
2 Simone de Beauvoir interprets this as follows: "[Mlisbehaviour of a man in 
more modem societies is only a minor folly, often regarded indulgently; 
even if he disobeys the laws of the community, man continues to belong to it; 
he is only an enfant terrible, offering no profound menace to the order of 
society. If, on the other hand, woman evades the rules of society, she returns 
to Nature and to the demon, she looses uncontrollable and evil forces in the 
collective midst. Fear is always mixed with the blame attached to woman's 
licentious conduct" (de Beauvoir, 1988: 221-222). 
3 Morgan's own argument is that this "moral madness" is the result of 
"patriarchal ideology" and practices. 
4 For a good discussion of de Beauvoir, see Toril Moi (Moi, 1994: especially, 
148-178) and Rosemarie Tong (Tong, 1989: 195-216). 
5 In her 1983 article, MacKinnon in fact offers an insightful analysis of the 
problems of the law of rape. What is wrong with the law is that the definition 
of rape or what counts as a violation of women's sexuality is often framed in 
44male sexual terms". Although the law of rape may be fraught with problems, 
it would also seem to distort many women's experiences and therefore it is 
inappropriate to suggest that most sex is after all "forced sex". The paradigm 
of "forced sex", however, is consistent with her overall view of the basic, 
social structure, where men fundamentally "use and control" women's 
sexuality. 
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Chapter Five 
Illocutionary Silencing and the Role of "Uptake" 
So far I have focused on examining the authoritative status bf the 
pornographer in society. If the pornographer has such a status, it was 
said, his subordinating speech acts would carry more social weight 
and would have the power to construct social reality according to his 
claims. 
Maybe one way in which pornography brings about a subordinate 
status of women in reality is to deprive them of the power to speak, or 
to make women's speech count less than the pornographer's speech. 
Feminists have contended not only that pornography constitutes 
subordination but that it also interferes with women's speech, or it 
silences women. If the pornographer has an authoritative status in the 
present society, then pornography may in fact have the social power to 
interfere with women's speech - but, one may ask, how might it 
actually happen? 
In this and the following chapter, I will examine the phenomenon by 
which it is claimed that women are silenced by pornography. Like the 
problem of subordination, the question of silencing has been more 
recently rekindled by Hornsby and Langton's re-examination of the 
issue from the perspective of speech act theory. In the present chapter 
I concentrate-on their argument about "illocutionary silencing". 
Hornsby and Langton have argued that pornography may contribute to 
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a social climate where women are deprived of the ability to perform 
certain vital illocutionary acts, such as the act of sexual refusal. The 
main objective of this chapter is to defend the premise of this silencing 
argument against some criticisms. I will elaborate on the sense of 
"silencing" in the next chapter and examine how pornographers' 
speech relates to it. 
1. Introduction: "Pornography silences" 
The argument that pornography silences women may now be a well- 
known feminist argument. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin suggest 
that pornography silences women by "eroticizing" men's dominance 
over women and propagating inauthentic views of female sexuality 
(e. g., MacKinnon, 1987,1991,1996; Dworkin, 1981). Pornography, 
for example, may depict women as though they enjoyed sex that was 
forced upon them, thereby making it difficult for women to refuse 
unwanted sex, or making women's protests against such sexual 
violence less credible and persuasive. MacKinnon argues that 
pornography sexualises women's public image and thus in effect 
women's allegations of sexual abuse and sexual harassment are heard 
askance: "She is told it did not happen, she imagined it, she wanted it. 
Her no meant yes" (MacKinnon, 1996: 5). The pernicious effect of 
pornography is claimed to be not only that women's voices are 
suppressed and denied this way but that women eventually acquiesce 
to a falsely constructed female identity themselves. MacKinnon often 
suggests that the liberty of producers and consumers of pornography_ 
simply collides with the liberty of women to speak: "So long as 
pornography exists in the way it does there will not be more speech by 
women" (MacKinnon, 1987: 193). 
MacKinnon and. Dworkin are not the only ones who argued that 
pornography may thus interfere with women's liberty to speak. Susan 
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Griffin also made a similar claim that the "pornographic idea of the 
female' condemns women (women's "real self") to silence (Griffin, 
1981: especially, 201-250). This silencing argument, however, has 
met with strong criticisms. The objection is raised not so much 
because the objectors deny the problem that feminists identify, but 
because they do not believe that the problem can be properly 
described as "silencing"; that is, "silencing" as usually conceived by 
liberals. They argue that pornography does not silence women, for it 
does not deprive women of their "negative liberty" to speak (Dworkin, 
R., 1991); it does not violate women's right to free speech (cf. West, 
2003). Pornography, after all, does not prevent women from protesting. 
Ronald Dworkin hence argues that the silencing argument is simply a 
conceptual "confusion" and fundamentally unconvincing. He warns 
that it is plainly wrong to describe someone's idea "silencing", 
depriving others of their "negative liberty" to speak, even though the 
consequence of such an idea might mean that some other ideas do not 
have equal chances of being heard and accepted (Dworkin, 1991: 15). 
If Dworkin is right, the silencing argument is indeed difficult to 
sustain. Frank Michelman, who is otherwise sympathetic to 
MacKinnon, also suggests that the claim that pornography silences 
women should be taken in a rather "figurative" sense (Michelman, 
1989: 296). If MacKinnon's sympathizers like Michelman too believe 
that the meaning of "silence' is only "figurative" or "metaphorical", 
the term would seem to lose much persuasiveness and also the 
explanatory power over the problem which women are said to be 
facing (cf. Jacobson, 1994: 66-67). 
Griffin, MacKinnon, and Andrea Dworkin may nonetheless offer a 
helpful insight into the problem of silencing, and I will expand my 
analysis, partly based on their insights, later on. The present chapter, 
however, focuses on Hornsby ý and Langton's, argument, 
I 
on 
"illocutionary silencing" (especially, Hornsby and Langton, ý 1998; 
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Langton, 1993; also Hornsby, 1994,1995). Hornsby and Langton 
wish to rescue the feminist claim from the charges of confusion and 
argue that this problem of silencing can be understood "literally", not 
"metaphorically". They argue that it could be real at least in some 
contexts. Drawing on Austin's idea that to speak is to do things with 
words, i. e., to do "illocutionary" things or illocutionary acts, Hornsby 
and Langton suggest that women's silence means that they are 
prevented from doing such illocutionary acts with their words. 
Women may well utter meaningful words and phrases, yet they are 
unable to perform acts which they intend to perform with these words 
and phrases. Since to speak is generally (among other things) to do 
illocutionary acts, the speech that does not perform these acts is 
somehow a failure - in fact an important failure. When illocution fails, 
one cannot literally do what one wants to do with one's speech. It is in 
this sense that, Hornsby and Langton claim, women may be silenced: 
they experience silencing of their illocutionary acts. ' They argue that 
looking at the issue in this way would enable us to understand why 
women may well have locutionary freedom (freedom to put their 
thoughts in the open) while they may still lack the freedom 2 s4 to do 
things with their words" (illocutionary freedom) in some 
circumstances. 
This argument concerning illocutionary silencing rests on the idea that 
most illocutionary acts are communicative, and essentially relational, 
acts. In performing various illocutionary acts, we typically try to 
communicate certain things to our hearers. For example, when we 
warn, refuse, request, etc. (i. e., when we perform the illocutionary acts 
of warning, refusing, requesting, etc. ), we try to let our hearers know 
that we are doing these acts, and we generally achieve these acts by 
securing understanding of these acts by the hearers. The performance 
of our illocutionary acts hence involves the hearer's understanding - 
what Austin called uptake - of illocutionary acts. If the hearer fails to 
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understand what the speaker is doing, i. e., what the speaker is trying to 
say, illocutionary acts are not successful and communication is 
unfulfilled. When illocution thus fails, we have not really said to our 
hearer what we wanted to say. 
Hornsby and Langton suggest that one way of understanding the 
bearing of pornography on the problem of women's silence is perhaps 
to understand that pornography somehow contributes to a social 
climate where men's capacity to understand women's speech is 
weakened - pornography prevents men's "uptake" of. women's 
utterances, especially in a sexual context. For example, women's 
utterances of sexual refusal may not be understood as refusal by the 
hearer, and thus they are unable to perform the illocutionary act of 
refusal. In this sense they may be silenced. 
This new silencing argument has been challenged on several grounds. 
In particular, the role of "uptake" in the performance of illocution has 
been fundamentally called into question. Daniel Jacobson and 
Alexander Bird argue that the performance of our illocutionary acts in 
no way hinges on the hearer's uptake of these acts, and therefore the 
argument on illocutionary silencing is essentially untenable (Jacobson, 
1994; Bird, 2002). They also claim that, if Hornsby and Langton are 
right, it would have rather "troubling" or "disturbing" implications. In 
this chapter I assess these counter-claims made against illocutionary 
silencing. I will try to show that these critics may in fact be mistaken 
about their assumption about, the, role of uptake. The charge of 
"troubling" consequences may also be overstated. I argue that we can 
perform various illocutionary acts by virtue of there being hearers who 
can recognize such acts, and that most of our illocutionary acts do rely 
on the hearer's understanding 
* 
of these acts for their performance. We 
cannot dismiss the role of the hearer from this activity. 
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Incidentally, also, the debate on uptake may cast light on why some 
feminists say they are dissatisfied with a certain tendency in 
mainstream philosophy, the root of which is claimed to be 
individualism, and why they suppose that this way of thinking is 
inimical to feminists' concern. I will briefly remark upon this issue 
before concluding the chapter. 
If the argument on uptake presented here is right, and if it is indeed 
found that women are prevented from achieving certain illocutionary 
acts due to an interference of some kind, then it might be considered 
as a case of silencing. I wish to clarify, however, the limited aim of 
this chapter. Firstly, I will not discuss here whether or how 
pornography might contribute to this problem of illocutionary 
silencing. I will deal with this issue in the next chapter. Secondly, I 
will not consider here the question of whether or not the right to free 
speech should include the right to free illocution. If successful 
illocution requires hearers' understanding, the notion of the right to 
free illocution certainly suggests the right to our hearers' 
understanding of what we say. Caroline West has attempted to show 
that there is a liberal case for arguing that the conception of the right 
to free speech extends to a "minimal comprehension" of hearers (West, 
2003). However, I will not enter this discussion. The objective here is 
mainly to defend the premise of the feminist argument on silencing - 
that "happy" performance of our illocutionary acts, in most cases, 
involves uptake by our hearer. Although the critics contend that the 
new silencing argument -is conceptually unfounded and totally_ 
untenable, I will try to show that it is not. 
2. Elocutionary silencing 
Hornsby ý and Langton 'approached the problem of silencing from 
Austinian speech act theory. One crucial idea behind their argument is 
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that speech is not simply a matter of pronouncing meaningful sounds 
and syllables; it is more than words; it is a kind of action. As Austin 
told us, we generally do many things with words. Hence, silence 
implies not merely a matter of failing to make meaningful sounds, but 
also failing to do those things that one wants to do with words; that is, 
in Austin's terminology, failing to perform illocutionary acts 
(Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 23; see also Hornsby, 1994: 199-200; 
1995: 138). Elocutionary acts are the acts that we do in speaking (see 
Chapter One). Recall speech act theorists' emphasis, which was cited 
in the earlier chapter, that locutionary acts typically entail 
illocutionary acts. Austin stated: "To perform a locutionary act is in 
general ... and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act" (Austin, 1976: 
98). Logically speaking, then, silenced locution should also mean 
silenced illocution. However the feminists' point is not that women's 
illocution is silenced because their locution happens to be silenced. 
Their point is rather that, although their locution is made, women's 
illocution is silenced; their speech fails to count as the act they intend, 
and in the worst case, even a gesture may not convey their intention. 
The crux of the matter seems to be that they are somehow prevented 
from doing certain things with words. 
Hornsby and Langton explain how illocutionary silencing might occur. 
They argue that it may occur, for example, when a woman tries to 
refuse a man's sexual advances. The woman says "no", intending to 
refuse, but her intention to perform the illocutionary act of refusal is 
not recognized by the hearer. Her intention in saying "no" is not 
understood. Since the hearer does not have uptake of the woman's 
speech, her intended act "misfires". Although she may utter the right 
words, and thus performs a locutionary act, she is "not fully successful 
in refusing: she fails to perform the illocutionary act of refusal" 
(Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 27). 
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Hornsby argues that, in general, for the speaker to perform 
illocutionary acts, a certain "felicity" condition must be present. 
Although what the speaker can do with his or her speech is normally 
constrained by the meaning of the words and the context of the 
utterance, aside from these constraints, illocutionary acts may be 
simply performed if the hearer is so disposed that he or she 
understands what the speaker is attempting to do in speaking. 
Although Austin thought that illocutionary acts are essentially 
"conventional" acts, acts done according to social convention, 
institutionalised rules or procedure (Austin, 1976: 14-15,25-38,105, 
109), Hornsby thinks that, as discussed in Chapter One, the majority 
of speech acts are communicative, rather than conventional 
("ceremonial" or "ritual"), in nature. Such communicative 
illocutionary acts are successful if the hearer takes the speaker's 
utterance to be what the speaker means it to be. The important felicity 
condition for communicative illocutionary acts is therefore the 
hearer's understanding, or recognition, of the speaker's intention to 
perform these illocutionary acts. This is what Austin meant by saying 
that the success of illocution involves "securing of uptake" (Austin, 
1976: 116-117, emphasis omitted). 
In general, illocution is achieved if the hearer recognizes what the 
speaker is attempting to do in speaking. If, for instance, the speaker 
intends to warn by saying something, i. e., intends to perform the 
illocutionary act of warning, and if the hearer recognizes that the 
speaker is intending to warn, then the illocutionary act of warning is 
successful. Similarly, also, if someone intends to advise another about 
a healthy diet, saying, 'Tat more fruits and vegetables", and the hearer 
understands that the speaker is intending to advise, the illocutionary 
act of advising is achieved. 
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Hornsby calls this felicity condition, which enables us to perform 
communicative illocutionary acts, "reciprocity". "Reciprocity" refers 
to the mutual "minimal receptiveness" of linguistic partners to one 
another's speech. VVhile this "reciprocity" is present, "the audience 
and the speaker [are] parties of a normal linguistic exchange", and 
"they are such as to recognize one another's speech as it is meant to be 
taken" (Hornsby, 1994: 192). They would know what illocutionary 
acts the others are trying to do. Hornsby further argues that 
"communication, which is a relation between people, requires more 
than common ways of interpreting patterns of sounds: it requires 
understanding on an audience's part which is attuned, not only to 
sounds' significance, but also to speakers' attempted performances of 
acts... " (Hornsby, 1994: 193). Hornsby and Langton thus emphasize 
that a "fully successful" communicative act, or illocutionary act, 
requires uptake on the part of the hearer (Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 
26). 3 
Let us go back to the example of the woman whose utterance of 
refusal failed. In this case it is said that she failed to perform the 
illocutionary act of refusal because there was no uptake by the hearer. 
There was no uptake because there was no condition of reciprocity. 
The woman, whatever she says, is not in a position to successfully 
communicate her refusal and remains unheard. Thus, it is said: "When 
reciprocity fails the speaker, she is silenced" (Hornsby, 1994: 28). 
A silencing case, such as this, is thought to explain what some would 
possibly call a date rape. Hornsby and Langton argue further that 
pornographic speech may contribute to creating a social climate where 
this is likely to occur; it may help create an environment where the 
condition of reciprocity breaks down, weakening the hearers' (men's) 
ability to understand the intended meaning of women's illocutionary 
acts (Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 27-28). For example, pornography 
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may spread among its audiences a belief that, when a woman says 
"no" in a sexual context, she does not actually intend to refuse. 
Although the arguments in the previous chapter made the case that the 
shared social Background makes pornographic speech possible, now, 
the silencing argument suggests that pornography can also affect the 
Background. This connection between pornography and the 
Background is indeed also plausible. 
Whatever the actual role of pornography in creating such a social 
climate, Hornsby and Langton argue that the problem of silencing can 
be real, not metaphorical, at least in some contexts. 
3. The problem of "undesirable consequences" 
This argument about illocutionary silencing has been challenged on 
several grounds. 4 Criticism is partly that the scenario of such silencing, 
especially in the case of sexual refusal, is very unlikely (see Chapter 
Six), but a more substantive critique is that Hornsby and Langton's 
argument, if they are right, would actu 
, 
ally have some "troubling" or 
"disturbing" implications. Critics contend that the consequence of the 
feminist argument means that they cannot call this silencing a "rape". 
Let us first consider this problem. 
Jacobson and Bird suggest that, if the act of refusal depends on the 
hearer's uptake, as the feminists claim, then nothing that the woman 
utters in this context would ever count as refusal (Jacobson, 1994: 77; 
Bird, 2002: 3). Whatever utterances she makes, nothing can be a 
refusal (because the man does not recognize them). In fact, according 
to the feminist scenario, there can be no refusal at all. If the woman 
does not refuse, Bird asks, how can the man be a rapist? 
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Hornsby and Langton counter Jacobson's criticism on this issue 
(Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 31). They answer that, although the 
hearer's state of mind does affect the question of whether or not the 
illocutionary act of refusal was performed, it in no way affects "the 
content of the speaker's intentions". That there was no illocutionary 
act of refusal does not mean that the woman gave her consent - an 
absence of refusal is not the same as giving consent. As the speaker's 
intention is no doubt crucial here, the hearer's viewpoint about the 
speaker's mind does not establish what illocutionary act the speaker 
intended to perform - the fact that the man believes that the woman 
consented does not mean that she so intended. Thus, Hornsby and 
Langton argue that the speaker's mind does matter, and that Jacobson 
simply confuses "a condition necessary for refusal" with "a condition 
sufficient for consent". 
Bird agrees with Hornsby and Langton on this point. Perhaps there is 
an independent issue of legal definition of rape, but even setting aside 
this technical issue, Bird thinks that the worst thing that the feminists 
could say of this case is that the man had sex without consent, and this 
does not seem as bad as the man's ignoring the woman's refusal (Bird, 
2002: 3). Both Jacobson and Bird suggest that such a "strange" 
consequence of the feminist argument could be avoided if we say that 
uptake is not necessary for the performance of illocution. Jacobson 
says: "[S]urely, by clearly and forcefully saying no, a woman does 
refuse" (Jacobson, 1994: 77), regardless of the man's understanding. 
That is why we can call this rape. He thinks that the act of refusal is 
performed in this case (and therefore it is not silenced). One may 
refuse (warn, etc. ) whether or not the hearer actually understands it. 
To say that illocution requires uptake is, according to Jacobson, "to 
hold the performance of an illocutionary act hostage to the perversity 
of one's audience' (ibid.: 73-74). %ýII 
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Although Jacobson and Bird here may have a point, the charge of a 
"disturbing" or "absurd" consequence may be nevertheless overstated. 
To return to the feminists' scenario, there might indeed be a sense in 
which the woman in this case refuses, as they suggest - the woman 
says "no", and the literal meaning of "no" is "no"; no dictionary ever 
says that a woman's "no" in a sexual context means "yes". And 
assuming that the woman's intention is sincere, that she does intend to 
refuse and she thus makes such an attempt, we may retain the sense 
that she refuses. Her intention is to refuse, and she does use the right 
word in the right context. However, it seems equally compatible to say 
that she is not really successful in her communicative act. There is no 
contradiction in saying here that she does not "fully succeed" in 
refusing. 
Consider what Hornsby and Langton said about one's being "fully 
successful" in performing a communicative act. They say of a speaker, 
who has failed to warn his hearer, that we may still use the verb 
46 warn" in such a context. For example, we sometimes hear an 
expression, " 'I warned him, but he didn't realize that I was serious' " 
(Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 26). But even in this case, we can allow 
for the sense that the speaker is not "fully succeeding" in the act of 
warning. That the act of warning is not "fully successful" means that, 
although the locutionary act is performed, the illocutionary act of 
warning is not successful. 
In the case of sexual refusal, in saying "no" and intending to refuse, 
what the woman is trying to do is in fact to communicate to the man 
that she is refusing. S he attempts to produce an understanding in him 
that she is refusing. Since that understanding does not materialize, it is 
claimed here that the illocutionary act of refusal is not performed. We 
indeed allow that she has a communicative intention and makes an 
attempt, but that intention remains unfulfilled (we also have to 
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remember that the feminists' claim that the woman is somehow 
"prevented" from doing this illocutionary act of refusal). In general, 
what we are trying to do in the performance of an illocutionary act is 
to let our hearer know that we are doing this act; thus, unless the 
hearer understands what we are trying to do, we do not succeed in 
doing it. However, both Jacobson and Bird argue that the hearer's 
understanding is not essential for the performance of illocutionary acts. 
Could the hearer's understanding really be made redundant for 
illocution? Since the question of hearer uptake is the crucial element 
in the argument about illocutionary silencing, in the next sections I 
will examine this issue in detail. 
4. Is uptake unnecessary? 
Some initial reflections 
Even prominent speech act theorists seem to disagree about the 
importance of the audience's understanding in our performance of 
illocutionary acts. Austin was clear on this point, and Hornsby and 
Langton follow this Austinian premise. Austin stated: 
I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what 
I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be 
achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried 
out. ( ... ) Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the 
understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution. 
So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing 
of uptake (Austin, 1976: 116-117). 
Searle's view is said to be less clear (see Jacobson, 1994: 73), but he 
does emphasize that the intentions that make up illocutionary acts are 
reflexive; that is, they are intended to be recognized. He says that these 
intentions are "achieved" if the hearer recognizes such intentions. 
Since this is a crucial point, it may be worthwhile quoting Searle at 
length: 
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In speaking I attempt to communicate certain things to my 
hearer by getting him to recognize my intention to communicate 
just those things. I achieve the intended effect on the hearer by 
getting him to recognize my intention to achieve that effect, and 
as soon as the hearer recognizes what it is my intention to 
achieve, it is in general achieved (Searle, 1969: 43). 
And he also says: 
In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are 
trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are 
trying to do. But the 'effect' on the hearer is not a belief or 
response, it consists simply in the hearer understanding the 
utterance of the speaker (ibid.: 47). 
Strawson, however, seems to disagree. He says that "the aim, if not the 
achievement, of securing uptake is an essential element in the 
5 
performance of the illocutionary act" (Strawson, 1964: 448). 
Jacobson sympathizes with Strawson, but contends that he makes a 
"weaker claim" than Strawson; namely, he thinks that "at most the 
aim of securing uptake ... is required" (Jacobson, 1995: 
74); and "[o]ur 
success in performing an illocutionary act does not depend on our 
success in securing uptake... " (ibid.: 77-78). Bird believes that uptake 
is not in general required for illocution, for it "may be effected by the 
words, their normal meaning and the context alone" (Bird, 2002: 13). 
Elocutionary acts, in his view, need not involve any "effect, " i. e., 
understanding, on the part of audiences. He even suggests that the 
speaker's "intention" to perform a particular act is in general not 
necessary for illocution. Is the hearer's uptake really unnecessary for 
illocu. tionary acts, as these theorists suggest? In what follows I aim toý 
show that uptake is indeed necessary for most, if not all, illocutionary 
acts. I proceed by way of examining examples, including some of the 
counter-examples that Bird offers. 
As Bird argues, there may be cases in which neither the speaker's 
communicative intention nor the hearer's recognition of the speaker's 
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intention is central to the performance of illocutionary acts. in these 
cases, the words used in the utterance and the context may, in fact, be 
decisive in determining what illocution is performed and whether or 
not it is successful. Highly conventionalised or institutionalised 
illocutionary acts seem to fall into this category. The kind of 
utterances which Austin himself was primarily concerned with, such 
as, I do" at a marriage ceremony, or "I name this ship the Queen 
Elizabeth", may be successfully performed, or may still count as 
certain illocutionary acts (illocutionary acts of marrying and 
christening, respectively), independent of the speaker's actual 
intention in making the utterance or of particular audiences' uptake of 
this intention. 6 Highly conventionalised illocutionary acts may still be 
effected as long as appropriate rules and procedures are in order. 
Circumstantial factors may be crucial in such convention-guided acts. 
However, Bird claims that the case is not restricted to such 
conventional or institutional illocutionary acts; it would extend to 
communicative ones also. 
Interestingly, he suggests such acts as "grumbling", "rejoicing", 
"gossiping", and "slandering", to prove his case (Bird, 2002: 8-9). He 
argues that these acts substantiate his point that non-conventional or 
communicative illocutionary acts are also done without involving the 
speaker's intention or the hearer's recognition of that speaker's 
intention. "Grumbling" and "rejoicing" can be done, even without 
anyone really listening to the speaker. Some people may just "gossip" 
without their. noticing what they. are doing. Also, one may slander 
someone "without anyone's taking one to have that intention". An act 
counts as slandering by virtue of the content of speech ("the falsity of 
the report") and the malicious intent of the speaker alone, and does not 
require any recognition by the hearer. He also mentions the case of 
"lying", which he believes strengthens his case. When one lies, of 
course, one's intention is better not recognized. 
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However, these examples of "grumbling" and "rejoicing" are, as Bird 
himself admits, whilst being non-conventional, strictly speaking, not 
communicative either. The speaker may perform these acts without 
having any communicative intention, and therefore no uptake is 
required. "Gossiping" may be a description or characterization that we 
assign to some other illocutionary acts, and that is why the speaker's 
intention need not feature in the act of gossiping itself. The problem 
common with these examples is that we do not know whether or not 
they are technically called "illocutionary" acts themselves. Austin 
excluded certain acts that we do in speaking from the category of 
illocutionary acts. Strawson seems to explain this by saying that an 
important feature of the illocutionary act is that the speaker's 
illocutionary intention is essentially "avowable" (Strawson, 1964: 454, 
458-459); this means, one can in principle make explicit one's 
intention to perform a certain illocutionary act. Thus, Strawson 
suggests, if a verbal act is an illocutionary act, one can use a formula, 
which Austin called the "explicit performative formula", such as "I 
warn", "I request", "I order", etc. According to this, Austin considered 
that the act of insulting, although it is no doubt done by speaking, is 
not an illocutionary act; that is, we cannot allow such an expression as 
"I insult you,, (Austin, 1976: 30-31). Similarly, therefore, we might 
disallow slandering and lying as illocutions. Nevertheless, I take 
Bird's point that these are also acts that we perform with speech. It 
may be that these would also turn out to be illocutionary acts. 
However, even if we allow that these are illocutionary acts, they seem 
to make up a special class, and do not substantiate his generalization- 
that neither the speaker's intention nor the audience's uptake is 
necessary for illocution. 
Bird's contention is that illocutionary acts are achieved solely by the 
meaning of the words used and the context of the utterance. Although 
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these are no doubt important factors, often, they do not fully 
determine the force of illocution or its success. Quite often we do not 
make our statements so explicit. We do not always use a 
"Performative fonnula7' to state explicitly what we are doing. In such a 
case the speaker's intention in saying certain things does indeed seem 
to become crucial in determining the illocutionary act, and the speaker 
expects the hearer to understand his intention in order to succeed in 
doing the thing that he is trying to do. For instance, a child may say to 
his father, "I'm getting thirsty"; in so speaking the child may be 
simply describing his state of affairs, or he might be asking his father 
to buy him a drink from the nearby vending machine. Or, in a bar, a 
bartender may come around and say, " 'The bar will be closed in five 
minutes' ". Thereby he may be simply infionning the customers that 
the bar will be closing or actually urging them to finish up their drinks 
and leave (these examples are borrowed from Bach, 1998: 82,85, 
slightly altered here). In each case what determines the nature of 
illocution is not merely the words used or the context but also the 
speaker's intention to perform these acts. What the meaning of the 
words and the context provide may be actually a clue as to what the 
speaker is intending to do in making a speech. And importantly, the 
speaker relies on the hearer's recognition of his intention to achieve 
these acts. If the bartender means that he is urging, rather than simply 
informing, in making the statement, he must be so understood by his 
customers; otherwise, his act of urging is not "happily" performed. 
Except for some of the cases that we considered earlier, it does not 
seem right to dismiss so flatly the role of the speaker's intention or the 
hearer's uptake. The feminist argument on silencing therefore makes 
sense, because we do rely on the hearer's recognition of our intention 
to perfonn particular illocutionary acts. 
169 
Further reflections 
Bird and Jacobson, however, may contend that the case of explicitly 
made utterances is different. In the case of the sexual refusal that we 
considered, the woman makes an unambiguous statement. She clearly 
says "no" to refuse. If the words are explicit, and they are made in the 
right context, would not the illocutionary act be performed, regardless 
of the hearer's uptake? Bird offers a couple of illustrative examples to 
show that this is the case. And he argues that these also show that the 
acts of warning and refusal, which are typically communicative acts, 
do not require uptake in particular. Here are summaries of some of his 
examples (Bird, 2002: 10-11): 
(a) Burglar 
A burglar approaches a property at night. He ignores a clearly written 
sign, " 'Warning: premises patrolled by fierce dogs' ", assuming that 
it is only a bluff. He enters the premise and belatedly finds out his 
mistake. 
(b) A conceited chef 
Jacques is a conceited chef, who believes that no one really wants to 
refuse his delicious meals when offered. Thus, despite the fact that 
Sara, a customer, clearly declines his offer, saying, " 'No, thank 
you' ", Jacques takes it as a request and brings her yet more food. 
Bird points out that, in each case, the hearer (the burglar and Jacques) 
does not have uptake of the speaker's intention of warning and 
refusing. According to Hornsby and Langton, we would have to say 
that there was no (illocutionary) act of warning or refusing. But, Bird 
argues, this is not the way that people normally interpret it. A clear 
waming sign does issue a warning, irrespective of the burglar's uptake. 
He argues that the burglar cannot complain, for, surely, "[h]e was 
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warned alright". Similarly, Sara does refuse, by clearly saying "no", 
regardless of the failure of Jacques's uptake. In both cases, the 
illocutionary acts of warning and refusing are done, and a failure of 
the hearer uptake does not prevent these acts from being performed. 
It seems to me, however, that there is an important difference between 
case (a) and case (b). The warning sign may have a communicative 
intention, but it is addressed to multiple audiences, and'hence the 
success of its illocutionary act of warning may not hinge on the 
particular uptake of the burglar. Whereas in case (b), Sara's 
communicative act is specifically directed to Jacques. In this sense, 
the role of Jacques as hearer weighs more than that of the burglar in 
the situation. Let us then concentrate on case (b) first. 
As I discussed in the sexual refusal case, we can allow that Sara's 
communicative intention is sincere and she makes an attempt to 
express her intention. She uses the right word in the right context. 
Thus, in this respect we may retain the sense that Sara "refuses". 
However, it is equally reasonable to say that Sara's act of refusal is 
not "fully successful", because her illocutionary act is not successful. 
In saying, "no, thank you", and attempting to perform the 
illocutionary act of refusal, Sara is in fact trying to communicate to 
Jacques that she is refusing. She intends to produce understanding in 
him that she is refusing. Since she is not understood in that way, she 
does not succeed in the illocutionary act of refusal vis-h-vis Jacques. 
Some seem to think that our intention to perform an illocutionary act 
(warning, refusing, etc. ) and the intention to secure uptake are 
separate things; therefore, they are also separate acts. Jacobson seems 
to think this way. He gives an example of Sally inviting Billy, and 
says that Sally is doing these different things in speaking: "[Glet Bill 
to come to her party (bring about a perlocutionary effect), invite him 
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(perform an illocutionary act), and get him to recognize her act as an 
invitation (secure uptake)" (Jacobson, 1994: 73). By dislodging the 
performance of illocutionary acts from the securing of uptake this way, 
one assumes that uptake is not essential for illocutionary acts. 
However, I doubt that we can sever the illocutionary act from securing 
of uptake of this act. For to perform a certain illocutionary act is to 
aim for an understanding that one is doing this act. To invite someone 
in saying something is precisely to aim to secure an understanding by 
the hearer that one is inviting. If you are inviting someone by speaking, 
and if you mean it, you are generally intending to produce 
understanding of this act by the hearer. 
Perhaps this point can be defended by employing the concept of 
"meaning". Searle linked the notion of illocutionary acts with the 
notion of the speaker's meaning something by saying something. He 
says that "the difference between just uttering sounds or making 
marks and performing an illocutionary act" is that those sounds or 
marks that one utters are said to "have meaning", whereas, one is 
typically said to "mean something", in the performance of an 
illocutionary act (Searle, 1969: 42-43). Searle. thinks that there is a 
clear connection between a speaker's meaning something by saying 
something and the speaker's intention to perform an illocutionary act. 
In fact he argues that "saying something and meaning it is a matter of 
intending to perform an illocutionary act" (Searle, 1969: 46). Thus, 
what amounts to the same thing is that when you are intending to 
perform an illocutionary act, you are meaning that your act is such and 
such an act. When you say "no" and intend to perform the 
illocutionary act of refusal, you mean that your act is that of refusal. 
And when you mean something by saying something, you typically 
intend to produce an "effect"7 (i. e., understanding of your meaning) 
on the hearer. Therefore, an attempt at an illocutionary act is an 
attempt at producing understanding by our hearer that we are doing 
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this act. What we are trying to achieve in the perfonnance of an 
illocutionary act is this understanding; we intend that we will be taken 
by our hearer to be doing such and such an act. 
Further, we normally achieve this understanding and thus achieve 
illocutionary acts by "getting" our hearer to recognize these intentions 
(Searle, 1969,43,46-49). To use Searle's example, when we say 
" 'Hello' " to someone and intend to greet him (i. e., intend to produce 
understanding by him that we are greeting), as soon as the hearer 
recognizes that we are intending to greet him, then we have 
successfully greeted him. We intend to do some illocutionary act in 
saying something, and as soon as our hearer recognizes this intention; 
that is, as soon as he recognizes what we are intending to do, we have 
successfully done the act. This is the reason why this intention is 
called "reflexive". It is intended to be recognized to achieve its effect. 
What is unique about communicative illocutionary acts is said to be 
that they can succeed, unlike other common activities, once the hearer 
recognizes the speaker's intention to perform these acts. Kent Bach 
stated: "One cannot succeed in running a marathon just by virtue of 
someone's recognizing one's intention to do so, but one can succeed 
in stating something, requesting something, and so on, by v irtue of 
one's addressee recognizing that one is stating it, requesting it, or 
whatevee'(Bach, 1998: 83). 
Thus, what I am stressing here is that the securing of understanding is 
an essential element in the performance of illocutionary acts, and 
cannot be separated as Jacobson seemed to do. Equally important is 
the fact that we actually normally perform these acts by securing such 
understanding. In daily life we perform a variety of illocutionary acts, 
such as refusing, ordering, asking, requesting, urging, etc., by 
"getting" our hearer to recognize what we are trying to do. It is not 
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only because words have some meanings but also because our hearer 
understands what we are doing with these words that we could 
achieve these diverse speech acts. The feminists' position actually 
appears more in tune with our intuition and experience. Suppose you 
say that you want to visit me tomorrow; I say, "I have an important 
visitor. In saying so I may be just. stating this fact to you, but perhaps 
also indirectly asking you not to come to my house tomorrow. I 
succeed in asking by getting you to recognize my intention to do so. 
"Getting", however, is slightly misleading, in that it gives an 
impression that the capacity to perform the illocutionary act solely 
rests on the speaker. In reality, the speaker also relies very much on 
the hearer to perform a variety of illocutionary acts. The speaker 
expects that the hearer will rightly infer, and recognize, the speaker's 
intention. Although Jacobson thought that it is bizarre that we require 
uptake, for it means, in his view, to hold illocution "hostage" to one's 
hearer, it is actually because we have those hearers who can recognize 
what we are doing that we can normally engage in various linguistic 
activities, including illocutionary acts. This is what Hornsby meant by 
the condition of "reciprocity", or mutual and "minimal receptiveness" 
of linguistic partners, by virtue of which we perform illocutionary acts. 
Thus, when speaking of the illocutionary act, we may be able to say 
the following: in speaking, we intend to produce understanding in our 
hearers that we are doing such and such an act; we intend that our 
hearers will take us to be doing such and such an act; and by actually 
being "so taken" by the hearers, we successfully do these acts. 
We have, however, to come back to case (a), the case of an explicit 
warning sign. I have mentioned that it is addressed to multiple 
audiences; therefore, the success of illocutionary act may not hinge on 
a particular person's uptake. Bird argues that this also weakens the 
feminist position that uptake is required for communicative illocution 
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in general. He admits that in many face-to-face situations people do 
try to communicate certain things to others. However, in the case of 
"written" or "broadcasf' speech, it is in fact not clear whether or not 
anyone's uptake deterinmes the success of illocution. "A politician in 
a political broadcast may argue for some proposition. On whose 
uptake does this illocution depend? On all the audience? On just some 
of the audience? On some sort of average? None of these seems right" 
(Bird, 2002: 12-13). He thinks that this last example again strengthens 
his case that "actual uptake" is irrelevant to the nature of illocution. 
In the case of multiple hearers, it seems indeed difficult to argue on 
"whose" uptake the success of illocution depends. It does not, 
however, seem to be enough to discredit the previous argument that 
uptake is essential in many other communicative situations. Although 
mass communications and the print media are increasingly an 
important aspect of modem life, they have not replaced more basic 
person-to-person oral communications. A majority of speech acts are 
done in quotidian situations where an individual is trying to 
communicate something to another individual. Even in the case of 
multiple hearers, we may not in the end deny the role of uptake; at 
least it seems odd to say that it is unnecessary. If actual uptake does 
not matter, as Bird suggests, it would seem to follow that a 
broadcasting politician could perform any illocutionary act without 
having anyone's uptake. But if he intends to warn the population 
about an impending terrorist attack, is he really warning even when no 
one really takes him to be warning? This also does not seem to be 
right. As to a warning sign also, if the entire population of a village 
believe that the sign near the level crossing is bogus (that it is there for 
the sake of the regulation; it does not mean what it says), if no one 
there ever thinks that the sign is warning, is the sign really performing 
the act of warning in this village? At least it is strange to call this a 
successful warning act. 
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Thus, the premise of Hornsby and Langton's argument on 
illocutionary silencing is conceptually sound; we do rely on the role of 
others (their "uptake") to perform our illocutionary acts. There may be 
indeed occasions where women cannot perform their illocutions, 
because this uptake fails. 
5. Illocution and perlocution 
If the preceding argument is right, illocutionary acts are the acts that 
have an "effect" on the hearer. This is the position most clearly taken 
by Austin, Hornsby, and Langton, and I think that other theorists 
(Searle, 1969; Bach and Harnish; 1979) also support this view. 
However, according to Austin, the distinguishing feature of 
perlocution is also the bringing of an "effect" on the hearer: it brings 
about "certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or 
actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other person" (Austin, 
1976: 101). Bird asks that, if both illocution and perlocution thus 
produce effects, what is it that really makes a difference between these 
acts. He claims that the correct way of distinguishing illocution and 
perlocution is that the nature of the former does not depend on any 
effect on the hearer, while that of the latter does depend on it (Bird, 
2002: 12-13). 
It is claimed that illocutionary acts produce certain effects on the 
hearer, but how do they differ from the perlocutionary effect? It has 
been contended that the illocutionary effect amounts to no more than 
"understanding", or "recognition", on the hearer's part of the 
speaker's 'illocutionary act (or intention to perform this act). The 
illocutionary effect is achieved as soon as the hearer understands what 
the speaker is trying to do. As Hornsby explains, linguistic partners 
may recognize one another's speech as it is meant to be, as long as 
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there is a condition of "reciprocity" among them. However, the 
intended consequence of perlocution requires more than such 
"reciprocity" provides. For instance, persuading is said to be typically 
a perlocutionary act. Persuasion aims to achieve an effect by speaking. 
In order to succeed in persuading someone about something, however, 
one would need more than the linguistic condition of "reciprocity". 
Hornsby illustrates this: 
If I am to persuade you that Austin was wrong about convention, 
it is not enough that you should realize that I mean you to come 
to think that Austin was wrong: to succeed in persuading you, I 
must avail myself of the power of reason working in you, and 
not just of the power of a language working for me (Hornsby, 
1994,195). 
In other words, the success of the act of persuasion depends on a 
variety of factors, including non-linguistic factors, such as your 
previous academic background, or the cogency of Hornsby's 
argument. Hornsby does not succeed in persuading just by getting you 
to recognize that she is trying to do so. Note, however, that, in this 
example, Hornsby is performing an illocutionary act of arguing, and 
this act of arguing can succeed by your recognition of it. 
Thus, a difference between illocution and perlocution is that 
illocutionary effects involve only understanding by the hearer, 
whereas perlocutionary effects depend on more than this 
understanding, and may be subject to various other factors. 
Furthermore, the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
effects is said to be that when one speaks, one typically intends to 
produce understanding, but one may not necessarily intend to produce 
further effects beyond this understanding. As Searle points out, 
"When I say 'Hello' and mean it, I do not necessarily intend to 
produce or elicit any state or action in my hearer other than the 
knowledge that he is being greeted" (Searle, 1969: 46). In general, 
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when we say "Hello" to someone, we intend that the hearer takes it 
that we are greeting him. Some may intend an additional 
perlocutionary effect on the hearer, such as pleasure or surprise, but 
this is not invariably the case. One may say of the difference between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effects that the former is more 
"basic" to language use than the latter. 
Illocutionary silencing and perlocutionaryfailures 
If we accept that the illocutionary act is normally within the sphere of 
language use, we may understand the feminist claim that a failure to 
perform illocutionary acts freely means a failure to exercise one's 
capacity of language freely. If one finds oneself systematically unable 
to perform some illocutionary acts, or is somehow prevented from 
doing them, then there is something wrong with the operation of 
speech. Hornsby and Langton suggest particularly that women's 
ability to perform an illocutionary act may be disabled in a sexual 
context, and that may be due to the influence of pornographic speech. 
Previously, when MacKinnon made an argument that pornography 
silences women's speech, the issue surrounded the "credibility" or 
denial of women's speech. She argued that, due to the kind of social 
climate created by pornography, women's stories of sexual abuse 
encounter incredulous audiences, or their protest against sexual 
violence is not taken seriously. In a sense, MacKinnon accounted for 
the problem of women's speech at the perlocutionary level; although 
they do speak, their speech fails to bring about anticipated further 
responses from their audiences. Hornsby and Langton's argument now 
points out the failure of women's speech at the illocutionary level. As 
we have seen, there is a reason to think that the failure at the 
illocutionary level, rather than at the perlocutionary, may be largely 
claimed to be a failure of speech itself. 
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Yet, this, of course, does not mean that perlocutionary failures are not 
problems. This should be obvious from the case of sexual refusal; in a 
case like this it is important that the woman brings about the intended 
perlocutionary effect of stopping the man's advances. But to achieve 
this perlocutionary effect, it is necessary that she succeed at the 
illocutionary level. If a woman is not taken to be refusing to begin 
with, it is unlikely that she will prevent a man's advances. Perpetual 
perlocutionary failures may also result in illocutionary misfires. If 
some men habitually mistrust women, they may, in some contexts, fail 
to understand women's illocution. A strong presumption may affect 
their receptiveness ("reciprocity") to women's speech. The case for 
illocutionary silencing should not be therefore taken to mean that 
perlocutionary failures of utterances are relatively unimportant. 
6. Relational dimension of language activity 
The debate on uptake shows the contrasting views of the nature of 
illocutionary acts and differing views of language users. It also seems 
to underline a kind of "dissatisfaction" shared by some feminists with 
respect to an account of language or an account of persons, which is 
claimed to be prevalent in mainstream (analytic) philosophy. 
The main feminist contention in the debate was that uptake is essential 
for illocution, which is fundamentally a communicative, interpersonal, 
and relational act. Their account of illocution thus involves the role of 
a hearer. On the contrary, the critics argued that uptake is inessential 
for illocution, which can be done in principle without invoking the 
reception by a hearer. In arguing this way, the critics in effect make 
the role of a hearer redundant in the performance of illocutionary acts. 
So far I have tried to demonstrate the communicative and 
interpersonal nature of illocutionary acts, mainly drawing on 
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observations of speech act theorists. But there are also others who 
similarly argue that there is something wrong with saying that our 
communicative acts can be done without any reception by our 
listeners. The significant point is how much these acts can be 
meaningfully individuated; whether these acts are in essence activities 
of discrete individuals, or whether they are necessarily interdependent 
and relational acts. Marilyn Frye also referred to Austin's concept of 
speech acts in an entirely different context, and argued that these acts 
are essentially social and relational acts, which do not " 'come off " 
without the hearer's uptake. Frye does not always seem to distinguish 
"illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts, but she makes sense when 
she says that our speech acts must have a reciprocal character in order 
for them to be the acts they are: 
When you say something like "I promise" or "I apologize, " you 
do not just assert or report something about yourself, you also 
reorient yourself and another person to each other. ( ... ) This 
alteration of relations requires and involves a certain cooperation 
from the second party. You can say, "I promise I'll write to 
you, " but also the other must take herself to be someone to 
whom you are obligated and must count on your doing what you 
said you'd do. If the second party's "uptake" is not forthcoming, 
the relation between the two does not take the intended shape, 
and the "promise" collapses. Your speech just hangs there 
embarrassed, unconsummated (Frye, 1983: 88). 
Hornsby argues that many philosophers fail to acknowledge the 
fundamentally communicative, interpersonal nature of our speech 
activity, and this may be because they succumb to a kind of 
"individualistic" thinking. What is claimed here is that these_ 
philosophers tend to treat individual language users as "self- 
sufficient" or "self-contained" subjects. They might accept that the 
speaker has an audience-directed intention, but still suppose that 
'[w]hat one can do with a hearer-directed intention, one can also do 
without' ". They think that, even in a communicative setting, "a basic 
speaker-related ingredient" can be extricated from that of hearers. In 
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short, they reflect a kind of "decompositionalist" thinking, under 
which an account of the relation between the speaker and the hearer 
simply disappears (Homsby, 2000: 93). 
Hornsby suspects that the basis for this is the "individualist" way of 
thinking, which she argues pervades much of mainstream philosophy 
- whether in philosophy of mind, epistemology, or political 
philosophy. It may now be a familiar claim that Western philosophy 
has this tendency; it has also been argued, particularly in the feminist 
literature, that this way of thinking is gendered. Merrill Hintikka and 
Jaakko Hintikka quote research on a gender-related difference in 
intellectual thinking, which apparently confirms such a view. They 
point out that "women are generally more sensitive to, and likely to 
assign more importance to, relational characteristics (e. g., 
interdependencies) than males, and less likely to think in terms of 
independent discrete units. Conversely, males generally prefer what is 
separable and manipulatable"; it is found that women tend to think 
more "holistic [cally]" or "total[Ily]", while men tend to think in terms 
of what is more "intrinsic" or "essential (non-relational)" properties 
(Hintikka and Hintikka, 1983: 146). 
This claim is, of course, arguable; as far as the present topic is 
concerned, Austin's or Searle's theory seems to contain as much 
relational component as the feminists'. 8 However, the debate on 
uptake and silencing does exhibit the difference between the feminists, 
who emphasize the relational nature of speech acts, and others, who 
are less inclined to do so. The present debate is but one example, but it 
seems to offer an insight into why some feminists are dissatisfied with 
the individualistic way of thinking, and suggest that this kind of 
thought may not advance the feminists' cause (see, e. g., Jaggar, 1983, 
and Scheman, 1983). Elocutionary silencing is a step in the direction 
for the case against pornography; but it shows that, it is only when we 
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see the nature of illocutionary acts reIationally, we would understand 
the claim that women are unable to do these acts in some contexts. As 
long as we conceive it as an act of an autonomous agent, we would 
not be in a position to see the problem at all. 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that most illocutionary acts require uptake by the hearer; 
we normally intend that our illocutionary acts be taken by our hearers 
as what we mean them to be, and we successfully perform these acts 
by being so taken by the hearers. Thus, to perform our illocutionary 
acts successfully, we need hearers, who are so disposed to recognize 
our intention in making the speech. If women are indeed unable to 
secure uptake in such a case considered here, they are then unable to 
perform the illocutionary acts. 
It has not yet been determined whether or not pornography actually 
contributes to this silencing; whether or not it is likely to undermine 
men's uptake and thus the condition of "reciprocity" in a sexual 
sphere. These matters will be addressed in the following chapter. 
Notes 
I To be precise, Hornsby and Langton characterize the notion of 
illocutionary silencing differently. For Langton, "the silenced person 
encounters illocutionary disablement: his or her speech misfires"; for- 
Hornsby, "the silenced person is deprived of illocutionary potential: she does 
not have it in her power to do with language what she might want to" 
(Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 21). This does not affect my discussion here. 
2 This point might be ultimately understood in the sense that pornography 
may be preventing women from achieving some illocutionary acts; they are 
not "free" in the sense that they are prevented from doing so. 
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3 Hornsby's position on this point has apparently changed over the years. In 
earlier articles, she argued that there can be an illocutionary act even where 
there is no uptake, where there is no "perfect" or "successful" illocutionary 
act (Hornsby, 1994: 199; 1995,137). She now seems to hold that there is 
only an unsuccessful attempt at it when there is no uptake. 
4 Judith Butler takes issue, from a postmodernist standpoint, with 
MacKinnon and Langton's argument about silencing (Butler, 1997, 
especially Chapter 2). Butler opposes the idea of the fixed meaning of 
utterances, and seems to deny, in effect, the agency (or, what she calls the 
"sovereignty") of the speaker in performing speech acts. She claims that no 
one, including the speakers themselves, has authority over the meaning of 
utterances. Although I am aware of this type of objection to the silencing 
argument, I cannot adequately deal with the issue in the present enquiry. 
5 Strawson, however, acknowledges the "overC and reflexive nature of the 
speaker's illocutionary intention, which is meant to be recognized. He says: 
"[T]he illocutionary force of an utterance is essentially something that is 
intended to be understood". "In the case of an illocutionary act of a kind not 
essentially conventional, the act of communication is performed if uptake is 
secured, if the utterance is taken to be issued with the complex overt 
intention with which it is issued" (Strawson, 1964: 459,458, respectively). 
6 However, Austin thought that, in cases where the speakers do not have 
requisite feelings or intentions in making utterances, the speech acts are 
"unhappy"; although they are not "void", and in his view still "achieved", 
they would constitute a case of infelicity, which he called "abuse" (Austin, - 
1976: 16). 
7 This concept originates from Grice, and was incorporated into Searle's 
theory of speech acts. Searle argues that the kind of "effect" that Grice 
suggests is "perlocutionary, " and he fails to notice what is actually involved 
is the "illocutionary effect" (Searle, 1969: 43-44,46-47). 
183 
8 This thesis points out that Wittgensteinian and communitarian philosophy 
also emphasize the relational nature of human activities. Hornsby claims that 
Austin is also guilty of individualist thinking, for he in the end did not see 
that the nature of illocution lies in its "effects" (Hornsby, 2000: 93). 
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Chapter Six 
Asymmetry in the "Rhetorical Space"' 
This chapter investigates why women's illocution may be "silenced" 
in a sexual context, or why the hearer's uptake may not be 
forthcoming in such circumstances. In the first part of the chapter I 
address the cases where a speaker's utterance can be unheeded, 
because of some strongly implicated subjective aspects about the 
speaker, i. e., certain socially transmitted and imposed assumptions 
about him or her. In the second part, I make a case that pornography 
may be playing an important role in creating an environment where 
women's illocutionary silencing can occur. 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter Five I argued that one's illocutionary act typically requires 
uptake by one's audience to succeed, and therefore that the feminists' 
argument on illocutionary silencing was not unfounded. Although 
there are sometimes failures of illocution (misfires), I maintained, 
against some critics, that we do need and rely on the audiences- 
reception to succeed in our speech acts and to communicate what we 
are attempting to do, and that at times it is crucial that we can do so. I 
also think, however, that not all illocutionary failures would constitute 
a problem. The feminists' concern is with particular instance's of 
misfire of women's speech, such as when a woman's utterance of 
sexual refusal is not taken as refusal. Hence, I aim to elaborate in this 
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chapter on why this counts as a matter of silencing; or in what sense it 
is different from other common misfires and thus needs to be 
considered as a problem. 
One way to explain this is to reveal the mechanism of the illocutionary 
failure in question; that is, to explain the way in which a woman in a 
sexual context may not be able to secure uptake by her audience. For 
what reasons does it fail to arise? Granted that we agree on the role of 
uptake in our usual communicative situation, some of us may still be 
unconvinced about the claim that women's explicit refusal fails to be 
understood as refusal. The point sometimes raised was thus that any 
normal and "reasonable" person would understand it as it is. 
Nonetheless, feminists like Hornsby suspect that there may be 
something wrong with the background operation of our linguistic 
practices for something like this to happen, and I think that this 
direction of thought is right. For a thorough understanding of such 
illocutionary failures, it appears that it is necessary to go beyond the 
analysis of speech acts and consider their relation to the wider 
operational context, as I did in Chapters Two, Three and Four. 
Some theorists, who are not necessarily concerned with the theory of 
speech acts or philosophy of language, have pointed out precisely 
such a broader dimension of (failed) utterances from different 
perspectives. Simply put, their arguments suggest that there are two 
principal factors that could affect the performativity of our utterances; 
i. e., how successfully our speech could be communicated to the 
audience. The major factors are "the context" and the "subjectivity" of 
the speaker. 
The "context" can mean a particular situation where a certain 
utterance is made, but I especially consider here the implication of the 
wider social context, or the Background of speech, which has been 
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alluded to. The Background constitutes the circumstances of a 
particular society, which encompass shared customs, norms, 
institutions, etc.; it is a social setting where any utterances are made. 
Here I fast borrow the notion espoused by the metaphor of "rhetorical 
spaces" provided by Lorraine Code to illustrate the point that 
utterances are always issued in a particular moral, cultural, and 
discursive context, which could limit the range of speech that can 
reasonably be heard and understood. Tbroughout the chapter I take the 
stance that not everyone is symmetrically placed in such a "space", 
meaning that some are perhaps more privileged than others in finding 
sympathetic listeners, because of some prevailing social and cultural 
practices and/or because of the existing power/authority relations 
within the space. What is meant by "subjectivity", on the other hand, 
are the subjective factors that hold for the speaker; I also limit the use 
of the word at present to consider especially such factors as gender 
and racial/ethnic identity of the speaker. Of particular relevance here 
is the question of how others may perceive such subjectivity on the 
part of the speaker. As will be shown, since the issue of subjectivity 
constitutes an important aspect of the "context" itself, more discussion 
will be devoted to this subject in the body of this chapter. 
This chapter consists of two main parts, addressing the related issues 
with separate focuses. In the first part of the chapter, I trace and 
explain the mechanism of "silencing", especially considering the 
problem of "subjectivity". It appears to me right that the subjective 
factors of the speaker are often implicitly implicated in, and affect, 
_ speech situations, and if this connotation is negative, the speaker may 
indeed be prevented from communicating successfully to his or her 
audience. I will occasionally draw on Code's analysis of the problems 
surrounding knowledge claims to explain this point. Some theorists 
imply further that this implication of subjectivity can be especially 
negative when it comes to express certain. socially circulated and 
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sustained, but unfairly imposed, norms and expectations about the 
character of the speaker. They suggest that such widely shared 
assumptions about the speaker could determine (or undermine) the 
audience's receptiveness to the speaker' speech. Such an account was 
given of the high-profile Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill controversy in 
1991, and I will also use this example myself, re-reading the Hill case 
now seems to shed some light on the problem of illocutionary 
silencing. 
Thus, in what follows, I will first make a general claim that certain 
socially sustained and unfairly imposed assumptions about particular 
groups of persons may indeed block the hearer's receptiveness to 
these people's speech either at perlocutionary or illocutionary level, 
and that this could explain the sense of illocutionary "silencing". If 
women's illocution fails to secure uptake by the hearer in some 
contexts, that may also be because of certain available norms or 
assumptions about them that are held by the hearer. But there is a 
further question regarding the role of pornography in contributing to 
this problem. Does it really play a significant part in silencing 
women's speech, as feminists claim? 
Drawing on some ideas from the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, 
I will argue that pornography may indeed play an important part in 
creating an environment where women's speech, such as speech of 
sexual refusal, may fail. The significance of pornography here again 
seems to depend on its social surroundings; in a society where 
pornography can be "authoritative", its claims about women's 
sexuality or sexual behaviour would seem to carry significant weight. 
Although I will attempt to explain here why pornography may be 
silencing speech, my argument is not meant to be an empirical 
explanation of a causality between pornography and women's 
illocutionary failures. Its aim is rather to highlight the significance of 
188 
pornography in a particular social setting and to offer a theoretical 
construction -of the important relation between pornography and 
women's speech. 
2. The "context" and the implication of subjectivity 
Code evokes the metaphor of "space" to emphasize the sense of 
'location" in which a particular speech or speakers always find 
themselves. Code's idea of "rhetorical spaces" appears to refer to a 
specific cultural, moral, and political milieu whose structure and 
characteristics are such that there is only a (contingently) limited 
range of available and possible discourse. She says: 
Rhetorical spaces, as I conceive of them here, are fictive but not 
fanciful or fixed locations, whose (tacit, rarely spoken) territorial 
imperatives structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can 
be voiced within them with a reasonable expectation of uptake 
and 'choral support': an expectation of being heard, understood, 
taken seriously" (Code, 1995: ix-x). 
The "rhetorical spaces" are thus discursive contexts whose internal 
characteristics can largely determine the kinds of subjects that are 
sensibly voiced, heard, and discussed within. The existence of such a 
64 space" is not hard to imagine. For instance, think of making a 
statement about "fly[ing] into Newark or La Guardia airport in the 
year 1600" or "productive public debate about abortion in the 
Vatican" at the present time; such statements would be simply 
pointless or hollow, because the already existing discourse just cannot 
make sense out of them, or because the discursive environment is 
simply not the one that is open to the expressed idea (ibid.: x). The 
particularities of the time and space do impose certain limitations on 
the range of topics that may reasonably be expected to be discussed 
within society. 
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In relation to this notion of "space', Code also says, "it matters who is 
speaking and where and why" (ibid.: x, emphasis added). In what 
follows, I will at least try to address the question of "who" and 
"where, " as it bears on the issue of pornographic speech. Although the 
examples of flying in the seventeenth century and the debate on 
abortion in Vatican may suggest to some that "rhetorical spaces" 
impose very strict limits to the range of possible discourse within, they 
in fact imply the structures of social spaces which are "either *closed 
against [some speech], or so constrained in the possibilities they offer 
that what is 'really' being said is slotted automatically into categories, 
ready-made places, where the fit is at best crude, at worst distorting 
and damaging" (ibid.: 61-62). 1 started off, borrowing the metaphor 
here chiefly to highlight the significance of social context in thinking 
about the success and failure of speech. Whereas the primary concern 
of Code's own project is about the position and situation of "knowing 
subjects". who advance some knowledge claims in these "rhetorical 
spaces", my task here centres on those of "speaking subjects" within 
such an environment. Imagine that pornographers also inhabit one 
such "space". What kinds of "discursive possibilities" are there in this 
space? Is it favourable to pornographer's speech? I believe that these 
questions are in fact partly answered, as I tried to explain the 
"authoritative' status of the pornographer in the present society. I 
described the contemporary pornographer as a "social character", who 
expresses and embodies certain distinctive values and norms of 
society. To the extent that the pornographer's speech reflects and 
expresses these widely shared values and norms of the community, it_ 
should follow that it normally has no difficulty receiving uptake. 
But what about women's utterances? Their utterances are made 
against this wider background where pornographi 
,c 
speech can be 
authoritative speech. Suppose for the moment that the feminist claim 
about pornography is true and that it does reflect a particular view 
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about women's sexuality, their nature, and behaviour, and it 
influences crucially a male audience's thinking. In a sexual context, 
then, it may well be that women's utterances which contradict the 
audience's assumed view fall outside the "discursive possibilities", 
and are unrecognized or denied. In this sense, the utterances of 
pornographers and those of women do not have symmetrical 
effectiveness in this "rhetorical space". 
As we saw in the last chapter, however, this claim about women's 
failed speech has been strongly contested. I have already examined 
some criticisms of illocutionary silencing, but- the critics are also 
unconvinced about the feminists' point that the hearer may not 
recognize women's speech for what it is; they argue that any person of 
normal sense and ability would not fail to recognize what is issued as 
an explicit and unambiguous statement. If, by any chance, the hearer 
does fail to understand, that would then just amount to an "abnormal" 
or "deviant" case, and women's illocutionary acts are normally 
understood as intended. Thus, referring to the example of sexual 
refusal, Green says, "any reasonable person would take the refusal for 
what it is" (Green, 1998: 298, emphasis added). 
Green also takes issue with Langton's example of a misfire of 
women's "protest". In the example, Langton speaks of Ordeal, an 
autobiographical account written by a former pornography star Linda 
Marchiano. Langton argues that Marchiano's book, written to protest 
against the pornography industry, was once actually reclassified and 
resold as adult entertainment. The book, which was meant to be 
Marchiano's voice of political protest, hence misfired. Langton argues 
that something about Marchiano or "the role she occupies" prevented 
her book from counting as an illocutionary act of protest (Langton; 
1993: 321-322). Green, however, contends: "Ordeal is normally 
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bought and sold for what it is. We must take care to distinguish 
possible outcomes from typical outcomes" (Green, 1998: 298). 
Jacobson similarly thinks that the scenario of sexual refusal is 
"unlikely". He argues that illocutionary acts are just what they are if 
they are ordinarily taken to be so by "competent" hearers. Thus, for 
instance: "[W]hat a competent auditor would take as an unambiguous 
warning is one, even if on some occasion the actual person being 
warned fails to recognize it, through some lapse of attention or 
sensitivity" (Jacobson, 1995: 77). Moreover, "[fln general to perform 
a given illocutionary act it is necessary that a competent auditor - 
where this will require more than purely linguistic competence - 
would recognize the illocutionary act as such" (ibid.: 78). In other 
words, Jacobson, like Green, believes that any "competent" person 
would understand a woman's intended illocutionary act, such as an 
explicit act of refusal. (And if it is normally so understood by a 
96 competent" person, then it is refusal. ) 
The assumption which underlies these critics' arguments is about the 
"competency", "normality", or "reasonableness" of ordinary hearers; 
thus, it is assumed, anyone's utterance, as long as it is clearly issued, 
would be understood. I do not doubt that characteristics like these are 
usually present in a speech situation, and my discussion in the 
previous chapter is also based on such an assumption. But it may still 
be too hasty to assume here that the "competency" of the hearer and 
stexplicitness" of the statement would always ensure successful_ 
communication. 
There are two reasons for saying this. For one thing, it would not seem 
to do justice to the feminist argument on silencing to invalidate the 
examples of sexual refusal or Ordeal and to conclude that anyone 
would understand and would be understood in cases like these. 
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Philosophers often rely on concrete examples to illuminate their 
abstract points, but simply refuting each one of their examples and 
drawing a conclusion might in fact end up not being able to see the 
forest from the trees. Frye suggests that, if one is to study such a 
phenomenon of social oppression as gender oppression, "Microscopic" 
attention to individual instances may fail to grasp the bigger picture 
and hence fail to see what is really going on. Using the metaphor of a 
"birdcage", she says, you would not notice why the bird in the cage is 
not free to fly away, as long as you keep looking at each individual 
wire. But you would see why, once "you step back ... take a 
macroscopic view of the whole cage"; there is there "a network of 
forces and barriers which are systematically related and which 
conspire to the immobilization... " (Frye, 1983: 7,19). My point is that, 
even if the sexual refusal and Ordeal examples sounded unlikely -I 
argue later that they are in fact not that unlikely - there might be other 
similar instances that women are experiencing and that it may be hasty 
to assume that these represent only "atypical" cases. 
My other objection surrounds the presumed status of the hearer. Both 
Jacobson and Green in fact invoke a very abstract or rationalized 
image of a hearer. Although I do not necessarily question the 
"competence" of ordinary hearers, I want to question the supposed 
neutrality, detachedness, disinterestedness, or otherwise unbiased 
nature of those hearers; that is, if the hearer has certain preconceptions 
or assumptions about the nature and character of the speaker, it could 
affect the hearer's understanding of the illocutionary force of what the 
speaker says, even though such speech may be clearly and 
unambiguously expressed. In order to illustrate this point, I would like 
to turn to Code's observations concerning the problems of making 
knowledge claims', and draw an analogy between someone's failure in 
having his or her knowledge claim acknowledged and someone's 
failure in securing uptake in a communicative situation. 
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According to Code, epistemologists traditionally hold that someone's 
knowledge claim - its propositional form is "s knows that p" - is 
justifiable when it meets "a set of necessary and sufficient conditions", 
and that such justificatory criteria should obtain for "a range of 
'typical' instances" (Code, 1995: 23). Code objects to this traditional 
paradigm on several grounds. One of her objections concerns 
epistemologists' assumptions about the status of knowers, who are 
presumed to be detached, neutral observers, capable of achieving " 'a 
view from nowhere' ". 
Code argues that mainstream epistemology has an affinity with 
positivist-empiricist, or "scientific", thinking. Since epistemology 
aspires to discover a set of objective and universal conditions under 
which anyone's knowledge claims are justified, anything that appears 
to interfere with these conditions is seen to be problematic. Partiality 
of the cognitive agent is one such problem. It is hence required that 
any knowledge claimant should be detached fiom his or her particular 
circumstances, in order that "cognitive outcome" will not be tainted. 
In fact, it is tacitly presupposed that, unless the knowing agent 
transcends any particularities, "then there is no knowledge worth 
analyzing" (ibid.: 24-25). In epistemology, the knower is assumed to 
be, and must be, such an ideal, detached observer. 
The implication of this requirement is therefore that the subjectivity of 
the knower (i. e., "factors that pertain to the circumstances" of the 
knower, such as his or her "location" and "identity" (Code, 1991: 4; 
1995: 10)) is irrelevant to epistemology. Epistemologists further hold 
that, anyone's knowledge claim, in so far as it satisfies the 
justificatory "necessary and sufficient" conditions, would be validated. 
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Now the stance of neutrality, objectivity, or aperspectivity in Western 
philosophy has long been under attack from those influenced by 
postmodern. thinking. Code's critique here also involves in many ways 
a similar thought; she calls into question the assumed neutrality or 
objectivity of traditional epistemologists. She is critical of their 
assumption that the neutrality of knowers is actually sustained. But 
she also contends that subjective factors of the knower - the s part in 
the proposition - are in fact epistemologically significant. She argues 
that the supposedly universal justificatory criteria, the "necessary and 
sufficienf' conditions, in the epistemological paradigm can be 
conceived for only a limited range of instances. Often, the question of 
subjectivity - who is making a knowledge claim - affects the 
credibility and outcome of such a claim. 
In an earlier work Code advances Wittgenstein's claim that 
"knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" (Code, 1991: 
215; Wittgenstein, 1974,49e, #378). One's knowledge claim, she 
argues, ultimately depends on others' confirmation or corroboration 
for it to count as "knowledge". The importance of acknowledgement 
may be understood if we remind ourselves of the fact that even a 
simple perceptual claim, such as " 'the cat is on the mat' ", needs 
someone else's affirmation to make sense. If Sara's claim that " 'the 
cat is on the mat' " is constantly denied by everyone else around her, 
how long could she continue making this claim? (ibid.: 216). If no one 
ever-accepts what she says, can she really say she knows that the cat is 
there? 
Attention to acknowledgement leads to the issue of why it fails to 
arise in some contexts. Knowledge claims may be gainsaid or not 
acknowledged because of the implication of subjectivity of the knower; 
yet, epistemology traditionally failed to heed this fact. It is important 
to note that Code's concern here is with what she calls "an 
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epistemology of everyday life" (Code, 1995: xi, 24). She distances 
herself from mainstream epistemology's preoccupation with "ideal 
knowers" and instead focuses on what actually happens to concrete 
people in various social locations. Therefore, she draws attention to 
the fact of how some social groups readily gain acknowledgement 
while others do not, and argues that the issue of claims to knowledge 
(and "cognitive authority" in general) is significantly intertwined with 
the issue of subjectivity. 
Code gives an example from James Thurber's fable, "The Unicom in 
the Garden", to illustrate the point. In the story, a man claims to his 
wife that he saw a unicorn in the garden. The wife scorns him and 
replies coolly, "The unicorn is a mythical beast". Believing he has 
gone crazy, she summons the police and a psychiatrist. However, 
when they arrive and ask the man to confirm his sighting of a unicorn, 
he replies that he said no such thing. He says, "Ibe unicorn is a 
mythical beast". Thereupon, the wife is "pronounced as 'crazy as a jay 
bird' and taken away cursing and screaming to be shut up in an 
institution, while the husband lives happily ever after (Thurber, cited 
in Code, 1991: 203). 
Thurber's story is, of course, only a fable, but Code thinks that the 
story is very illustrative. She asks whether or not it could be just a 
coincidence that it was the husband's, and not the wife's, account that 
was believed in this case. Code also cites Martin Hollis, who said, 
commenting on the story: 
It seems patent that the truth of the various beliefs makes all 
the difference. If there actually was a unicorn in the garden, his 
belief is not certifiable. If he actually said that there was, her 
belief that he did needs no psychiatrist to explain it., The 
psychiatrist intervenes only where beliefs are false or irrational 
(Hollis, 1982: 76). 
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Code questions Hollis's tacit assumption that a rational and 
objectively informed psychiatric view would ensure that the separate 
claims of the husband and the wife would be unfailingly assessed. She 
thinks it rather too "sanguine" to believe that different experiential 
accounts are so neutrally and impartially judged as Hollis believes, 
with all " 'subjective' factors ... scrupulously eliminated (Code, 1991: 
203-204). 
In Thurber's story, the wife's "claim to know" based on her 
"empirical evidence", so to speak, was not given acknowledgement. In 
a society where women are traditionally associated with psychiatric 
illnesses and irrationality, it may not be an accident that the wife's 
claim could not have much credibility compared to the husband's. 
Traditionally speaking, it seems to be the case that women's professed 
"knowledge" counts generally less than men's, and it is suspected that 
such subjective factors as the gender of the knowing subject are also 
the conditions that influence the outcome of knowledge claims. Hence, 
it is suggested that someone's knowledge claim (even though it may 
satisft the "necessary and sufficient conditions") may still fail to be 
acknowledged if others have some preconceived ideas concerning the 
subjectivity of the knower. 
If we turn our attention from the philosopher's narrow preoccupation 
with paradigmatic instances to concrete, everyday situations, Code's 
argument appears to be persuasive; we would indeed notice that there 
are many social instances in which someone's knowledge claims are_ 
assessed against the background where certain presumptions about the 
knower operate. The same claim made by pupils and teachers, or 
doctors and nurses, may not receive equal recognition. The capacity to 
gain acknowledgement is often mediated by subjective factors, and if 
this implication is negative, acknowledgement may fail to arise. Code 
argues that such cases are by no means atypical in real life; some 
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social groups daily report their experience of their claims being denied 
or not taken seriously at all; women encounter disbelief when they 
report their experiences of sexual abuse, and a black man is met with 
incredulous responses when he is stopped by police officers (Code, 
1995: 59-60). 
This issue of subjectivity surrounding the claim of knowledge would 
seem to apply equally to other mundane speech situations. Code's 
observations also invoke a dialogical picture between the would-be 
knower and the listener who acknowledges the former, and it seems 
fair to suppose that some subjective factors about the speaker are often 
tacitly presumed by the hearer in communicative settings. The failure 
of having one's knowledge claim acknowledged is usually a failure to 
secure the intended perlocutionary effect of speech; one has failed to 
convince or persuade one's audience of the reliability of one's claim. 
But an illocutionary failure would also appear to occur, or the speaker 
may fail to secure uptake of his intended act, if the hearer has certain 
strong assumptions about the speaker; a soldier, who has been 
disciplined always to look up to his superiors, may think that the 
general is ordering him to do a certain thing when actually the latter is 
only making a suggestion. The hearer's preconceptions about the 
speaker are likely to affect the receptivity of the hearer to the 
speaker's speech. Such strong assumptions may "precondition", or 
"dispose", the hearer's mind in a certain way, thereby the hearer 
would not have "uptake' of the illocutionary force of words that the 
speaker says. To the hearer's mind, certain speech acts of the speaker 
are just unimaginable. Hence, an illocutionary act may fail, although 
words are unambiguously spoken. 
Code complained that epistemology traditionally neglected the 
relevance of subjectivity, but it may be said similarly that critics of 
Langton and Hornsby have overlooked the implications of subjective 
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factors in a speech context. Indeed, the critics seem to hold an image 
of an ideal hearer (or men in a sexual context), who is unencumbered 
by any cultural presumptions. Actual speech situations turn out to be 
more dynamic than is supposed by these critics. Elocution can be 
affected by how the hearer perceives the identity of the speaker, and it 
matters therefore who is speaking in what context. 
To be sure, the subjectivity of the speaker can imply factors that 
pertain to a particular individual speaker alone. At present, however, 
by the concept of subjectivity I specially consider those social 
categories to which the speaker belongs (i. e., "identity", such as 
gender, class, and ethnicity), and the implications of these. If the 
relevance of subjectivity in a communicative situation is thus 
understood, the case of failed sexual refusal does not appear that 
implausible. To return to the earlier scenario, it was suggested that the 
man had a certain expectation about the behaviour of women in 
general; he had an assumption about how women would behave in a 
sexual encounter; he somehow assumed that women do not really 
mean to refuse sex even when they say "no". In such a circumstance, 
it is plausible that the illocution of refusal might not be recognized as 
refusal. As clear and unambiguous a statement as it may be, the 
hearer's perception about the woman could block the recognition of 
her intention to refuse. 
3. Norms, stories, and failed utterances 
Thus, what has been argued is that the subjective dimension of the 
speaker could influence the outcome of illocutionary acts. If it is 
negatively implicated in speech situations, even an explicit utterance 
may fail to obtain understanding of the intended meaning. 
Nevertheless, this alone perhaps does not fully account for the sense 
of "silencing", and the concept needs to be further refined. I 
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Some theorists have pointed out the systematic inability or difficulty 
that some social groups (mostly minorities) often face in finding 
"empathic" listeners in the public domain. They suggest that this is 
because certain widely shared public images about these people's 
identity and personality - which is often just unfairly imposed 
stereotypical assumptions and norms - precondition others' 
perceptions and sometimes undermine their receptiveness to these 
groups' concerns. It seems to suggest in turn that the sub ective 
aspects of the speaker which might negatively affect the performance 
of utterances could be traced to such norms and assumptions operating 
in society, and that the sense of "silencing" could be derived from 
such background linguistic practices, and from the connected sense of 
systematic unfairness and powerlessness involved in the phenomenon. 
To demonstrate that this may be the case, I will draw on some 
commentaries of the testimony of Anita Hill given at the United States 
Senate hearings in 1991. Hill's sexual harassment charges against 
Clarence Thomas were made at the hearings over his nomination to 
the United States Supreme Court; it was a highly publicized incident 
at the time and subsequently a subject of much debate. Although so 
much has been written on this already, rethinking "what went wrong 
with Anita Hill" now would seem to offer an insight into the problems 
of women's illocutionary silencing. 
My argument still surrounds the role of "uptake", or due 
"acknowledgement" in our various communicative activities, and the 
question of why uptake may nonetheless fail. I have emphasized the 
importance of the hearer's uptake of illocutionary acts, but others' 
acknowledgement of our intended act is often crucial in many other 
daily exchanges, and this simple fact is also likely to be forgotten. 
Frye argues that even such emotions as one's anger need to be 
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acknowledged or directly engaged with: "Being angry at someone is 
somewhat like a speech act in that it has a certain conventional force 
whereby it sets people up in a certain sort of orientation to each other; 
and like a speech act, it cannot 'come off' if it does not get uptake" 
(Frye, 1983: 88). However, she also claims that when women get 
angry, they are often not accorded uptake: "Deprived of uptake, the 
woman's anger is left as just a burst of expression of individual 
feeling. As a social act, an act of communication, it doesn't happen. It 
is, as Austin would have said, 'non-played"' (ibid.: 89). Frye takes 
such an emotive expression as anger to be also fundamentally a 
relational, interpersonal act, which needs to be acknowledged by the 
one to whom it is directed; otherwise, it is said, it just "doesn't 
happen". 
Hill's speech at the hearings was also an example of a woman's failed 
speech. In fact, it may be said that Hill failed in different ways. Code 
also examines the commentaries upon Hill and considers it 
specifically as an instance of failure of a person's testimony to count 
as a source of knowledge. 
Code seems to use the word "testimony" here in a general way, as an 
epistemological category of sources of human knowledge. Testimony 
is said to be "an act of telling ... intended to impart information, " and 
may state knowledge or prejudice; but if it is believed, the knowledge 
contained in the testimony is transferred to other persons (Fricker, 
1999). Thus, testimony is our indirect way of gaining knowledge. 
According to Code, Anglo-American epistemologists usually cite 
"perception", "memory", and "testimony" as the sources of 
knowledge. It is said, however, that "perception" is now commonly 
regarded as the most reliable source of knowledge among these three; 
"memory" is less reliable; and "testimony" is the least trustworthy of 
all three. The reason appears to be that, in mainstream epistemology, 
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first person, direct observation is privileged as the paradigmatic model 
for obtaining knowledge (Code, 1995: 64). 
Earlier on, Wittgenstein's remark was quoted, in which he claimed 
that knowledge ultimately depends on acknowledgment. Code also 
points out, however, that, among these sources of knowledge, only 
"testimony" invokes such interpersonal or interactive dimension and 
looks to acknowledgement for its completion. "Perception" and 
"memory", on the other hand, involve only a self-standing epistemic 
agent, as if the role of others were not relevant in knowledge stating 
(Code, 1995: 64-65). 
Code argues that the testimonial form of knowledge is actually a 
socio-cultural fact of our everyday life, and hence that traditional 
philosophy's mistrust of testimony is rather baffling (ibid.: 65). Indeed, 
our ordinary communication involves numerous instances of such 
"testimony"; we ubiquitously exchange pieces of knowledge or 
information with other persons. Although I cannot enter here into a 
proper epistemological discussion as to whether or not "testimony" is 
really a reliable source of knowledge, it does appear an undeniable 
social fact that we ordinarily rely on others' "testimony" to gain 
knowledge in our everyday life. Wittgenstein also claimed that "it 
isn't for example just my experience, but other people's, that I get 
knowledge from' ' (Wittgenstein, 1974: 36e, #275). 
Nevertheless, as a testimony inherently relies on the role. of the 
listener for its fulfilment, the testimonial situations are said to be 
"often tangled negotiations where it matters who the participants 
are... " (Code, 1995: 67, emphasis added). Hill's testimony seems to 
have been precisely such a "tangled situation". The fate of Hill was 
that she was not so lucky with the "participants" and in the end her 
testimony failed to be acknowledged as evidence against Thomas. , 
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Hill's speech was also a failure of speech acts; especially, a failure of 
perlocutionary acts. She did not succeed in convincing others of the 
truth of her story, or others did not take her story to be credible. With 
regard to Hill, MacKinnon thinks that she was silenced. The 
unsympathetic and incredulous responses that Hill received, in 
MacKinnon's view, amounted to the same thing as silencing. In fact, 
MacKinnon thinks that Hill's case was a perfect example of women's 
silence created by pornography. Because Hill spoke about sex and 
pornography (although repeating Thomas's words), and because in a 
world saturated with pornography, women's words about sex and 
pornography become "live" pornography itself, Hill herself became 
sexualised on the scene and her speech was deemed "unworthy of 
belief' (MacKinnon, 1996: 64-68). Butler, however, later argued that 
MacKinnon downplayed or ignored the racial implication of the 
incident, which was also a central element in the whole affair (Butler, 
1997: 83-84). Indeed, it may be difficult to construe the direct link 
between pornography and Hill's testimony, and to claim that Hill was 
silenced because of pornography; nonetheless, one may still see the 
sense in which Hill failed in her speech acts, and it appears that it was 
importantly to do with certain subjective factors about Hill. 2 
KimberI6 Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 1992) argues that Hill's testimonial 
utterances were made against a socio-cultural context where certain 
norms, "myths", and stereotypes about black women could effectively 
constrain what she can reasonably say in a public sphere. Crenshaw 
points out the fact that, in the context of American society, black 
women are frequently associated with sexual licentiousness, and 
unlike white women, the fact of their sexual victimhood is often 
invisible and unheeded in public discourse. In such a context, Hill's 
accusation of sexual harassment did not seem to carry much 
credibility to many audiences. In contrast to Hill, Thomas availed 
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himself of the entrenched imagery of systematic discrimination 
against male African-Americans by white Americans. He alleged that 
the enquiry at the hearings constituted a "high-tech lynching" of him, 
and managed to appeal to the imagery of racial oppression in the 
history of America to portray himself as another innocent victim of 
social injustice (Marable, 1992; Panter, 1992; Lubiano, 1992). Even 
though such a claim was plainly unreasonable, in a situation where the 
accuser and the accused were both black Americans, Thomas's 
strategy seems to have helped him out in the end. He was able to take 
advantage of some existing images and stories in society to win 
(enough) sympathy from the audience. Hill, on the other hand, could 
not find any such helpful story in the background to boost her 
credibility. Thus, Crenshaw points out that the "lack of available and 
widely comprehended narratives to communicate the reality of her 
experience as a black woman to the world" proved to be Hill's great 
disadvantage (Crenshaw, 1992: 404). 
Hill's handicap, in one sense, therefore, was the unavailability of a 
sympathetic social narrative against which she could recount her own 
story. But it is not really that there were no stories about "black 
women" in American society; there actually were, but these worked 
more to Hill's disadvantage rather than to her benefit. 
Wahneema Lubiano argues that such "categories" as "black lady", or 
"black woman" in a particular society are "not simply social 
taxonomies" but are more "loaded" concepts, usually with some 
stories associated with them. Such stories may not have permanently 
fixed storylines, but they do work as a sort of perceptual tool, as 
"building blocks of 'reality' for many people" (Lubiano, 1992: 330). 
Through such easily available narratives people tend to perceive the 
identity and characteristics of certain others in society. Analogous to 
literary characters in narratives, then, a category like ', 'black woman" 
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offers some stories; the problem is, however, that these stories may be 
littered with stereotypical norms, images, and assumptions, or in short 
"myths", about the protagonists. For example, the character of "black 
woman" in America is said to revolve typically around such images as 
"Mammy, welfare cheat, [or] Jezebel"; Nell Irvin Panter remarks that 
these were also the roles assigned to Hill (Panter, 1992: 2 10). 
Unlike the MacIntyrean "social characters" quoted in an earlier 
chapter, these characters may not epitomize the morality of society, 
but they similarly generate certain expectations from other members 
of society about their personality and behaviour. Whereas 
MacIntyrean characters are in tune with social expectations (they have 
to be, for they embody social values and norms), the expectations for 
the character "black woman" may actually be out of sync with the 
wishes of the real person who occupies the role. The character of 
"black woman" may impose a certain imagery on the public mind, 
such as her promiscuity, even when the reality is otherwise, and such 
an image comes to set a certain domain of "speakability" for a black 
woman in the public sphere. It may have b&en the case, then, that such 
socially sustained narratives with their concomitant norms and 
expectations about the character of "black woman" put the audience 
"on guard" when Hill spoke and effectively worked to remove 
credibility from her allegations. That may be a possible explanation 
for Hill's failure of perlocutionary acts. 
I suppose, however, that it is also plausible to argue that Hill's speech 
met another failure; that is, it may be possible to construe that she 
experienced an illocutionary silencing in the course of the hearings. 
Hill is said to have recited as much as she could remember what 
Thomas had privately said to her. Thus, to use an "explicit 
performative formula! ', in accordance with Austinian language, she 
might have said something like this: "I testify that Judge Thomas said 
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to me that.... "; or "I quote him saying as.... " However, she may not 
have used such an explicit formula, and even if she had used one, 
there are still chances that her illocution was not understood for what 
it was. If the audience in effect had some preconceptions about the 
character of a "black woman", or the character of "Jezebel", the cited 
dirty words which really must have come from Thomas may have 
been implicitly associated with Hill. In such a case the audience may 
fail to recognize the intended meanings of I testify" and "I quote", 
and instead might hear them as "I think I heard", or even "I dreamed 
him saying.... " In this respect, Hill's speech fails to be an act of 
testimony, but an act of fantasizing. 
This may sound implausible to some, because the setting was 
undeniably a testimonial session, but I have argued that not only 
perlocution but also illocution can be affected by the subjectivity of 
the speaker. In fact, there are close relations between perlocutionary 
and illocutionary failures. Perlocution, of course, can fail even when 
illocution is successful (successful perlocution requires more than 
understanding of the hearer; see Section 5, Chapter Five). But one 
possible reason for a failure of perlocution. is a failure at the 
illocutionary level; if the hearer does not grasp what the'speaker is 
attempting to do, it is unlikely that the speech would achieve its 
intended effect. Therefore, the failure of Hill's testimony may have 
been partly the result of an illocutionary failure. 
Thus, Hill's speech made at the Senate hearings failed in different 
senses. Firstly, though she had the freedom to speak against Thomas, 
her testimony in the end did not count as "evidence"; that is; it did not 
count as a reliable source of knowledge for others. Secondly, she 
failed to bring about the desired perlocutionary effect of convincing 
others. Thirdly, during the procedure of the hearings, Hill also 
possibly failed to secure uptake of the intended illocutionary act. - 
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The case of Hill is instructive, for it suggests that certain socially 
circulated and sustained norms and expectations about the speaker 
could prevent the speaker's utterances from counting as an act that 
was intended in some circumstances. Such prevention could happen 
either at the illocutionary level in the form of failed uptake or at the 
perlocutionary level in the form of denial. A similar thing may be said 
to be happening when a woman's speech of sexual refusal is not 
recognized as refusal. If there are in fact certain widely shared 
assumptions and expectations about women's sexuality and behaviour 
among men, it could constrain what individual women could say (in 
men's minds) in a sexual situation. To be sure, the example of sexual 
refusal and the case of Hill (and that of Ordeal) are not exactly 
parallel. In the former, when a woman speaks and means one thing, 
she is taken to mean another. In the latter, a woman cites another (e. g., 
quotes sexually explicit speech), and she is taken to be speaking on 
her own behalf. But the analogy here is that, in both cases, the 
intended illocutionary act of the speaker fails to be recognized (refusal, 
protest, and testimony are not taken as such), because of the hearer's 
assumption concerning the subjectivity of the speaker. And the cause 
of the failure is likely to be attributable to some other practices in the 
background. 
People's ideas about the characters of "woman" or "black woman" 
then could constrain the realm of speakability of a woman or a black 
woman in some situations. The same, of course, could be said for the 
character of "man" as well. Thus, it may not be only women whose 
speech acts can be affected in some ways. It is also true that there are 
different images about the characters of "woman" or "black woman" 
in society. However, certain images are perhaps more prevalent than 
others; existing social narratives reproduce and spread stereotypical 
assumptions about some social groups, which indeed become a 
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convenient tool for some to interpret the nature and behaviour of 
others. 
I trace the meaning of "silencing" to the sense that such social norms 
and expectations, which are often just unfairly imposed on some 
social groups, intervene in the background to constrain these people's 
capacity for speech in important situations. To be sure, some 
stereotypes appear innocuous, being just what they are, existing and 
circulating in society without any clear origin or instigators. In this 
sense it might be debatable whether or not we could duly characterize 
them as something "unfaie'. But we should also note that the sense of 
unfairness may be occasionally felt by those who are often labelled by, 
and live with, such stereotypical norms. As the instance of Hill's 
testimony may show, these cultural images may prove to be 
"disadvantages" for the stereotyped people in very crucial settings. It 
is when such norms are adversely involved that the mutual 
receptiveness of partners in the linguistic exchange, what Hornsby 
called the condition of "reciprocity", breaks down. The capacity of 
speech inherently relies on a certain receptiveness of others, but such 
receptiveness may frequently be blocked, and some people are simply 
unable to do certain things with their words. 
The word "silencing", though, may still irk some political theorists. I 
do not, however, think that it is really problematic to use the term, for 
there is a sense in the phenomenon that some speakers' capacity for 
speech acts is hindered; they are not in the position to communicate 
freely certain things that they want to communicate, because of the 
condition set by other linguistic practices. I am not suggesting here 
that anything directly follows from this observation about the methods 
that should be employed to counter this problem, for this would 
involve different considerations. 
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Thus formulated, this "silencing" argument does not implicate any 
specific individuals but only refers to some shared practices in a 
community. This does not mean, however, that no one is hence 
responsible; it means rather that anyone in the community could be 
from time to time participating in such a practice and engendering an 
environment that can silence some groups' speech. In the following 
section of the chapter, I will specifically consider the place and role of 
pornographic speech in connection with women's silencing. 
This silencing argument, however, might still invite the kind of 
objection that Ronald Dworkin raised earlier. Dworkin's objection is 
mainly raised against MacKinnon's contention that pornography 
should be banned, because it intimidates women into silence or 
"conditions men to nýdsunderstand what they say" (Dworkin, 1993: 
38). In MacKinnon's view, it is women, not pornographers, who 
should be really given First Amendment protection of free speech. 
Dworkin retorts to this as follows: 
[I]t is premised on an unacceptable proposition: that the right to 
free speech includes a right to circumstances that encourage one 
to speak, and a right that others grasp and respect what one 
means to say. These are obviously not rights that any society can 
recognize or enforce. Creationists, flat-earthers, and bigots, for 
example, are ridiculed in many parts of America now; that 
ridicule undoubtedly dampens the enthusiasm many of them 
have for speaking out and limits the attention others pay to what 
they say. ( ... ) But it goes far ... to insist that freedom of speech includes not only opportunity to speak to the public but a 
guarantee of a sympathetic or even competent understanding of 
what one says (ibid.: 38). 
In fact, such liberals as Dworkin believe that it is an "unacceptable" 
extension of the right to free speech to include under this notion a 
right to others' understanding of -what one says. To admit such' a 
notion would entail imposing unjustifiably heavy burdens and 
obligations on - hearers ; and end up sacrificing ý other important 
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individual liberties (West, 2003: 392-393,405). Langton and Hornsby, 
who advanced the notion of "free illocution", may nonetheless defend 
their claim by saying that certain kinds of speech acts (such as 
women's speech of sexual refusal) are so vital that it would be 
justified to grant them special protection. However, of course, the 
liberals' contention that the individual ought not to be bound by 
unacceptably grave duties and obligations in the name of free speech 
is a reasonable and understandable argument. 3 In the course of the 
discussion, I have not proposed that the right to speech should include 
such a "right to circumstances". 
Dworkin, nevertheless, on his part, seems to envisage rather a simple 
notion of whatfree exercise of speech requires; if the arguments so far 
presented are right, the circumstances of speech are important. To 
speak, and hence to perform speech acts - remember that, according 
to Austin, to speak is ipsofacto to do things with words - inherently 
rely on the community of hearers who are minimally receptive to what 
the speaker says. It is not merely because one is allowed to speak but 
also because there are others who understand what one is trying to do 
that one can freely exercise one's capacity of speech. One invariably 
depends on others (except where one is altogether doing a monologue) 
to say anything that is meaningful, and it is by no means "asking too 
much" to suggest that one needs such minimally "sympathetic" 
listeners. 
The enquiry in this chapter also suggests that the speaker's 
subjectivity tends to be pre-interpreted and implied in a speech 
situation; there is certainly a more dynamic dimension between the 
speaker and the hearer in a concrete communicative setting than what 
an abstract linguistic theory allows. If some social groups indeed 
systematically face illocutionary failures and if that is likely to do with 
some unfairly imputed norms about them, then in fact this social 
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environment needs to be changed, if not by law, then by other 
available means. The first thing to note, however, is not to deny the 
importance of "circumstances"; both the speaker and the hearer are 
situated in particular social contexts, and in most social situations, the 
speaker also crucially depends on the hearer to meaningfully exercise 
his or her capacity of speech. 
4. The role of pornography in the Background 
I have argued that the subjectivity of the speaker could affect the 
outcome of illocutionary acts. Socially circulated stories and 
narratives spread certain assumptions about the speaker, which could 
undermine the hearer's receptivity to the speaker's speech. 
Illocutionary silencing is said to occur when the speaker is unable to 
perform illocutionary acts, due to such socially transmitted 
assumptions regarding his or her subjectivity. Thus, for example, if 
women are unable to perform the illocutionary act of sexual refusal, 
because men's uptake fails, it may be because, as it has been 
contended, pornography is spreading a belief that women's refusal 
does not really mean refusal. 
Nevertheless, there is still a question about whether or not 
pornography actually says such things, whether or not it is really 
responsible for women's illocutionary failures in sexual contexts, or 
how it may contribute to such failures. To limit our attention to the 
issue of refusal for the moment, there are in fact some suggestions that 
this stereotype surrounding women and sex is nothing new; it is in fact 
centuries old. West, for instance, evocatively recites the following 
lines from Otto von Bismarck. West herself does not make much of it, 
which is only quoted in the epigram of her article, but it hints at the 
main issue, which is that a woman's "no" is not taken as 'ýno" in a 
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sexual situation. The quoted lines imply that this gender stereotype, or 
an idea very similar to it, existed in Bismarckian Germany: 
When a diplomat says yes, he means perhaps. 
When he says perhaps, he means no. 
When he says no, he is not a diplomat. 
When a lady says no, she means perhaps. 
When she says perhaps, she means yes. 
But when she says yes, she is no lady (von Bismarck, cited in 
West, 2003: 391). 
Some also suggest that such an idea is even implicit in courtly love 
poems. 4 Although the case of courtly love is actually slightly complex, 
a "modem feminist" reading of the poems may offer such an 
interpretation. Courtly love poems, which were mainly the products of 
the Middle Ages, were principally written from a "male perspective"; 
they rarely took account of a woman's viewpoint (MacLennan, 2001; 
Owen, 1975: 29). Although, in courtly time, it was the man who had 
to offer "service" to his lady and to prove his faithfulness and loyalty, 
enduring the tests of hardships (such as, a long separation), the irony 
of courtly love is that it was also believed that the man's devotion 
would "entitle' him to his beloved's love (cf. Owen, 1975: 29). In fact, 
the man would often suffer; he had to suffer the lady's 
unresponsiveness, indifference, fickleness, etc. He was subject to 
disappointment and his passion often remained unfulfilled. Yet, the 
theme of courtly love had mixed motifs of rejection, one-sided hope, 
and expectations. A courtly lover may have thought that his lady's 
apparent rejection may not be really intended to be a rejection but a 
step in her playful "game" or another "test" she is imposing on him to 
check his commitment. It is because of such one-sided thinking and 
expectations in courtly poems that it is alleged that it also contains a 
version of the thought that a woman's refusal does not always mean 
refusal. 
212 
Courtly poems and the quote from Bismarck are just a few illustrative 
examples. The main contention is that this idea, which has so far been 
largely attributed to pornography, has been a conventional stereotype 
of the gender. If pornography says that a woman's "no" is not a "no", 
it is not the origin of this idea. It only gives an expression to an old, 
traditional gender stereotype, or "recites" and perhaps somewhat 
"exaggerates" it (Butler, 1997: 69). 
If, nonetheless, pornography does express an idea that women's "no" 
does not mean "no" in the present age and culture, in certain senses it 
will be more problematic than courtly poems, and possibly more than 
other contemporary speech. The reasons for this are: (i) even if courtly 
poems and pornography express the same idea, it would not in the end 
carry the same meaning and significance, because of the surrounding 
social context; (ii) pornography's utterances are likely to influence the 
audience, given the social background; (iii) the particular way 
pornography renders its ideas to the audience and its "authoritative" 
status in the domain of sex would give it a special presence. 
I will address these reasons in turn. But in addition to the question of 
the significance of pornographic speech, there is also a separate issue 
of whether or not pornography actually says that women's "no" does 
not mean "no". This itself is an empirical matter, which cannot be 
addressed from a purely theoretical reasoning. There are, however, 
some who suggest that pornography does express such an idea, or an 
idea quite similar to it. According to Peter Baker, who confesses to 
have been once a regular consumer of pornography, one of the" 
common themes of pornography is that "women arc all really 
'desperate' for sex with men; " and thus "women [in 
pornography] ... initiate sexual activity or respond immediately to male 
advances" (Baker, - 1992: 133). He also observes: "[Plomography 
expresses more than the view that women are mcre sex objects. It tells 
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men that women enjoy sex and are always available for it, even when 
they deny it. It tells men that women secretly enjoy rape" (ibid.: 140). 
Pornography, then, may be sometimes telling its audiences that 
women do not really intend to refuse sex even when they say "no". 
If it actually says such a thing, then its overall meaning would 
certainly differ now from what it would have been in Bismarckian or 
courtly days. The general social context again becomes relevant. 
Wittgenstein often stressed that the meaning and significance of a 
particular speech and action depend on its circumstances. "What is 
happening now has significance - in [the] surroundings. The 
surroundings give it its importance" (Wittgenstein, 2001: 129e-130e, 
#593). Moreover, "[olur talk gets its meaning from the rest of our 
proceedings" (Wittgenstein, 1979: 30e, #229). The relevance of 
"surroundings" applies similarly in thinking about the social meaning 
of speech. The concept of the "Background" was meant to capture this 
relation between individual speech and activity and the wider social 
context. 
Wittgenstein's notion of "language-game" may also help to illustrate 
the point. For one thing, Wittgenstein used the concept of "language- 
game" to advance an argument that language has no common essence, 
but rather has multifarious uses, i. e., "language-games". Language 
does not have a core unifying structure, but consists of a multiplicity 
of ways through which uses of words are "related" to one another. 
Wittgenstein says, if one looks at language-games, one would not find 
"something that is common to alr', but only find "similarities, 
relationships", "complicated network", "overlapping ... fibres", and 
"family resemblances" (Wittgenstein, 2001: 27e-28c, #65-67). Thus, 
"language-game" refers to a web of similarities, relations, or patterns 
among language uses, which together constitute what we call language. 
But the notion also importantly serves to illustrate that speaking of 
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language is an activity, which is not isolated from the rest of the 
community; uses of language are integrated and embedded in the form 
of life. Hintikka and Hintikka point out that it is wrong to interpret the 
concept of "language-game" merely as "verbal" language-game 
(Hintikka and Hintikka, 1986: 195, also 217-220). In fact, 
Wittgenstein stated: "I shall ... call the whole, consisting of language 
and the actions into which it is woven, a 'language-game' 
(Wittgenstein, 2001: 4e, #7). Hintikka and Hintikka explain that 
"language-games" are our uses of language "in practice"; they mean 
language and its "interactions with our nonlinguistic environment" 
(Hintikka and Hintikka, 1986: 195) 
If our uses of language are language-games, which necessarily 
interact with their social environment, the language-game of 
pornography obviously differs from that of the courtly love poem, and 
hence even if they are to make the same utterances, their respective 
social meanings would largely differ. In courtly time, there was 
actually a practice of chivalry in place, and courtly lovers in fact 
valued a "spiritual" bond more than physical relations between them 
(MacLennan, 2001, Owen, 1975). Suppose that a courtly poem did say 
that a woman's "no" does not mean "no". Because of its overall 
context,. however, this may not have had a sexual connotation in 
courtly days. Even if it did have a sexual subtext, it would not have 
had much social significance in a context where a platonic or spiritual 
union between lovers was a supreme ideal. 
In contrast, when pornography says that women do not mean "no", it 
invariably means sexual intercourse. And such utterances appear to 
carry weight in a society where sexuality is far more openly expressed, 
and it itself is considered a value. It appears to gain "appropriateness" 
and currency in a culture where women's status as sexual beings is 
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more firmly entrenched. The surroundings, therefore, give more 
significance to pornographic speech. 
Would individual men, however, be really likely to believe what 
pornography says? It is sometimes claimed that pornography is just a 
fantasy, and it does not really mean anything by what it says. Is it 
misguided to take seriously what pornography says only 
"fantastically", which is unlikely to affect men's thinking? 
Wittgenstein, nevertheless, said that we distinguish the truth or falsity 
of an idea against the "inherited background", or worldview; against 
the system of shared understandings of the community. He also 
argued: 
When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not 
a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light 
dawns gradually over the whole. ) 
It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in 
which consequences and premises give one another mutual 
support (Wittgenstein, 1974: 21e, #141,142). 
Wittgenstein here talks about a network of related beliefs which 
mutually reinforce one another. It is the aspect of connectedness that 
matters. Hence, the question of whether pornography's utterances are 
believable or likely to be believed would also appear to depend 
importantly on the connection of beliefs and ideas that individual men 
would make. That means the comparison, association, and connection 
that these men make between pornography and some shared ideas, - 
beliefs, and norms in the Background. In men's mind, pornography's 
claim may be corroborated, for example, by what other men say of 
women generally (in a private setting), or their ideas of how women 
are commonly viewed and treated in society. The audiences of 
pornography possibly have a nexus of understandings, including of 
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"what women are essentially like", and they would believe what 
pornography says if they think that it makes sense to them. 
Searle also argued that our linguistic and perceptual interpretations too 
(among others) are enabled by, and take place against, the Background 
understandings. That is, our interpretations of the meaning of even 
simple sentences like " 'Sally cut the cake' ", or " 'Bill cut the grass"' 
depend on our common understandings of the world, interactions with 
the world, and our capacities and abilities to deal with this world 
(Searle, 1995: 130-131). When pornography makes utterances, these 
were also interpreted against the audiences' understanding of how the 
world normally functions around them. 
Given the kind of the Background, I argue that it is quite possible that 
pornography's speech is believed by its audiences. It is, nonetheless, 
to be acknowledged that it may not be only pornographic speech that 
would spread a certain idea about women's nature and behaviour. 
Speech other than pornography may similarly say that women's "no" 
is not "no", which could equally influence men's thinking. The 
particular problem of pornography nevertheless might be that it is the 
speech that most paradigmatically says such an idea in public. It may 
clearly illustrate and repeatedly suggest it (Baker suggests that a 
repetitive theme is in fact quite common in pornography (Baker, 
1992)). Considering the "authority" of pornographers in the sexual 
domain in the present culture, their emblematic status as the exemplar 
of certain sex/gender related values and norms, it seems right to think 
that pornographers' speech has some important resonance. It has been 
said that pornography offers inspirations to other artists and film 
directors. Pornography may exploit the existing gender stereotypes, 
but it also typically reproduces and reinforces them, and these are in 
turn reflected back in society. 
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Tbus, pornography may indeed be playing an important role in 
spreading certain ideas about women, creating a social climate where 
men's uptake of women's speech can fail and illocutionary silencing 
can occur. In this sense then pornography may be "silencing" speech. 
It needs to be emphasized, however, that this claim is not meant to be 
an empirical or straightforwardly causal argument about silencing. I 
attempted to show that there appears to be indeed an important 
connection between pornography and some of women's illocutionary 
failures, but this connection is, as MacKinnon suggested previously, 
not meant to imply "linear causality", or causality in terms of strict 
generalizations (if A then B follows). Pornography may be silencing, 
for it seems to be playing an important role in creating a social 
environment which is conducive to failures of women's speech in a 
sexual context. This sense of silencing is indicated by Langton and 
Hornsby's suggestion that some speech "set the (felicity) condition for 
other speech" (Langton, 1993: 324; Hornsby and Langton, 1998: 27). 
My argument in this chapter in fact sought to defend and expand this 
claim. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to explain the sense of silencing, 
focusing on how the speaker may fail to secure uptake in some 
contexts. Drawing on an analogy between the failure of knowledge 
claims and the failure of illocutionary acts, I argued that the 
subjectivity of the speaker is also a key factor in a communicative 
situation which could influence the outcome of illocutionary acts. If 
the hearer has some preconceptions or assumptions concerning the 
subjectivity of the speaker, then the speaker may indeed fail to secure 
uptake and to perform the intended illocutionary acts successfully. 
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The concrete example of Hill casts light on why the speaker's 
illocution may be silenced. Some socially circulated and sustained 
norms, "narratives", and stories spread certain assumptions and 
expectations about the speaker. I defended the notion of silencing, 
because these unfairly imputed subjectivities can in fact prevent 
speakers from achieving uptake. In this sense, it is said some speech 
"sets a condition" for other speech. 
I also argued that pornography may be creating such a condition for 
women's speech. What pornography says has significance and is 
likely to affect the audience's thinking, given the structure of the 
Background we have. As has been suggested, it may be playing an 
important part in generating a social climate where women's 
illocutionary silencing can occur. 
Notes 
1 "Rhetorical space" is the term which I borrow from Lorraine Code's book, 
Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations (1995). 
2 Code also offers an analysis of Hill's testimony, highlighting especially the 
central problems of subjectivity and of the uneven distributions of epistemic 
privilege in society that the Hill case illustrates (Code, 1995: 58-82, 
especially, 67-69,74-80). She argues that "rhetorical spaces ... generate 
presumptions of credibility and trust that attach differentially according to 
how speakers and interpreters are positioned within them" (ibid.: 60). 
Disparity in epistemic privilege may result not necessarily because the- 
knowledge professed is "false", but rather because of such social 
"presumptions" and the existing structures of hierarchy and power. For the 
purpose of this chapter, I mainly relied on other theorists whom Code also 
consults. 
3 West argues that "there is some powerful liberal reason for thinking that 
the right to free speech should include a minimal comprehension 
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requirement" (West, 2003: 396); thus, the consumption of pornography may 
be said to violate women's right to freedom of speech, and anti-pornography 
legislation can be defended on free speech grounds. West also defends the 
thought that "communication of ideas is a two-sided process", and argues 
that the liberal notion of free speech includes "the speaker's freedom to 
communicate ideas" to others (ibid.: 406,408, respectively; emphasis 
omitted). This entails that the hearer's comprehension should not be 
prevented by the action of another agent (ibid.: 408-409). In contrast to West, 
I have not committed in this thesis to demonstrating that the right to free 
speech should include such a right to audience comprehension. Rather, I 
attempted to show that our capacity of speech importantly depends on the 
role of receptive audiences; therefore, it hinges more on the structure of the 
tsenvironment" than is sometimes supposed. 
41 am grateful to the audience at the Philosophy Society Meeting at the 
University of Brighton in May 2004 for drawing my attention to this point. 
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Chapter Seven 
Critique of the Form of Life 
The earlier chapters assessed the meaning and problems of 
pornography through speech act analysis and also through the 
examination of its "Background". It has been suggested that the social 
meaning and significance of pornography would become clearer once 
it is seen against the backdrop of related social values and norms. 
Pornography reflects and is intertwined with such values and norms, 
which often manifest themselves at the level of "social imaginary". 
Given this social background, I argued, pornography can be 
authoritative, and can also constitute subordinating and silencing 
speech, though its significance ultimately derives from its 
surroundings; i. e., shared community norms and values. 
Pornography and its related norms and practices are thus part of a 
cultural community, or as Wittgenstein put it, of a "form of life". A 
logical next step of the enquiry would seem to lead to a renunciation 
of such cultural norms and practices. Wittgenstein, however, is known 
for saying that our form of life is something that "has to be accepted",. 
and this will have implications for the kind of critique engaged in this 
chapter; although Wittgenstein's philosophy apparently denies us a 
means of criticizing the existing form of life, feminists, who are 
concerned with pornography, do want to critique and transform it. I 
will argue here that, even if one adopts a broadly Wittgensteinian 
perspective, the present form of life is "immanently" changeable. 
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1. Introduction 
In assessing the meaning and status of pornographic speech in 
contemporary society, I articulated the need to go beyond speech act 
analysis. I then drew an insight from what is called the philosophy of 
the "Background"; from the ideas of the later Wittgenstein, and some 
communitarian and feminist thinkers, who emphasized the relevance 
of the social context that surrounds individual activities, or the 
interconnectedness among these (seemingly independent) individual 
activities. The central insight drawn was that our speech and actions 
are given their meaning and significance by their social settings. That 
is to say, speech and actions are essentially interwoven with other 
community activities and practices, and reflect some shared values, 
beliefs, and norms of the community. The meaning of individual 
speech and actions therefore often becomes salient against the 
background of such related community norms and practices. 
Wittgenstein argued that a family of similar or related activities 
together form a language-game, and constitute part of the 
community's form of life. 
I have suggested that pornographic speech could be understood 
essentially in the same way. Its social meaning and significance may 
not become entirely manifest as long as it is treated as an autonomous 
and isolated speech. In this regard, speech act theory, though it 
illuminates certain constitutive harms of pornography, seems to leave 
unexplained the ultimate source of those harms; for example, the 
theory could not explain the authoritative character of that speech. 
Pornography is also woven into, and reflects, other community values, 
norms, and practices - and I have specifically discussed some sexual 
values and norms of gender, which appear to have become more 
distinct in recent times. I argued that pornographers in contemporary 
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society are "authoritative" in the sense that they not only reflect such 
distinctive norms and values but also have come to occupy the social 
position - in MacIntyre's term, the role of social characters; 
pornographers embody in their life and personality these very values 
and norms. They exhibit these standards, and what they say and do 
may also set a model for other members of society. 
If pornographers are indeed the kind of authoritative social figures 
who embody society's norms about sex and women, which other 
community members might look up to, it seems reasonable to think 
that their speech would have more social relevance. As we have seen, 
authoritative speech acts normally carry a legitimating force of 
utterance, and hence more power to bring about the subordination of 
women. And if pornography essentially reflects shared community 
norms and practices, then its locutions would be likely to have more 
credibility, whereas women's speech that does not confonn to such 
norms may even fail to obtain uptake by the audience. I argued that 
pornography can be subordinating and silencing speech, although its 
authority and efficacy ultimately depend on its surroundings, the 
background of shared norms and values. 
It appears now that we have some grounds to raise objections to the 
practice of pornography. However, to impugn the practice of 
pornography logically entails that we call into question those 
background norms and values that are reflected in pornography, and 
this is, to some extent, also necessary. For even though pornography_ 
may play a special role in effecting the subordinate status of women, 
many existing problems may not be fundamentally resolved as long as 
those cultural habits, people's assumptions and attitudes are not 
addressed at the same time. The norms that pornography expresses are 
not carried by it alone. What is therefore needed is perhaps to pay 
critical attention to pornography, as well as those background norms 
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and values that make this speech possible. It seems that the norms of 
gender affect the status and liberty of women more directly than 
sexual values as such. However, as the sexual norms may serve to 
reinforce the existing gender roles, and some sex norms may be 
criticized on certain moral grounds, it seems pertinent that this also 
becomes the subject of our attention. It may not mean that all the 
values and norms that are reflected by pornography will thus be 
judged as harmful and condemnable, but it will mean that, after some 
reflection, some proposals to change the present practices will be 
made. As the background of pornography thus changes, it might lose 
eventually its authoritative character as well. 
I have argued that pornography and the norms and values which it 
reflects constitute part of a shared cultural landscape, or what 
Wittgenstein called, "a form of life" ("speaking of language is part of 
an activity, or of a life-form" (Wittgenstein, 200 1: 10, #23)). Although 
this concept of a form of life, like that of language-game, was never so 
elaborated by Wittgenstein himself, Michael Kober thinks that it 
probably refers to "a medley-like mixture or garland of practices 
somehow supporting or complementing one another", and is perhaps 
best seen as "the setting in which (e. g. discursive) language-games are 
practiced" (Kober, 1996: 418). Furthermore, he thinks that the idea of 
forms of life presupposes the idea of "community", "custom", and 
"institutions" (ibid.: 418). As explained in Chapter Two, what the 
concept of the form of life represents is the same as the concept of the 
"Background". A form of life connotes a particular community's 
shared understandings, culture, and contacts with the world in general, 
which enable members of the community to engage in various 
common activities, and speaking is also part of this community life. 
When I use the term "form of life" in this chapter, however, I am 
primarily considering the social and cultural aspect of it; especially 
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that part of the form of life which comprises and enables the 
pornographic language-game. 
What appears to raise an issue with regard to the critique of the form 
of life, however, is Wittgenstein's observation that this form of life, 
which enables our language-games, is something that we should leave 
as it is; he claimed: "What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one 
could say - fonns of life" (Wittgenstein, 2001: 192). He also 
repeatedly urged us not to replace the actual language with something 
that we deem more ideal by way of philosophical theorizing: 
"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; 
it can in the end only describe it. / For it cannot give it any foundation 
either. / It leaves everything as it is" (ibid.: 42, #124). Peter Winch, 
who applied the Wittgensteinian approach to social sciences, endorsed 
this comment by Wittgenstein (Winch, 1990: 103). On the face of it, 
these remarks are puzzling, and have some implications for the 
present inquiry and the approach that has been taken; Wittgenstein, 
whose philosophy was also crucial in my investigations, seems to tell 
us here that the current language-games, including pornographic 
language-games, are the only language practices available to us. 
Perhaps one is forgiven for wondering why one is urged to accept the 
existing language-games and forms of life, and why philosophy is said 
to be in no way evaluative or critical. 
We might suppose that, though a Wittgensteinian approach to speech 
may offer a way of understanding meanings, it stops short of offering 
tools for evaluating them. To be sure, Wittgenstein's was simply not a 
political theory, and does not seem to offer much in the way of 
criticism of our existing form of life. By seemingly endorsing a 
particular community's way of life, the philosophy of Wittgenstein or 
Winch at times appears to come close to relativism. ' Ifekman, on the 
other hand, also notes that most theories of the "Background", such as 
225 
that of the later Wittgenstein (to which I add that of communitarians), 
have prima facie a conservative character. For "[i]t assumes that 
meaning rests on something like tradition - the set of meanings 
handed down to us from our forefathers" (Hekman, 1999: 13 1). And 
she points out that Edmund Burke was one of such "Background" 
theorists (ibid.: 131). 
Nonetheless, part of what concerned Wittgenstein has some echoes in 
much of the recent debate in political philosophy, especially, in 
relation to the issue of cultural diversity and cultural critique 
(Scheman, 1996: 384). What Wittgenstein apparently negates is the 
availability of a transcendent standpoint, or an absolute standard 
according to which diverse practices can be universally evaluated. In 
what follows, I will first draw implications for my enquiry from 
Wittgenstein's claim that our form of life is "given", or that 
philosophy leaves everything as it is. There are in fact certain reasons 
why a criticism of our form of life might not be as straightforward as 
it seems, and the critique of pornography and its related norms also 
does not appear to be an exception. Nevertheless, in spite of some 
apparent difficulties, I do hold that certain criticisms are possible, and 
that the initial ferninist objections to pornography remain valid. Even 
accepting the Wittgensteinian premise, there are still means of 
criticizing and revising our existing social practices. In general, what 
is known as the "immanent", or internal, form of social criticism 
appears to be compatible with a Wittgensteinian view of the form of 
life. Within this broadly immanent approach, there are different ways_ 
of assessing and engaging with the form of life, and I will discuss 
these in turn. 
226 
2. The lack of an absolute standard 
In an article entitled, Forms of life: mapping the rough ground, Naomi 
Scheman gets to grips with Wittgenstein's claim that our form of life 
is "the given", and asks why he seems to deprive us of the very 
possibilities of engaging in meaningful social criticism. When he 
asserted that the form of life is "what has to be accepted", she wonders, 
"what is the force of this 'has to'? " (Scheman, 1996: 384). Since I also 
drew on his philosophy to approach the meaning of pornography, I 
will discuss a little what was implied by it and what implications it 
would have for my enquiry. My aim here, however, is not to offer an 
exposition of his thoughts but to consider the questions that might 
arise from this Wittgensteinian approach to the form of life. 
It is perhaps important to mention that, as discussed earlier, in 
Wittgenstein's later works, the concept of a form of life is said to 
indicate the circumstances or setting in which multiple activities and 
language-games take place. But the notion also seems importantly to 
serve as a system or basis of our beliefs, knowledge, and 
2 justifications. What Wittgenstein suggests is that it is only against 
such a shared system or background that conditions of doubt, 
rationality, correctness, and language-games ever become possible 
(O'Connor, 2002: 29-31). He stated: "I did not get my picture of the 
world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because 
I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background 
against which I distinguish between true and false" (Wittgenstein, 
1979: l5e, #94); "All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of 
a hypothesis takes place already within a system. ( ... ) The system is 
not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments 
have their life" (Wittgenstein, 1979: l6e, #105). Thus, the thought is 
that any "confirmation or disconfirmation of a belief always already 
presupposes such a system and is internal to it" (Sluga, 1996: 22, 
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emphasis added). As the concept served as the foundation of our 
beliefs, knowledge, and activities, and it is what makes our language- 
games possible, the form of life was probably claimed by Wittgenstein 
to be "the given" of the world. Although this notion of a shared 
background as bedrock of our beliefs and activities obviously plays a 
crucial part in his later philosophy, his thoughts can also be gleaned 
somewhat from his comments on philosophy and the nature of 
language, which are, I believe, not unrelated with the philosophy of 
the "Background". 
In a passage in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein invokes a 
metaphor of smooth, pristine ice and contrasts it with that of the 
"rough ground" (Wittgenstein, 2001: 40, #107, also mentioned in 
Scheman, 1996: 383). The ice is pure and looks ideal, but it is slippery, 
and therefore we cannot walk; the rugged ground, which has friction, 
is actually the place where we can stand and walk. Here the metaphor 
of "slippery ice" represents the ideal purity of logic, while the "rough 
ground" describes the inexactness and untidiness of ordinary spoken 
language. The contrast is made here to bring up the importance of the 
latter. Earlier, when he wrote Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Wittgenstein seemed to believe that a single, underlying logical 
structure of language was discoverable, but in later periods, he came 
to the view that language actually contained no such single "essence" 
(Sluga, 1996: 9-10,13,16; Grayling, 2001: 78-79). As mentioned in 
earlier chapters, Wittgenstein came to think that language has only its 
multifarious uses, which are fundamentally and intrinsically connected 
with various other human activities (Wittgenstein, 2001: 4e, #7,10C, 
#23; cf. Bloor, 1996). Wittgenstein now claimed that it is a plain 
mistake to seek some "hidden essence" of language; for everything, he 
said, "lies open to view" (ibid.: 37c, #91-92,38e, #97,39e, #101-103, 
40e, #108,43e, #126). The working of language is understood, not by 
searching for some hidden structure underneath,, but by paying 
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attention to its manifold characters, which are given their meaning 
through our actual, everyday use. 
Time and again, Wittgenstein remarks upon the logicians' or 
philosophers' "mistakes". Logic deals with words and propositions 
which are "pure and clear-cut", but actual language often betrays this 
purity of logic. "Conflicts" arise, therefore, when logicians could not 
find this purity, or exactness, in ordinary language (ibid.: 39e, #105, 
40e, #107). But the problem emerges, because logicians are essentially 
misunderstanding the nature of language. As stated, Wittgenstein's 
view is that we understand what language is by studying how it is 
actually used in our everyday settings and not by looking for its 
"hidden" uniformity. What is thus required is to bring words back 
from logical scrutiny to their "original home": "What we do is to bring 
words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (ibid.: 41e, 
#116, emphasis omitted). In other words, to use the metaphors, to 
leave the ideal purity of ice and go back to the rough ground. 
However, from this discovery that neither logical purity nor essential 
structure of language is attainable, Wittgenstein seems to go further 
and suggests that we should in no way attempt to interfere with it. He 
seems to demand that philosophy, especially, should not seek to 
replace it with "some non-spatial and non-temPoral chimera" (ibid.: 
40e, #108). Wittgenstein appears to have certain beliefs about what 
philosophy could and could not achieve, and what approach it should 
take. He seems to argue that mistakes and misconceptions tend to arise 
when philosophers try to transcend the actual, temporal, and imperfect 
("Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday' (ibid.: 
l6e, #38)) and attempt to offer in lieu some uniform and 
universalizable theory, such as, an account of "essence", "property", 
etc. Instead, he argues, philosophy should only "describe'! what is 
already laid open; it should neither "explain" nor "deduce"; it should 
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not advocate a theory; "it simply leaves everything as it is" (ibid.: 40e, 
#109,42e, #124,43e, #126). 
Thus, in important ways Wittgenstein's apparent endorsement of the 
form of life reflects his beliefs about the nature of language, and also 
his view of philosophy. If one understands how language really works 
and admits that there is no single standard against which it is 
measured, one may be inclined to accept it as well as the form of life, 
which makes speech activity possible in the first place. It is our 
practices, shared activity, and agreements that give meaning to what 
we say and do ("it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (Wittgenstein, 1979: 
28e, #204)). Moreover, Wittgenstein seems to have believed that 
philosophy is bound to make "mistakes" when it seeks to go beyond 
actual human practices and attempts to evaluate them against such a 
standpoint. Scheman notes that there is some element in 
Wittgenstein's later thought that indicates his "[distrust] of the 
employment of practice-transcendent reason ... in the attempt to shape 
changes in forms of life" (Schernan, 1996: 385). 
One thing that Wittgenstein seems to deny is the availability of some 
absolute criteria, which would be obtainable through pure 
philosophical reflection, and which could transcend the actuality of a 
particular human society. What he suggests also has some echoes in 
many of the movements which are sceptical or critical of any 
theorizing which aims to claim a universalist or objectivist grounding. 
As Scheman points out, this issue thus has wider repercussions (ibid.: 
384). In the practical course of life, as well as in theory, it is exactly 
an issue to know how to engage in reasoned criticism against some 
existing social practices of our own, or those of others, which we 
believe to be unjust. Critique is not easy, especially when, such 
practices are intricately. bound: up -with, deeply held traditions and 
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culture. Thus, the question is, if it is not from some "transcendent" 
viewpoint, how we could obtain some reasonable, justified ground 
from which we can judge various social practices. Could one say that 
Wittgenstein was simply wrong on this point; that we could rightly 
employ our reason; that there are some objective, legitimate 
standpoints from which we can rationally and fairly evaluate existing 
cultural practices? Or are our judgements inevitably "partial", in 
which case they are bound to lose their legitimate force? (ibid.: 384) 
With respect to the critique of the pornographic language-game, there 
may be a certain point in acknowledging that an objectivist or 
somehow "privileged" standpoint cannot be invoked to assess the 
social norms and values that underlie pornography. The difficulty is 
how we can judge neutrally some of those norms and practices. 
Consider, for example, the cultural norm which tends to sexualise 
women's nature and identity. Women are often identified with their 
sexual bodies and sexuality, and characterized as essentially sexual 
beings. Although I have suggested that such a norm perhaps should be 
challenged, it might be contended that this is not possible, insofar as 
there is no way of speaking of the correct or incorrect identity of 
woman; we could not say that the sexualised identity is wrong, 
because there is no way of determining it. The objection is therefore 
that my argument presupposes a wrong move; a move which assumes 
that there is somehow such a thing as true or false female identity, 
against which the present practices can be evaluated. 
It might be thought that the sexualised existence of women has been 
entirely constructed out of a male point of view, and has been imposed 
on women, and that those women who are unaware of this are having 
false consciousness. However, there is a difference between saying 
that the current practice largely reflects a male standpoint and serves 
male interests, and saying that this view is definitely "false'. It is not 
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certain how to demonstrate the second point. Indeed, there may be no 
such thing as true or false femininity, or no "essence" of woman, and 
here Wittgenstein may concur with this point. Butler has made an 
analogous claim in respect of the meaning of a woman's utterance, 
which has been the issue of the last two chapters. She argues that we 
cannot determine a single meaning for every utterance; at the very 
least, no one would be in a privileged "position to 'assign' the same 
utterances the same meanings" once ind for all (Butler, 1997: 87). 
If there is no such thing as a single essence of woman, it may be 
argued, the gendered identity of women and its expression just depend 
on the form of life. As a child is initiated into a particular language, 
she also "inherits" the world-view of that particular community, which 
would normally encompass ideas about the nature and roles of the 
sexes. Could it be argued that there is no truth or falsity of gender 
norms but there are only their cultural variants, interwoven with the 
world-views of each community? And thus the norm which sexualises 
women's identity is rather like the kind of community norms which 
people understand as just " 'the way we happen to do things around 
here' " (Waldron, 1989: 576). Such norms are often mundane and 
mostly relatively trivial, but very familiar and usually escape our 
attention. As Jeremy Waldron stated: 
[t]he norms for beginning and ending letters.... We begin with 
'Dear John' rather than 'John: ' and sign off with 'Yours 
sincerely' rather than 'Good-bye for now. ' Other societies do 
these things in different styles and it is not a difference that we 
take particularly seriously.... The norms of letter writing serve- 
their purpose even though those whose behavior they govem 
have thoroughly internalized the point that they are simply 
matters of convention. So we are in a position to think it 
perfectly appropriate for members of some other community to 
end their letters with exclamations like 'Allah'be praisedl"or 
conventional optatives like 'May your loins be fruitfull', even 
though we would never do the same (ibid.: 576). 
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The question is whether or not some social norms are almost 
analogous to such a "convention". Conventions and customs are not 
uniform across cultures, but equally deemed acceptable in their own 
social settings. Tbus, some cultures tend to associate women and sex, 
though others do not, and that is the way people "happen to do" things 
in their respective societies, which are equally regarded as 
ccappropriate,, or at least as quite "normal" in their own settings. One 
might say that there are simply different attitudes and perspectives 
when it comes to the idea of what woman is. A similar thing may be 
said about people's attitudes about sexual practices. 
I would like to argue that certain norms and practices are nonetheless 
troublesome. However, what Wittgenstein seems to suggest, and 
others say more explicitly, is that a transcendent or absolute 
standpoint from which we can universally judge existing social 
practices could not be found. It certainly appears to be the case that an 
argument from metaphysics, for example, would not help to resolve 
the question of gender norm that we are discussing; it does not look 
optimal to point to some real identity of woman and argue that some 
practices contradict this reality. In some respects, the postmodernists' 
view comes close to Wittgenstein's view of the form of life. Richard 
Rorty's view, for instance, is said to indicate that "the attempt to 
question and challenge the values and norms of one's own culture or 
that of any other in terms that transcend their self-understanding is 
illusory" (Benhabib, 1995: 242). Rorty in fact urges feminists to give 
up the thought of ever finding such a "neutral court of appeal" in order_ 
to seek changes in the present way of life: 
[D]o not charge a current social practice or a currently spoken 
language with being unfaithful to reality, with getting things 
wrong. Do notIcriticize it as a result of ideology of prejudice, 
where these are tacitly contrasted with your own employment of a 
truth-tracking faculty called 'reason, or a neutral method called 
'disinterested observation'. Do not even criticize it as 'unjust' if 
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Aunjust' is supposed to mean more than 'sometimes incoherent 
even in its own terms'. ( ... ) Drop the appeal to neutral criteria, and 
the claim that something large like Nature or Reason or History or 
the Moral Law is on the side of the oppressed (Rorty, 1991: 7). 
What feminists could do, he adds, is just to "make invidious 
comparisons between the actual present and a possible, if inchoate, 
future" (ibid.: 7). 
The difference between Wittgenstein and postmodemists like Rorty 
lies in what they seem to say or said about the present language-games 
or form of life. Whereas Wittgenstein claimed that our form of life 
had to be accepted, 3 postmodernists do not appear to be committed to 
such a view; in fact, for them nothing is sacred or stable. Sabina 
Lovibond discusses postmodernists' (i. e., Rorty's and Lyotard's) 
distrust, and dismissal of, any notions of "universality", "consensus", 
or "unity" of human reason and practice. Since human history would 
contain no such convergence, postmodernists would say, current 
language-games are perfectly replaceable with some new games. It 
only means that "the replacement of one 'game' by another [cannot] 
be evaluated according to any absolute standard" (Lovibond, 1987: 7). 
Rorty believes that anyone, whoever it is, could initiate changes in the 
existing practices or carve up a space within society, in order that 
more previously neglected voices would be heard. But this entails 
"struggle" among differing views to seek prominence over one 
another (Rorty, 1991: 4). From this point of view, any language-game 
or form of life becomes just as "contingent" as the one before 
(Lovibond, 1987: 7). There is no way of assessing which form of life - 
is fundamentally just or inherently better; only the "struggles" could 
prolong the life of one over another. 
Yet, to summarize the main issue: the implication, of Wittgenstcin's 
philosophy points towards a view that we lack some absolute criteria 
which would transcend the limit of a particular human culture and 
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according to which we can judge the existing social norms and 
practices. I will argue, however, that this need not mean that criticism 
of present practices is never possible. In fact, a criticism of the present 
form of life appears to be possible, even without appealing to an 
absolute standard. In the following sections I will try to explain how 
this might be done. 
3. "Immanent criticism" 
One of Wittgenstein's claims about philosophy appeared to be that it 
should not seek to go beyond actual human practices; that it should 
not seek "some non-spatial and non-temporal chimera" (Wittgenstcin, 
2001: 40e, #108). However, to say that context-transcendent critique 
is not available is not to say that critique is no longer viable. Scheman 
insists that it is a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein's philosophy as 
actually foreclosing the opportunities of our social and cultural 
criticisms. She argues that such a mistaken view holds that 
Wittgenstein is leaving us only two alternatives; that is, we are left 
with either accepting the present ways of life or changing them by 
means of following some " 'super-idealized guidance' ", such as 
"objectivist epistemologies and realist metaphysics" (Scheman, 1996: 
386,403). She believes that we can "reject" such a choice. Our form 
of life is "immanently and empirically revisable" (ibid.: 386); we can 
initiate changes "by attending to those aspects of our practices that are 
critical and transformative" (ibid.: 403). What we ought to do when 
we initiate changes is "calling not for a repudiation of human practice 
in favor of something independent of it, but for a change in that 
practice, a change that begins with a politically conscious placing of 
ourselves within, but somewhere on the margins of, a form of life", 
(ibid.: 387). In other words, the resourccs for criticism and change can 
be and should be sought from the existing culture and traditions. ', 
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What Scheman suggests here, and what is compatible with 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, is so-called "immanent" form of social 
criticism, and it has also been advocated by Michael Walzer (Walzer, 
1987). To defend this immanent method of critique, Walzer firstly 
argues that moral philosophy in general is best pursued in an 
"interpretive" mode. It means that moral claims have a stronger force 
when they are based on, or are an account of, already existing morality. 
Although philosophical approaches have involved "discovery or 
"invention" of moral principles, Walzer argues that these are 
ultimately unnecessary, for we usually already have rich resources 
within the existing moral traditions. Furthermore, he argues that what 
is likely to happen when we engage in critical reflections is to give an 
interpretation of existing morality. He believes that moral reflections 
can only begin within, and ultimately should always proceed from, 
such existing morality, because this "moral world" we inhabit 
"provides us with everything we need to live a moral life, including 
the capacity for reflection and criticism" (ibid.: 21). 
Walzer explains that social criticisms can be carried out in the same 
manner. The best social critic is the one who finds resources within 
the existing local values, and connects her arguments with those 
locally held values. The appeal of this form of criticism - at least to 
the other members of the same society - is intuitively clear, because 
its validity derives from the already shared values and norms. The 
criticism becomes persuasive, as it invokes the local language, the 
local moral vocabulary, which are immediately intelligible to the rest 
of the members of society. Walzer gives as an example an account 
from John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration. He claims that the 
ultimate appeal of Locke's argument on the toleration of religions to 
his contemporaries was his use of the idea which these people already 
shared; namely, that of " 'salvation by faith alone' " (ibid.: 54). Locke 
argued that people cannot be forced to be saved by a religion which 
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they "distrust"; it is only faith, or "the inward persuasion of the mind", 
that could achieve "the salvation of men's souls" (Locke, 1990: 41, 
20). Walzer suggests that this is the kind of thing that an ideal social 
critic would do: advancing a new moral argument by means of 
interpreting (or reinterpreting) an already shared moral discourse. 
In our time, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi might 
be the best example of such a social critique. When the dictatorial 
military regime of Burma crushed the popular movement for 
democracy and dismissed the ideas of "democracy" and "human 
rights" as purely Western concepts, Suu Kyi pointed out that these 
were not unknown in the indigenous culture; she argued that the 
traditional Buddhist teachings, which are the moral fibre of the 
Burmese culture, also encompass the idea of legitimacy of the ruler 
(the king) based on popular consent and of the ruler's duty to be 
subject to the "will of the people" (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1995: 167-173). 
Suu Kyi also argued that the idea of equal moral worth of each human 
being is already inherent in the teachings of Buddhism: 
"Buddhism ... places the greatest value on man, who alone of all 
beings can achieve the supreme state of Buddhahood. Each man has in 
him the potential to realize the truth through his own will and 
endeavour and to help others to realize it. Human life is therefore 
infinitely precious" (ibid.: 174). Suu Kyi thus defended the ideas of 
democracy and human rights for the Burmese, saying that these were 
not at all foreign to local values. Similar ideas in fact already existed 
in the traditional values of Burma. 
Thus, the best social critic - like Locke and Suu Kyi here - is said to 
connect his or her claims with the already shared morality of the 
community. As the criticism calls upon the community's own 
assumptions, it is said to be "immanent". 
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Although it has a certain appeal, a worry about immanent criticism 
was sometimes whether or not it could truly call for a radical social 
reform. If you are "inside", and if you already have certain particular 
relations and attachments with other members of society, could you 
really objectively distance yourself from these attachments? As it is 
sometimes assumed that ideal social critics are rather "detached" and 
"disinterested" observers, devoid of any partiality, internal critics 
appear to lack this crucial quality of "critical distance" (Walzer, 1987: 
35-36). 
Nevertheless, Walzer argues that the kind of distance at stake here is 
not the detachment from the society at large but rather the distance 
"from certain sorts of power relationships within society" (ibid.: 60). 
What critics need to detach themselves from is "not connection [as 
such] but authority and domination" (ibid.: 60). The best social critic 
is thus someone who is in the society yet outside of its dominant 
power structure. "Marginality" of critics is hence "one way of 
establishing (or experiencing) this critical distance" (ibid.: 60). Those 
placed at the margins of society are probably the best critics, because 
they are outside of the mainstream positions and the dominant 
paradigm of thought. Because of this status, they see and experience 
what those in the mainstream may not see and experience, and as such 
could bring truly keen and critical insights. Their views are valuable to 
unsettle received ways of life. Thus, internal criticism is most likely to 
arise from the margins of society, where experience is different and 
vested interest in the status quo is absent. 
The importance of marginality of critics was also pointed out by 
Scheman (Scheman, 1996: 387,389-390). The existence of 
marginality demonstrates the sometimes neglected fact that a culture 
is never truly homogeneous; that on the margins of a seemingly 
consensual social life, there may be those who do not fit this 
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prevailing norm. As she also discusses, the frequent invocation of 
"we", such as in the remark I cited earlier - "that is the way we 
happen to do things around here" - may exaggerate the extent to 
which such norms are actually accepted by the members of society. 
But Scheman particularly stresses the role of a position that might be 
termed "privileged marginality" (ibid.: 390). The phrase is indeed a 
curious juxtaposition of opposites; normally, the privileged are those 
situated at the "centre" of a power structure of society while the 
marginals are those at the "periphery" of that structure. According to 
Scheman, the combination of these two means, importantly, that the 
location of marginality itself is a privilege (because they can obtain 
critical views against the dominant standpoint). But it also means that 
there are those in society who are both "privileged" enough to have 
their voice heard by the rest of society and yet "marginal" in the sense 
that their social positions are not quite within the power structure. 
Academics and philosophers, especially, in her view, are said to have 
such privileged marginality. 
Scheman's suggestion is interesting, although, closely examined, the 
notions of privilege, power, and marginality involve not so much 
static but rather shifting positions, reflecting different dimensions of 
power relations in society. Academics, in Scheman's view, are said to 
be generally outside of the power apparatus of society, but they 
possess a certain privilege of belonging to the professional class, as 
well as of commanding intellectual authority. As a shifting notion, 
however, the question of marginality may be potentially complicated, 
as when we try to determine which social groups are truly, in the 
position of the marginal to claim the status of the privileged critic. 
Nonetheless, the idea is a hopeful one, and can also be applied to the 
present issue. A criticism can begin from inside a culture, from the 
margins of it, and some critics are even ideally situated for it. It may 
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be that feminist academics are such privileged marginals. As women, 
feminist scholars may be outside of the influential structure of society, 
and as those who study feminism, they possess marginality in that 
they are often distanced from, or critical of, the dominant paradigm of 
thought. However, qua scholars, they nonetheless have the privilege of 
access to the resources of knowledge and also have the capacity and 
opportunity to disseminate their critical views. Their status also 
commands a certain respectability in society. If some initiatives are to 
start to bring about a change in the existing status of women in the 
culture, they are also the ones who could initiate such a task. 4 
Nevertheless, if their criticism is to win wider support, it should 
appeal to already existing local values and norms. What critics should 
do, according to Walzer, is to interpret and elaborate on those already 
shared norms and morality, and give an account of them in a way that 
shows the connection between these morals and critics' own 
contentions. What, then, could one say about pornography and the 
form of life according to this immanent form of criticism? Walzer 
claims that the existing morality "provides us with everything we need 
to live a moral life" (Walzer, 1987: 21); that "[e]very human society 
provides for its members ... standards of virtuous character, worthy 
performance, just social arrangements. ( ... ) [T]hey are embodied in 
many different forms; legal and religious texts, moral tales, epic 
poems, codes of behavior, ritual practices, etc. " (ibid.: 47-48). 
It may be that valuable resources to oppose pornographic culture are 
found in other stories and narratives coexisting in the form of life. 5 
Novels are often good illustrative examples that attest to our already 
shared morality. We would find alternative stories 'of love and sexual 
relationships that artic , uiate different values that are iargely absent in 
the pornographic language-game. We would find, for example, the 
value of a mutually caring and supportive relationship between a man 
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and a woman, and descriptions of sexual relations that are thought to 
be valuable and meaningful, because they reflect and constitute a 
generally loving relationship. Some of the contemporary sexual norms 
separate sex acts from this overall context, and thus appear very much 
"reductive" in their treatment of our sexual life or even look contrary 
to those other values that we hold. Storm Jameson is thus severely 
critical of pornography and contrasts its treatment of sexual relations 
with that in Romeo and Juliet: 
By cutting the sexual act out of the complex web of human 
relationships, to expose it in the form of naYve recital of bodily 
gestures and sensations, its authors make everything much too 
easy for themselves. Nothing, but nothing, is so easy to describe 
as physical postures. What Romeo may have done with the parts 
of his body, or what he said in the act, his creator did not think 
worth recording. Since what he wanted was to give a sense of 
overwhelming erotic delight, its intensity would have been 
lowered and dulled by insisting on attention to the animal 
gestures (Jameson, 1972: 211). 
Nussbaum's objection to Playboy also partly reflects a similar 
reasoning. The magazine's treatment of women, she argues, shows 
that sex is cut off from "any deep connection with self-expression or 
emotion", and the sexual partners are merely seen as pieces of 
"interchangeable commodities" (Nussbaum, 2000: 234). Whereas, if 
we turn to such works as those by D. H. Lawrence, we see the kind of 
sexual relationship that is fully reciprocal and takes place in die 
context of mutual sympathy and concern. Furthermore, sex is regarded 
there not only as the expression of one's love for one's partner but 
also as an important medium for one's own self-expression (ibid.: - 
230-231; see also Section 5). Jameson and Nussbaum in fact hold that 
norms reflected in pornography disregard human values and emotion, 
which they think ought to be the universal standards. However, the 
point here is that such values are already represented in locally 
existing narratives; here we see different attitudes towards sexual 
relations. These stories suggest that it is also part of the community's 
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world-view that sex is embedded in a deeply emotional human affair; 
it reflects one's fundamental regard for one's partner and can also be a 
significant expression of oneself. Tbus, when some sex norms and 
pornography appear essentially to contradict such values, there are 
grounds for criticism. 
It is not entirely clear, however, how customary values might be 
employed to challenge norms of gender as such. Such values are often 
known to be complicit with, rather than transformative of, the existing 
social roles of the sexes. As discussed in the chapter on silencing, 
traditional gender stereotypes are also reflected in pornography. As I 
argue in the next section, a critique of gender norms may in the end 
have to be more explicitly a political one. However, one way of 
resisting the prevailing image of sexualised female identity, for 
example, is to provide alternative descriptions of it. It could be done 
partly, by stressing various roles that women already play in diverse 
spheres of society, and a variety of skills, talent, and qualities that they 
manifest in respective fields. There are professional women, career 
business women, and women athletes, to name a few, and women's 
identity can be, empirically speaking, multiple and various. 
Immanent social criticism thus does not invoke anything like an 
objective, universal truth that transcends a particular human culture. It 
rather finds resources for a critique from within the culture, by means 
of reinterpreting the already existing shared morality, values, nonns, 
and practices. The worry sometimes expressed about this interpretive 
method of social criticism is, however, that we cannot always tell" 
"bad" interpretations from "good" ones, and that there is in the end no 
way of telling which is the best account of our morality. Walzer 
acknowledges such an objection and agrees that there is indeed "no 
definitive way of ending - [our] disagreement" about better 
interpretations (Walzer, 1987: 28)., In such a case, we would simply 
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need to continue our arguments. But whether our arguments are 
immanent or not, their acceptance is not always guaranteed, and the 
chances of that acceptance seem higher if the ideas and beliefs are not 
so foreign. 
As far as the norm of gender is concerned, however, the problem may 
arise in another dimension. People's ideas about women's nature are 
often formed not through particular theoretical reflections but through 
looking at the already existing relationship between the sexes, and 
also through prevailing images, art, and stories circulating in society. 
The current stories and narratives are, however, often filled with 
stereotypical images of women, which seem to pose an obstacle to a 
redescription of women's identity. One can only hope for incremental 
change in people's attitudes and perceptions through constant offering 
of alternative accounts. 
Overall, however, the interpretive or immanent method of social 
criticism seems to best accord with Wittgenstem's philosophical 
approach. All approbation or disapprobation of practices is internal, 
and no transcendent guidance is called for. "rhe problems are solved, 
not by reporting new experience, but by arranging what we have 
always known" (Wittgenstein, 2001: 40, # 109). 
4. Political criticism 
Scheman argued that our social practices are "immanently revisable", 
by "calling ... for a change that 
begins with a politically conscious 
placing of ourselves within, but somewhere on the margins of, a forin 
of life" (Scheman, 1996: 387, emphasis added). This suggests that an 
inunanent form of social criticism can have a political character. It 
seems that, for feminists, who are concerned with pornography, thcrc 
is another way of problematizing the existing form of life. They can 
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also engage in a "politically conscious" form of critique; they could 
argue that pornography and some norms which it reflects are 
"oppressive"; that these social norms conflict with women's equality 
and liberty. 
After all, the liberal society is expressly committed to equality and 
liberty of all citizens; these are also the values that the society holds. 
In fact, these are some of the supreme values that the members of the 
society share. Feminists could invoke these values and argue that 
some social norms, or some interpretations of women are problematic, 
because they are not conducive to women's equality and liberty. 
As we know, however, this is the central feminist argument against 
pornography, and this is why I stated that the feminists' objection to 
pornography would still hold in the light of the suggestion that there is 
no transcendent or absolute ground for a critique. By appealing to our 
already expressed commitment to democratic values, the criticism 
becomes not only immanent but a more overtly political one. 
Pornography and the related gender norms therefore still remain 
problematic in this regard. I want to explain this point a little further. 
Gender norms and subordination of women 
I have argued that pornography reflects the cultural norm which 
associates women with sexuality. I have, however, also acknowledged 
that such a norm may not be dismissed outright as wrong, because 
there are no ways of telling the correct or incorrect identity of woman. 
Some may argue that we simply have different views on this issue. I 
have also said that people's ideas about female identity are often 
formed not in the way of theoretical understandings but in the way of 
much less rigorous understandings. Such ideas tend to be influenced 
by what they commonly see and read in images, stories, art, and daily 
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practice; i. e., what Taylor called "social imaginaries". If one were to 
oppose the pornographic descriptions of women, according to the 
previous argument, one would invoke the existing morality, which 
would disapprove of the fundamental separation of sex from our other 
cherished values and emotions. Or, another way to cope with 
characteristic images of women is to offer alternative interpretations 
of women's identity, by pointing out various other nonsexual roles 
women already play in society. Nevertheless, the difficulty here seems 
to be that we do not have a means of telling which interpretation of 
women is, in the end, better or worse; and hence whether a change in 
the prevailing imagery is ultimately better or worse for women. From 
an earlier discussion, an immanent critique seems to suggest only that 
"there are different ways of seeing" women in the community. 
Feminists, however, often found problematic the range of typecast 
feminine models offered in conventional narratives. The female 
characters that often appear in our social imaginaries do not suggest 
innovative roles. When women play a positive role, they are more or 
less tied to conservative positions which they have been assigned to, 
such as the role of good mother, wife, or daughter. Lovibond also 
noted that in our everyday life we are often led to "interpret ourselves 
and our neighbours in terms of a rather more topical range of 'imputcd 
characters' "(Lovibond: 1987: 23), 6 and a list of such quotidian 
"imputations" does not look so inspiring in terms of offering 
alternative accounts of women's identity or empowering womcn's 
situation. 
The point is that conventional norms about women often militate 
against women's achieving substantive equality with men. Historically 
speaking, the prevailing ideas about women's nature or identity often 
contributed to the marginalization of women in society (e. g., such 
ideas as that women have a weak moral capacity; see Morgan, 1987). 
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In many parts of the world cultural traditions still bind women in 
different ways and assign them to predetermined social roles. 7 
What may be called for therefore, in addition to, or perhaps more than, 
just pointing at alternative interpretations of female identity, is to call 
into question directly some of the customary ideas about women's 
nature or identity; that is, to call them into question, because we do 
not think that the following of these norms is favourable in terms of 
protecting and improving women's status in society. Lovibond 
suggests that such censuring and challenging of conventional 
assumptions is ultimately crucial if we are to alter the persisting 
inequality between men and women. If we want to rectify the existing 
gender inequality, she suggests, then it would entail "a thorough-going 
revision of the range of social scripts, narrative archetypes, ways of 
life, ways of earning a living, etc. available to individual women and 
men" (ibid.: 22). 8 
The argument about pornography in fact made the case that 
pornography and the gender norm which it reflects can indeed conflict 
with women's equality and liberty. This is the reason why these 
practices are objected to. It is not argued, however, that these norms 
thus always adversely affect women's status, liberty, or power; nor is 
it claimed here that they are the only cause for women's having these 
disadvantages; it is argued that they seem to importantly contribute to 
such social and political disadvantages. 
Some f6minists in fact point to "culture" in general as the key factor in 
explaining women's inequality. Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey 
argue that the "explanation of women's subordination and the 
experience of fernininity cannot be reduced to biology, economics, 
psychic drives or irrationality, but is institutional ised in values, 
practices, and discourses" (Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 107). 71ey 
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criticize liberal theorists" tendency to focus on "traditional, concrete 
political institutions", and not to pay sufficient attention to "less 
tangible factors", such as "discourses and traditions" (ibid.: 1993: 54). 
People's mundane and unquestioning following of cultural values, 
norms and discourse reinforce the stereotyped nature, function, and 
role for women, perpetuate the existing gender division and hierarchy, 
and thus can become the cause of oppression (cf. Young, 1991b: 41). 
Pornography and the norm of sexualisation of women are also such 
cultural norms that bring about similar consequences. Some may 
question whether "culture" really is the crucial factor in producing 
women's subordinate status, and whether other reasons, such as legal 
and economic circumstances, might not be more relevant. However, 
although there are perhaps complex causes that could explain 
women's subordination, it seems undeniable that "culture", which 
vitally affects and guides people's everyday attitudes and behaviour, 
must be an important factor that underlies the structure of social 
organization and relations. 
The point is therefore that cultural norms can be a cause of 
subordination of women, and it appears to be the case too with 
pornography and the gender norm which it reflects. The critique thus 
becomes a more explicitly political one in the sense that it brings to 
our attention the political significance of existing cultural norms and 
practices. This political critique of the form of life is still compatible 
with an immanent critique, in the sense that it appeals to our 
commitment to the principles of liberty and equality; i. e., the values 
presupposed in liberal democratic society. The existing form of life is 
criticized, because it is not favourable to promoting women's liberty 
and equality. 
There is, however, also the issue of how to achieve the transfonnation 
of the form of life. If norms are pervasive, it may not be cffcctive to 
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attempt to select and regulate certain speech and conduct. Although a 
case for regulating pornography may still be made, in practice, to 
determine what exactly counts as pornography could prove to be 
difficult. This seems to suggest the importance of polificisation of the 
norms, critical dialogue among the public, to unsettle the taken-for- 
granted pattern of following the norms. What is needed is to educate 
the public about the implication of some social practice and to aim for 
changes in the habits of thought, everyday attitudes and behaviour, 
concerning gender norms and relations. People's unquestioning 
following of norms would need to be called into question to initiate a 
change in the form of life. 9 
Sometimes the non-interventionist approach is defended on the 
grounds of a distinction between the realm of essentially private 
conduct and that of public and political matters. Matters pertaining to 
sex and the sexual, and such cultural norms as gender norms, may be 
thought to belong to the private realm according to this distinction. 
But the separation of personal and political is sometimes misleading, 
and no legal intervention, of course, does not have to preclude public 
discussion at all. Furthermore, a clear demarcation between the 
personal and the public political realm may not be maintained, 
especially when cultural norms and habits have political implications. 
We may not recommend our objection to existing norms as law; 
however, in order for people's awareness to be raised and perceptions 
to be changed with regard to the implication of pomography and 
related norms, these need to be much in the public discussion and 
have to be politicised. The aim, then, first, is to raise awareness in 
order that it will lead to changes in perceptions and attitudes. 
I started this section discussing a certain difficulty with an approach 
which only points to an alternative interpretation of women's identity 
to challenge the prevailing norm of femininity; from this approach, we 
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could not say confidently which interpretations are ultimately better or 
worse. However, this is not the only critique possible under the 
immanent method; I have argued that pornography and the gender 
norm which it reflects are problematic, because they tend to contribute 
to women's social and political disadvantages. Hence, a change in 
these norms, a change in the form of life is better in terms of 
empowering women's status and promoting their interests. 
5. Social norms and women's dignity 
I have thus attempted to show that the immanent form of social 
criticism is still available, even if we broadly accept the 
Wittgensteinian view of the form of life. Feminists can still assess and 
question pornography and the related norms, by invoking other norms 
and values, which are also present and shared, including the 
democratic values of liberal society. 
In criticizing the existing cultural practices, some explicitly part with 
the Wittgensteinian standpoint, arguing that there are universal 
standards of right and wrong, against which the existing practices can 
be duly evaluated. Nussbaum takes such a view. In her recent books 
on the issues of culture and sexual justice, Nussbaum clearly argued 
for the rightness of appealing to the universal, "humanist" values in 
assessing social norms and institutions (Nussbaum, 1995a, 2000). 
Nussbaum's philosophical position certainly appears to be at odds 
with the Wittgensteinian one, which denies the availability of values 
which would transcend the existing practices. Nonetheless, the moral 
values which Nussbaum invokes in her arguments do not appear to be 
"alien" to liberal society; in fact, they are also part of the moral 
language that people in liberal society often invoke, either implicitly 
or explicitly. Her view, therefore, would seem to offer another way of 
examining the existing form of life, which, as far as the present issue 
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is concerned, is still compatible with an immanent critique. I would 
thus like to turn to Nussbaum's arguments briefly, before I conclude 
this chapter. 
Nussbaum argues that all human beings have dignity, which deserves 
respect from other members of society and institutions. This dignity of 
human beings entails "an idea of equal worth" of each person, 
regardless of sex, race, and class, etc.; i. e., regardless of any innate or 
contingent characteristics of the person. Human dignity is accordingly 
held equally by all persons, "just in virtue of being human". This idea 
of the equal worth of human beings is also said to be strongly 
connected with "an idea of liberty"; for to respect the equal worth of 
individual humans is also to respect their capacity to shape and direct 
their lives according to their own values and wishes (Nussbaum, 2000.: 
5). 
She thinks that the dignity of human beings is therefore a central 
moral value that needs to be protected anywhere in the world. The 
importance of human dignity is also expressed in her concept of 
essential "human capabilities" or "human functions" -a concept 
which she believes can serve as a critical standard against which the 
existing social institutions and norms can be evaluated. There are, she 
argues, certain vital human activities or functions, which "are likely to 
have a special importance for everything else [humans] choose and 
do" (ibid.: 40). To protect human dignity, in a fundamental sense, 
consists in the preservation of these important human capabilities of 
all citizens. 
Nussbaum has devised a long list of such essential human capabilities 
("being able to have a good health"; "being able to be secure against 
violent assault, " etc.; (see ibid.: 41; also Nussbaum, *1995a)), but one 
of them is explicitly linked to the idea of the dignity of each human 
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being itself. One of the central human capabilities is that every 
member of society is able to "[have] the social bases of self-respect 
and nonhumiliation; ... be treated as a dignified human 
being whose 
worth is equal to that of others... " (ibid.: 41). 
The centrality of human dignity is also reflected in her criticism of 
sexual objectification, especially pornography, in American society 
(Nussbaum, 1995b; Nussbaum, 2000). She argues that, although 
pornography, such as Playboy, claims to celebrate women's beauty 
and sexuality, taken as a whole, what it does is in fact the denial of the 
regard for the dignity of women. Playboy treats women fundamentally 
as an object of male sexual use; the message the magazine relates to 
the reader is, "Whatever else this woman is and does, for us she is an 
object for sexual enjoyment" (Nussbaum, 2000: 234). Women, 
whoever they are and whatever class they belong to, all essentially 
turn into "cunts" before male prowess. In Playboy, women - whether 
they are tennis players or Ivy League students - all come to play the 
same function. They also become pieces of "interchangeable 
commodities ... very like cars, or suits, namely, expensive possessions 
that mark one's status in the world of men" (ibid.: 234). Thus 
pornographic objectification involves the commodification, fungibility, 
ownership, and, of course, fundamental instrumentalization of women 
(ibid.: 234-235). 
Nussbaum's criticism of pornography in fact resonates with that made 
by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin (see also Garry, 1978). Although 
the radical feminists do not explicitly invoke the language of the 
dignity of persons, the idea is very much implicit in their critique; 
fundamentally, for these feminists, pornography is objectionable, 
because it entails the dehumanisation of women: the denial of 
women's dignity and autonomy; women who are made to exist not as 
ends in themselves but merely as instruments or "things" that gratify 
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male sexual needs. It is not difficult to find some. passages in 
MacKinnon's and Dworkin's writings which indicate this thought. 
MacKinnon says, for example, women are "beings that exist for men" 
(MacKinnon, 1983: 531) (indicating instrumentality); they are defined 
by pornography as "to be acted upon" (MacKinnon, 1987: 130) 
(indicating a passive object). MacKinnon and Dworkin's civil rights 
ordinance against pornography partly defined it as that which 
"[dehumanize women] as sexual objects or things for use"; 
pornography, in their view, is something that treats women "less than 
human, on the basis of sex" (MacKinnon, 1996: 22-23). 
The value of dignity of each human being is indeed the value that 
liberal society is already strongly committed to. It may be argued that 
one reason why the social norms are currently not so propitious to 
women's interests and become a cause of oppression is that they are 
often expressed in a way that disregards this basic requirement of 
respect for the worth of women. Stereotypical characterization and 
"use" of women's sexuality not only in pornography but also in some 
corporate advertisements (e. g., motor shows) are a testimony that 
women in our society can still be "less than fully human"; they can be 
an instrument, a sexualised object for use by another. 
If the contention of the opponents of pornography is mainly that it 
"destroys something of value" in society (Mendus, 1985: 111), then 
pornography and similar social norms do commonly denigrate 
"something of value". The moral value, which may be invoked to 
criticize the form of life, therefore could also be women's dignity as 
human beings; this is also a cherished idea of liberal society. Some 
social norms are deemed to be incompatible with our commitment to 
respect each one's dignity - one may say of this idea that to respect a 
person's dignity is not to treat her as one's subordinate, an inferior 
human being; to treat her as a morally autonomous human being with 
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her own reason and emotions; and not to regard her as something to be 
possessed, sexually dominated, and brutalized. Furthermore, to accord 
her respect is not to belittle her moral status, by debasing her character, 
by equating her body with impurity, or her sexuality with immorality. 
Fundamentally, to respect her humanity means to give her 
symmetrical regard and concern. 
Although Nussbaum advanced the idea of human dignity as a 
universal humanist value to be protected, this is also a value not 
foreign to liberal society. Feminists, hence, could also appeal to this 
idea of dignity and argue that some existing social norms are 
problematic, because they undermine women's dignity. 
6. Conclusion: Critique and transformation of the Background 
I have thus argued that a critique of the form of life is still possible, 
even if one follows a Wittgensteinian perspective. The form of life of 
liberal society contains those values which could be invoked to call 
into question the pornographic language-game. Our form of life is not 
monolithic; it includes diverse views and positions, and these are the 
resources that could be deployed to question existing practices. Thus, 
a critique and changes in the form of life, as Scheman noted, could 
commence from somewhere within the form of life. 
This, however, raises a question as to what extent our form of life is 
indeed "given". At one point, Wittgenstein remarked that our 
"language-game does change with time" (Wittgenstein, 1979: 34e, 
#256; cf, Winch, 1990: 15). Hekman suggests that Wittgenstein's 
philosophy in fact involves a very complex notion of changes in the 
form of life. This appears in the context where he evokes the metaphor 
of the water running through a river and the "riverbed". The riverbed 
here seems to imply the bedrock of our beliefs, our world-views 
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(Wittgenstein in fact calls world-views "mythology" here). 
Wittgenstein suggests how changes in our individual beliefs might 
occur, and how these changes might slowly but eventually alter the 
bedrock (the riverbed) itself- 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as 
channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened 
but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid 
propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river- 
bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the 
movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed 
itself, though there is not a sharp division of the one from the 
other (Wittgenstein, 1979: l5e, #96-97). 
What Wittgenstein calls "empirical propositions" express our beliefs 
and ideas which can be assessed as "true or false" (O'Connor, 2002: 
32-33; Mulhall and Swift, 1996: 268). Some of these are "fluid" and 
can be doubted, but others may function as the ground against which 
other propositions could be assessed. But these relations could alter 
"with time". The riverbed, itself, finally, seems to change its path 
slowly. Wittgenstein here in fact suggests that our form of life does 
transform itself over a long period. Hekman argues that this shifting- 
riverbed metaphor by Wittgenstein would offer a valuable insight to 
feminists, who wish for changes in the current practices: 
The riverbed ... shifts not overnight but over time. It changes 
course eventually because the water flows through an adjacent 
section of the riverbed, a section connected by rock and sand ta 
the main riverbed. Change is thus effected by connection, not 
radical relocation. I interpret this to mean that social and 
linguistic change is a function of the redeployment and 
redefinition of words and practices that already exist in social 
life. Social reformers take linguistic tools that are already at their 
disposal and reemploy them in new areas; they take the familiar 
and turn it to unfamiliar purposes. The result is new 
social/linguistic practices (Hekman, 1999: 130-13 1). 
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Transformation in the form of life therefore proceeds gradually. The 
change can begin by our politicising and questioning the background 
habits and assumptions, and by refusing to conform to accepted norms. 
Individual women may then "redefine" the norms of femininity. As 
Hekman argues, the changes would not entail a sudden overthrow of 
the form of life, but would involve, first of all, people's conscious 
engagement with it. 
Notes 
1 Hans Sluga, however, argues that Wittgenstein's is not "careless 
relativism7' but "a form of naturalism", (Sluga, 1996: 22), by which he is 
said to mean that the world constrains the nature of language-games that can 
be played. 
2 This theme is mostly taken up in On Certainty, where Wittgenstein uses the 
term "world-picture" to describe a shared background of beliefs or 
knowledge (e. g., Wittgenstein, 1974: 15, #94). Kober points out the 
resemblances between the notion of a "form of life" and that of a "world- 
picture" (Kober, 1996: 418-419). 
3 Hekman, however, argues that Wittgenstein's concept of the Background 
involves a complicated notion of its change (Hekman, 1999: 129-130). 1 will 
come back to this point later in the chapter. 
41 do not wish to deny the tremendous dedication and contribution to 
women's causes that have been made and are made daily by non-academic 
women activists. I think they are also critics on the margins of the form of 
life. I only wish to point out that feminist academics have some privileges 
that accrue to their professional status. 
5 This is partly the approach taken by Nussbaum in her discussion of 
objectification (Nussbaum, 1995b; 2000), which is thus compatible with an 
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immanent criticism, although her ethical arguments are fundamentally 
universalist. 
6 In the original context, Lovibond raises the issue with respect to 
MacIntyre's claim in After Virtue that the community's "mythology" is a 
good source of moral guidance. She argues that it is not so assuring in terms 
of sexual politics. 
7 For examples of such traditional norms, see, e. g., Nussbaum and Glover 
(1995) and Nussbaum (2000). 
8 Again, it should be perhaps mentioned that, in the original context, 
Lovibond's central contention is against those postmodernist theorists whom 
she regards as failing to offer a means of condemning the unjust social 
arrangements, including the fixed pattern of sex roles. Of the social norms 
and institutions which she is critiquing, she seems to have in mind 
particularly the society's "functionalist" assumption that women's role is "to 
reproduce and nurture the species" (ibid.: 22). 
9 See Cheshire Calhoun (1990). Calhoun argues that, although individuals 
cannot be held "morally blameworthy" for unconsciously following some 
(oppressive) norms and habits, they may still be held "responsible" for not 
undoing or unlearning such practices. 
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Conclusion 
Feminists who opposed pornography contended that it is a practice of 
"sex discrimination", a "violation of women's civil rights", and an 
institution of subordination of women. Although feminist activists 
who raised objections to pornography were often publicly maligned 
by their opponents (witness, for instance, pornographers' vilifications 
of Andrea Dworkin (Bindel, 2005)), in this thesis, I have tried to show 
that the main thrusts of these feminist arguments are defensible; there 
are in fact ways in which pornography contributes to women's lesser 
standing in society and limited freedom. I have, however, attempted to 
illuminate these problems by exploring the issues which have not been 
fully examined by these feminists; crucially, I offered an account of 
the meaning of pornography, informed by a Wittgensteinian view of 
social practices. 
I first attended to Langton's (later also Hornsby's) analysis of 
pornographic speech made from a perspective of speech act theory. 
Hornsby and Langton attempted to show that the feminist claim that 
pornography subordinates and silences women is philosophically 
coherent and defensible. Langton argued that pornography may be 
said to constitute subordinating speech, because its illocutionary acts 
subordinate women. Hornsby and Langton further claimed that 
pornography possibly contributes to a social climate, whereby the 
linguistic condition of "reciprocity" between men and women is 
undermined; that is, pornography's social influence is such that it 
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prevents men's "uptake" of women's illocutionary acts, depriving 
women of the ability to perform these acts, especially in a sexual 
context. 
I elaborated speech act analysis, and defended Hornsby and Langton's 
position against some critics. I particularly defended the point that our 
illocution requires. the audience's "uptake" to succeed. The attention 
to relational and communicative nature of our speech acts would offer 
an understanding of why some speech could "fail" even though the 
utterance act itself is not physically prevented. 
Although Langton and Hornsby's speech act argument is illuminating, 
their analyses seem to leave further questions. I addressed these 
questions and supplemented speech act analysis by drawing on ideas 
from the philosophy of the "Background". The concept of the 
"Background" (or "a form of life") in this thesis was meant to capture 
the sense that our speech and actions are always part of a shared social 
life; they are enmeshed with, or related with, other speech and 
activities in the community; individual speech and actions are given 
their meaning and significance by this Background. 
Drawing on this idea of the Background, I attempted to explain the 
social meaning of pornography. I argued that pornography is also 
integrated with the shared community life and reflects some cultural 
norms and values presupposed by members of the community. Our 
pornographic language-game derives meaning from, and is enabled by, 
these Background norms and values. Borrowing the notion of "social 
character" from Alasdair MacIntyre, I further argued that the 
pornographer in the contemporary liberal culture may be said to be 
such a "social character; " the pornographer embodies and exemplifies 
shared values and norms related to sex and gender. It, is in this 
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pornographer's unique capacity to embody certain norms of society 
that I argued that he may be said to have "authoritative" status. 
It was explained that the linguistic approach to the issue of 
pornography was a relatively recent innovation, and it was an 
approach which distinguished itself from a standard empirical and 
causal harm argument against pornography. But the investigation into 
the meaning of pornography carried out in this thesis points also to an 
intricate causal connection between cultural norms and women's 
status (cf. Cameron and Frazer, 1992; MacKinnon, 1987: 156-157). 
Cultural norms often reinforce existing roles and functions for women 
and also offer ready-made ideas of femininity (stereotypes, if you 
will), which people can daily interact with. The collective 
consequence of people's acceptance and following of these norms can 
lead to social and political disadvantages for some individual women. 
Cultural norms, such as pornography, in short, are playing an 
important part in creating a social condition which is conducive to 
women's social and sexual subordination. This does not mean to 
suggest a straightforward causal relation between cultural norms and 
the status of women in society. This rather suggests a complex way in 
which the idea of female identity, or subjectivity, is constructed and 
sustained through everyday social norms and the way in which this 
could come to affect individual women's lives in different ways. 
Although the Wittgensteinian view of the form of life has a prima 
facie conservative character, I argued that the immanent form of social 
criticism is still available and the present form of life and the 
pornographic language-game may be transformed. There are divisions 
and diversities within the form of life, and these are the resources that 
could be employed to assess and criticize the existing social norms. 
Some of the received values of the liberal society, such as the idea of 
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sexual equality and respect for the dignity of human beings, could be 
appealed to for this purpose. 
Ilie suggestion that cultural norms affect women's status also means 
that cultural practices cannot be simply exonerated as "private" 
matters located outside the scope of our political concern. Although 
the thesis has not offered much in the way of providing a blueprint for 
actions to change the present form of life, it has indicated the 
importance of individuals' consciously and critically engaging with 
accepted habits of thought and practice. Some individuals, such as 
feminist academics and activists, may need to take the initiative in 
order to unsettle some of our Background assumptions and norms and 
call for a change in the form of life. 
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